Fault Tolerant Cryptographic Primitives for Space Applications by Juliato, Marcio
Fault Tolerant Cryptographic




presented to the University of Waterloo
in fulfillment of the
thesis requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2011
c© Marcio Juliato 2011
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis,
including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.
I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
ii
Abstract
Spacecrafts are extensively used by public and private sectors to support a variety of
services. Considering the cost and the strategic importance of these spacecrafts, there has
been an increasing demand to utilize strong cryptographic primitives to assure their secu-
rity. Moreover, it is of utmost importance to consider fault tolerance in their designs due
to the harsh environment found in space, while keeping low area and power consumption.
The problem of recovering spacecrafts from failures or attacks, and bringing them back to
an operational and safe state is crucial for reliability. Despite the recent interest in incor-
porating on-board security, there is limited research in this area. This research proposes
a trusted hardware module approach for recovering the spacecrafts subsystems and their
cryptographic capabilities after an attack or a major failure has happened. The proposed
fault tolerant trusted modules are capable of performing platform restoration as well as
recovering the cryptographic capabilities of the spacecraft. This research also proposes ef-
ficient fault tolerant architectures for the secure hash (SHA-2) and message authentication
code (HMAC) algorithms. The proposed architectures are the first in the literature to
detect and correct errors by using Hamming codes to protect the main registers. Further-
more, a quantitative analysis of the probability of failure of the proposed fault tolerance
mechanisms is introduced. Based upon an extensive set of experimental results along with
probability of failure analysis, it was possible to show that the proposed fault tolerant
scheme based on information redundancy leads to a better implementation and provides
better SEU resistance than the traditional Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR). The fault
tolerant cryptographic primitives introduced in this research are of crucial importance for
the implementation of on-board security in spacecrafts.
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Epigraph
I do not know what I may appear to the world,
but to myself I seem to have been only like a boy playing on the sea-shore,
and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble
or a prettier shell than ordinary,





This chapter presents the motivation that led to the development of this research, and
lists the main contributions resulting from this thesis. It also provides the reader with a
summary of each chapter that comprises the remainder of this document.
1.1 Motivation
Spacecrafts are extensively used by public and private sectors to support a wide variety
of services. For instance, they provide communication services, support navigation and
meteorological services, allow for scientific experiments to be conducted, and are even
utilized to increase homeland security. Some countries also employ non-military satellites to
increase their military communication capabilities. For instance, during the Desert Shield
and Desert Storm operations the United States (U.S.) Department of Defense (DOD) used
commercial satellites to perform 45% of all communications between the U.S. and the
Persian Gulf [140]. With regard to the costs involved, the space sector is a multi-billion
business. According to a report from the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) [140],
the commercial satellite industry generated $85 billion in revenue in 2000. The Galileo
program [54] from the European Space Agency (ESA) [53] had an initial cost of 3.4 billion
Euros [52], with a recent request of additional 1.9 billion Euros [125] to complete the
program. Galileo is estimated to have an annual market for services and equipment of 200
billion Euros by 2013 [52].
Considering the numbers presented above, the disruption of satellite services, whether
intentional or not, can have a major economic impact. For example, in 1998 a failure
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of the Galaxy IV satellite disrupted about 80 to 90 percent of 45 million pagers across
the U.S. for 2 to 4 days [140]. This failure also blocked the authorization of credit card
transactions at points of sale such as gasoline pumps. With the growing worldwide demand
for satellite-based services, the dependence on these spacecrafts tends to increase and so
do the financial losses in case of failure. As a result, spacecrafts must perform with high
reliability and availability.
The construction, launch and operation of spacecrafts are usually carried out by space
agencies and contractors. Details of such activities are traditionally not made available
to the general public, leading to the false impression that third parties cannot tamper
with or compromise spacecrafts after launch. However, as mentioned in [24], advances in
technology allow for more complex attacks to be easily launched against space systems. As
a result, it is definitely not a good strategy to rely on obscurity and uniqueness to assure
the security of spacecrafts. Anti-jamming techniques are used to avoid interference with
communications. However, strong security becomes mandatory if the spacecraft is to be
protected against attackers. For example, if security is not addressed properly, an attacker
could possibly perform replay attacks, intercept proprietary data, send invalid commands,
or masquerade as a legitimate user.
Due to the current lack of appropriate countermeasures to protect spacecrafts, the
probability of success may be high if some individual, group, or organization put effort in
compromising space systems. Not only satellites orbiting Earth are at risk, but also deep
space spacecrafts and probes. For instance, several TV transmissions based on satellites
have already been attacked and hijacked [103]. Some of them were used to transmit
adult content to inappropriate audiences, while others transmitted propaganda and protest
material [138, 124, 49, 142, 153, 113, 141]. Although these incidents were related to the
tampering of the satellites’ data link, the incident can become even more serious if the
Tracking, Telemetry and Control (TT&C) link is targeted. If the TT&C link is attacked,
the spacecraft may be put out of its orbital path, dropped down to Earth, or compromised
in such a way that it can become nothing else than space junk. For instance, reports
indicate that attackers took control of a British satellite and demanded money to give the
control back to the operators [56, 72, 126].
Since countries rely heavily on commercial satellites for communication, threats to those
spacecrafts have the potential of putting a nation’s critical infrastructures at risk [140,
145, 14]. For instance, at the time the United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defense (MoD)
satellite was attacked, Margaret Beckett, leader of UK House of Commons, warned about
the big impact that electronic attacks can have in Britain’s communications infrastructures.
She complemented: “Hijacking a satellite is one of the first activities in an infowar attack”.
Therefore, as pointed out by the U.S. GAO [140], it is evident that security of spacecrafts
2
should be more fully addressed.
The implementation of strong security mechanisms in spacecrafts is not straightfor-
ward [23]. One of the difficulties encountered is the protection of security mechanisms
from the harsh environment found in space. Radiation originating from both the Sun and
deep space is the best documented cause of a class of errors known as Single Event Upsets
(SEUs) [107]. SEUs are forms of soft errors, i.e., they are errors that occur in the circuitry
of a system causing bit-flips, but are not damaging to the hardware. According to a study
of on-orbit spacecraft failures [168], 45% of failures happen due to electrical reasons. Of
all subsystems failures, 27% happen in the telemetry, tracking and control (TT&C) as well
as in the command and data handling subsystems (CDH), mainly due failures in control
processor 26%, in electric circuitry 17%, and computer resets 7%. Considering these two
subsystems, the TT&C alone is responsible for more than 70% of the failures.
Although SEUs are of great concern in aerospace applications, some applications can
comfortably tolerate bit-flips. On the one hand, a photo taken by an Earth observation
satellite may not get corrupted if a bit-flip happens in a storage element holding one of
its pixels. On the other hand, cryptographic computations are very sensitive with respect
to SEUs, so that a bit-flip in cryptographic data is enough to cause the cryptographic
computation to fail. For example, a bit-flip in early rounds of AES can cause 50% of the
bits of the result to be erroneous [17]. As reported in [168], about 35% of the failures that
happen on TT&C and CDH leads to the loss of the mission whereas 60% of them leads
to the mission degradation. Therefore, the fault tolerant implementation of cryptographic
primitives in the aforementioned spacecraft subsystems is crucial to ensure that mission
reliability is not decreased by the utilization of security mechanisms.
Once launched, spacecrafts follow their orbital or deep space paths. The duration
of their operational lifetimes, in turn, may vary from a couple of months to decades.
Therefore, they must be capable of operating for long periods of time without physical
maintenance. An exception to this case is the Hubble Space Telescope [120], which was
serviced four times since it began its operation in 1990. In all those occasions, the Space
Shuttle [123] was used. Since the average cost to launch the Space Shuttle is $450 mil-
lion [123], post-launch maintenance is performed only in rare exceptions (not to mention
the retirement of the Space Shuttle program in 2011). Post launch maintenance is not the
case for the whole majority of spacecrafts. As a consequence, it is crucial to design fault
tolerant systems, so that the effects of radiation on circuits do not cause critical failures.
Such failures could disrupt the normal operation of the spacecraft or even cause its loss.
Furthermore, the fact of employing rockets to launch spacecrafts into space imposes
very stringent restrictions on the hardware size and weight. Also, given that spacecrafts
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are usually powered by solar panels and re-chargeable batteries, there are heavy restrictions
on power consumption of their electrical subsystems. Additionally, heat transfer in space
is solely carried out by conduction and radiation. The lack of convection imposes severe
constraints on power dissipation of on-board circuitry. Finally, given the tight budget
which is very often imposed on space agencies, the cost of embedded components must
also be considered when building spacecrafts. As part of the computational subsystem
of spacecrafts, cryptographic primitives used in space applications must take all these
constraints into account while being designed and implemented.
1.2 Contributions
Given the range of threats against spacecrafts and the multiple constraints imposed by
space systems, this research has the main goal of proposing fault tolerant security mecha-
nisms for space applications. Specifically, main problems being addressed in this research
include:
1. How to recover a spacecraft from an attacker who has gained control over its com-
putational platform?
2. How to perform a secure restoration of the spacecraft’s cryptographic capabilities in
face of failures and attacks?
3. How to maximize security in the recovery mechanism and how to quantify it?
4. How to achieve efficiency in fault tolerance mechanisms for cryptographic primitives
tailored to space applications so that they can cope with radiation-induced faults
and demand minimum implementation requirements?
5. How to determine the resistance against of SEUs of fault tolerance mechanisms and
how to compare different schemes?
In face of the aforementioned questions, the first goal is to propose schemes to recover
the spacecraft and its cryptographic capabilities after major failures or attacks have oc-
curred. A major failure can result from SEUs, a power outage, and/or a temperature
variation. Since cryptographic data is quite sensitive to bit-flips, an SEU in cryptographic
computation will certainly lead to failures. Furthermore, even when space systems imple-
ment security mechanisms, attackers can potentially exploit security holes to break into
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the system. In that case, there should still exist some means to bring the spacecraft con-
trol back to the ground operators. More precisely, it is necessary to detect when attacks
or failures have happened, bring the spacecraft to a safe state, and re-establish a secured
communication channel with the control center.
The second goal relates to proposal and evaluation of fault tolerant schemes for integrity
and authentication schemes. More specifically, the main focus is on the Secure Hash
Algorithm (SHA-2) [133] and on the keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) [132]
based on SHA-2. Hash functions can be applied to space systems in many different ways.
It could be employed in invasion detection and recovery schemes [88] to determine, for
example, whether an attacker, who may have broken into the spacecraft, has tampered
with the system’s program memories or the configuration of Field Programmable Gate
Arrays (FPGAs). Integrity and authentication are also of utmost importance in secure
communications. For instance, they are used to certify that the data received from a control
center was not modified and came from a valid control center (not from an attacker). As
a result, it becomes possible to assure, for example, that maneuvering commands are from
a legitimate operator and that they were not accidentally or maliciously compromised.
Authentication mechanisms are fundamental when updating the spacecraft hardware and
software in case of attacks and failures. Moreover, the resistance against SEUS of each fault
tolerant technique proposed for SHA-2 and HMAC was evaluated through a probability
of failure analysis. Such an analysis allowed for the comparison of the proposed schemes
against well established for space systems such as Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR).
1.3 Thesis Overview
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 provides a short introduction to fault tolerance and space systems. It in-
cludes fundamental concepts, commonly used definitions, and an introduction to radiation
effects on electronic circuits. Also, technological, architectural and recovery techniques for
mitigating SEUs are presented. In addition, several aspects of space systems are described,
such as spacecraft subsystems, space missions types and security levels. Several threats
against space systems are reviewed followed by a number of known attacks that have been
reported during the last couple of decades. Moreover, a set of security requirements for
space systems is presented, most of them based on standards and recommendations of the
Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS).
Chapter 3 comprises the state-of-the-art in security for space systems. It includes some
traditional SEU mitigation techniques that have been used in space applications. Next,
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previous research on hardware implementation of cryptographic primitives is presented.
Although most of them do not consider fault tolerance, they provide ideas and optimization
techniques that can be adopted in conjunction with mitigation schemes. Some proposals of
fault tolerant security mechanisms that could be utilized in space systems are also presented
in this chapter.
Chapter 4 presents proposals for fault tolerant system recovery. Specifically, the pro-
posed approach rely on a trusted platform along with a challenge-response protocol to
recover spacecrafts in case of major failures and attacks followed by the re-establishment
of their cryptographic capabilities. The system recovery process relies on the computation
of integrity checks, which in turn employ fault tolerant hash functions.
Chapter 5 introduces hardware/software approaches tailored for SHA-2 and HMAC
algorithms. Several levels of partitioning are explored, which includes simple operations
implemented as custom instructions as well as entire SHA-2 and HMAC algorithms im-
plemented as peripherals. Through experimental results based upon a NIOS2 processor it
was possible to precisely determine the gains of performance in face of the increase in the
system implementation area.
Chapter 6 proposes efficient fault tolerance mechanisms targeting SHA-2 hash functions.
Several hardware design architectures are evaluated in hardware implementations based
on FPGAs. Furthermore, implementation aspects of each approach are discussed, such as
implementation area, memory requirements, power consumption, frequency of operation,
and throughput. As a result, it was possible to show that the proposed scheme based
on information redundancy provides fault tolerance with considerable savings in terms of
implementation area, memory requirements and power consumption.
Chapter 7 explores the fault tolerant technique based on information redundancy to
HMAC. Again, several hardware designs were proposed and analyzed using FPGAs. Ex-
perimental results have shown that the proposed technique provides even better implemen-
tation results for HMAC, which has a more complex architecture compared to SHA-2.
Chapter 8 introduces a probabilistic analysis in order to determine the robustness of
each fault tolerance mechanisms in the presence of SEUs. A systematic analysis of the
resistance against of SEUs is a crucial complementary step towards a more comprehensive
evaluation the fault tolerant cryptographic modules. Through the determination of the
probability of failure of each module, it was possible to directly compare the different fault
tolerance approaches considered in this research, including the widely used TMR.
Chapter 9 discusses the contributions of this research and compares them with related




This chapter comprises three main sections. The first one aims at providing background
information on fault tolerance, which includes fundamental concepts and definitions, radia-
tion effects on electronic circuits, as well as SEU mitigation techniques. The second section
provides an overview on space systems, which comprises spacecraft subsystems, types of
space missions and associated threats, security requirements, and hardware platforms in
space. The last section introduces the SHA-2 and HMAC algorithms which are further
utilized in the following chapters.
2.1 Fault Tolerance
Nowadays, computer systems are employed in a wide variety of tasks, varying from text
editors and web browsers to embedded control of devices, machines and spacecrafts. On
the one hand, when a text editor crashes, it may not cause much more than frustration
and limited loss of data. On the other hand, a failure in a medical, military or aerospace
system can pose threats to human life and national security, as well as cause environmental
disasters and severe losses. Consequently, these critical tasks demand the employment of
fault tolerant computer systems.
2.1.1 Fundamental Concepts
There are three fundamental concepts in the fault tolerant field: fault, error and failure. A
fault refers to the occurrence of events in hardware and software, such as the alteration of
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a physical property, a manufacturing imperfection, or a programming bug. Errors can be
defined as consequences of faults, which cause the deviation of a given information from
its correct value. A failure is a consequence of an error and is manifested as a corrupted
execution of a given task [87].
Alternatively, faults, errors and failures can be explained by considering three universes,
namely physical, informational and external [87]. The physical universe is constituted of
physical entities, such as semiconductor devices. A fault is then defined as the physical
alteration or defect of a component in the physical universe. On top of that comes the
informational universe, which comprise pieces of information, such as a byte (or any other
data unit). When a piece of information gets corrupted, it is said that an error has
occurred. Finally, there is the external universe, where the consequences of errors show
up. The incorrect result or processing, caused by errors, is called a failure.
To illustrate the differences between those three concepts, consider a high energy par-
ticle hitting a silicon chip. This collision could upset the charge balance on silicon causing
a transistor to switch off. This alteration of physical properties can be denoted as a fault.
If the affected transistor is used to implement a register, some stored information can
be altered. The consequence is going to be an error in the data stored in the register.
Next, by using this corrupted register, a cryptographic algorithm will certainly perform,
for example, an erroneous signature check therefore causing a failure.
2.1.1.1 Design Goals
Systems are designed with multiple goals in mind, where functionality and performance are
the more common ones. However, some other requirements are very often found in space
applications, such as reliability, availability, and safety. The inclusion of fault tolerance
into the system can help designers to meet the aforementioned requirements.
Reliability is defined as the probability that a system will perform its designed tasks for
a certain period of time, say [t0, t], assuming that it was perfectly functional at t0. During
[t0, t] no incorrect performance or maintenance is acceptable. In space applications, t can
be in the order of decades. Fault tolerance can improve system reliability by keeping it
functional when hardware and software failures occur. This can be achieved, for example,
through the use of redundant units, so that the system can operate even when one or more
units are not functional.
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Availability is the probability that a system is operational at the instant of time t. That
is to say that the system has a very narrow time frame to recover from failures. Hence,
it is possible to have frequent, but short, periods of inoperability and still achieve high
availability. The use of spare units, for example, favors high availability, if tasks can be
transfered from one unit to the other in a short time frame.
Safety refers to the capability of the system to fail in a safe manner. It is defined as the
probability that the subsystem will function correctly or will stop working in such a way
that it does not disturb the rest of the system. Detecting subsystem failures and disrupting
its abnormal functioning is fundamental for achieving safety.
2.1.2 Radiation Effects
Radiation effects on electronic chips can vary from temporary malfunction to permanent
damage [121]. They can suffer from Total Ionizing Dose (TID) Effects as a result of a
long exposure to radiation. Also, they can be caused by a single energetic particle and
then are denoted as SEEs. TID effects are consequences of accumulating ionizing damage,
which causes devices to suffer with, for example, threshold shifts, increased current leakage
and altered functional timing. They are mainly caused by protons and neutrons, usually
found in Solar Wind, in the Van Allen Belt, and in Cosmic Rays [121]. TID effects can
be reduced through device shielding, but since that involves the device manufacturing, it
is out of the scope of this research. SEEs are caused by high-energy subatomic particles
and electromagnetic waves, which can come from many different sources. High-energy
subatomic particles, such as electrons, protons, neutrons, alpha particles (Helium nuclei),
heavy ions (heavier than Helium), commonly found in Solar Wind, in the Van Allen Belt,
and in Cosmic Rays. Electromagnetic waves, such as X-rays and gamma rays can be
found in cosmic rays and in radioactive decay. The interaction of cosmic rays with Oxygen
and Nitrogen present in the Earth’s atmosphere also generate neutrons as well as other
secondary particles such as pions and muons.
SEEs can happen at the ground level, aircraft altitudes, and in space [102]. At the
ground level, they are mainly caused primarily by neutrons and secondarily by protons. At
the sea level, for example, an average flux of 20 neutrons/cm2/hour can be found. However,
not only radiation coming from space interferes with applications at the ground level. The
packaging material of chips may contain radioactive impurities, whose radioactive decay
emits particles with the potential of causing SEEs. Airborne applications face higher
levels of neutrons flux, more specifically, 7,200 neutrons/cm2/hour. Therefore, they are
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more prone to suffer SEEs than applications on the ground. Nevertheless, ground level
and airborne applications are naturally protected by the Earth’s atmosphere. Radiation
coming from space, such as gama rays, X-rays, protons, alpha particles and heavy ions, are
mainly absorbed by the Earth’s atmosphere. That implies that spaceborne applications
suffer more severely from its direct exposure to radiation coming from space. Although
the Earth’s magnetosphere deflects most of the Solar Wind, some radiation are still able
to reach Earth’s atmosphere and surface in polar regions. Besides, the magnetosphere
traps protons, electrons, and other nuclei such as alpha particles. This region of trapped
particles is called Van Allen Belt. As a consequence, spacecrafts operating past the Earth’s
magnetosphere must deal with higher levels of radiation, either trapped in the Van Allen
belt or coming from space.
When subatomic particles and electromagnetic waves carry enough energy, they can
displace electrons, atoms and molecules. This process is referred to as ionization. As
pictured in Figure 2.1, an ionizing radiation transversing a silicon chip creates a track
of electron hole pairs. The consequence is a charge accumulation, which might become
a transient current pulse (often called a glitch). This phenomenon is denoted as Single
Transient Effect (SET).
Figure 2.1: Ionization of a Silicon Surface
Advances in technology have made it possible to build transistors with reduced dimen-
sions, thinner gate oxides, and lower operation voltages. As a consequence, information
can be represented or stored using electric signals with reduced intensity. As a result,
particles that once used to be innocuous, can now have higher potentials to cause upsets.
In other words, as transistor sizes scales down, they become more sensitive to SEEs.
Several types of SEEs can happen within digital circuits [5]. If a transistor has a
parasitic PNPN structure, radiation effects can cause the parasitic transistor to turn on
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the primary one indefinitely. More specifically, this transistor pair acts like a thyristor.
This phenomenon is called Single Event Latchup (SEL). The only way to turn off the
induced thyristor is to power cycle the device. Another phenomenon happens when a
transistor is turned on by radiation and its drain-source voltage is higher than the device’s
breakdown limit. The consequences are excessive drain-voltage currents and overheating,
therefore causing the transistor burn out. This event is denoted as Single Event Burnout
(SEB). Yet another effect caused by radiation is called Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR).
It happens when ionizing radiation hits the transistor at the same time a high voltage is
applied its gate. The result is the rupture of the gate’s dioxide insulation, followed by
overheating and destruction of the gate region. Likewise SEBs, SEGRs causes permanent
damage to the transistor. Nevertheless, the more common consequences of SETs are SEUs.
2.1.2.1 Single Event Upsets
An SEU can be defined as a change of state in storage elements as a consequence of ionizing
radiation. Since digital computers manipulate information in its binary representation, a
change of state is basically a bit-flip in registers or memory elements. SEUs are considered
soft errors in the sense that they do not cause permanent damage to the circuit. Actually,
the effects of SEUs over registers and memory can be reversed by rewriting the correct
information to the storage element. Given that an SEU is a more common consequence of
an SET, the former is of main interest in this research. In order to adopt countermeasures
to mitigate SEUs in digital circuits, it is necessary to understand how SEUs are generated.
SETs can happen in combinational and sequential logic of digital circuits.
A typical digital circuit configuration very often found in sequential circuits is illustrated
in Figure 2.2. It consists of a register feeding a combinational logic, which in turn writes
its results back to a register. If an SET happens in a register, as depicted in Figure 2.2
(a), it can cause its transistors to change state therefore flipping the stored bit. In this
case, it is said that an SEU happened directly in the register. As a consequence, the
combinational logic will receive an incorrect input value coming from the registers. SETs
can also occur in a transistor of the combinational part of the circuit, as shown in Figure 2.2
(b). The inversion of a transistor state will cause a flipped signal to propagate through
the combinational logic. Eventually, this corrupted output reaches the input of a register.
Next, if setup and hold times of the register are met, the input will be sampled at the
rising (or falling) edge of the clock. The result is an incorrect computation being stored
within a register, i.e. an indirect register SEU occurring through the combinational logic.
Similarly, SETs can cause SEUs in SRAM memory cells. Figure 2.3 (a) shows a sim-
plified SRAM memory cell, consisting of four transistors, T1, T2, T3, and T4, as preseted
11
(a) (b)
Figure 2.2: SET in Sequential and Combinational Logic
in [102]. Depending on the states of the transistors, the cell can store a ’0’ or a ’1’. As-
suming that the transistors are in such a configuration that the cell holds the value ’1’ as
the information bit. Also, let a SET happen in the gate of transistor T4, as illustrated in
Figure 2.3 (a), causing it to turn on. Consequently, the upper-left and bottom-left tran-
sistors will be, respectively, turned on and off. Also, the up-right transistor will be turned
off. The result is an inversion on the value of the stored bit, which became ’0’, as shown
in Figure 2.3 (b). In sum, an SEU happened in the SRAM cell.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.3: SET in an SRAM Memory Cell
Although SEUs in a single bit has been discussed so far, multiple bits can also be affected
by a single high-energy particle. Depending on the angle of incidence of the particle, it
may travel through several transistors therefore causing the so called Multiple Bit Upset
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(MBU). Due to the two-dimension disposition of transistors on a chip die, MBUs are less
likely to happen than SEUs. However, due to transistor scaling, a single particle can affect
neighboring transistors, thus causing MBUs to occur more often. Moreover, depending on
a combinational logic fan-out, a single SET can provoke multiple transient pulses at the
outputs. Again, if these SETs meet setup and hold times, they can upset multiple registers
therefore causing MBUs.
SEUs can also interfere with controlling portions of a digital circuit, for example, its
state machine. As a consequence, the circuit can enter invalid states and even come to a
complete halt therefore requiring a power cycle to come back to normal operation. This
functional disruption due to SEUs are denoted Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI).
2.1.3 SEUs in ASICs and FPGAs
ASICs are customized integrated circuits designed to perform a dedicated function. They
can be designed using three main techniques: Standard Cells, Gate Arrays, and Full Cus-
tom. Standard Cell employs third party tools and utilizes a library of pre-fabricated
building blocks (the so called standard cells) to design the integrated circuit. Once the
physical placement of all standard cells is done, the designer must perform the circuit
routing therefore electrically connecting all the standard cells. At the end, lithographic
layers are produced, which are then used to fabricate the chip die. In contrast, Gate Array
design does not employ individual cells. Instead of that, several pre-designed lithographic
layers are employed, each of them consisting of transistors, gates and other devices. In this
technique, all the appropriate elements must be connected together to obtain the desired
circuit functionality. Alternatively, the Full Custom approach requires all elements of the
entire lithographic layers to be designed. In other words, all the transistors of the chip are
individually conceived and electrically connected.
Regardless of the technique used, chip dies are produced following the specifications of
lithographic layers. After that, the chip’s functionality is fixed and no further modification
is possible without a chip re-spin. Although ASICs’ combinational logic can suffer from
SEUs, the implemented circuitry cannot be altered by such upsets. Consequently, ASICs
provide high immunity against SEUs regarding its circuit functionality. However, radiation
effects on the transistors of an ASIC can still cause SEUs in registers and memory elements,
as previously described.
FPGAs are devices based on an architecture that can be configured in many differ-
ent ways, following the designer’s specifications. A traditional (simplified) FPGA internal
architecture, as illustrated in Figure 2.4, is constituted by Logic Blocks, Input/Output
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(I/O) Blocks and Block Random Access Memories (Block RAMs) which are electrically
connected by Routing Matrices and Interconnection Buses. More precisely, the term pro-
gramming refers to the process of configuring and interconnecting the FPGA’s internal
elements. This is achieved by 1) configuring the Logic Blocks and Block RAMs with the
appropriate binary values; 2) configuring the Routing Matrices to turn on and off the
appropriate connections; and 3) configuring I/O Blocks to function as input, output, or
tri-state pins.
Figure 2.4: Traditional FPGA Architecture
Logic Blocks are configurable elements which implement combinational logic by using
Look-Up Tables (LUTs). Specifically, a traditional Logic Block is composed of a LUT, an
adder (or carry logic), a multiplexer and a register, as shown in Figure 2.5. I/O Blocks per-
form the signal interfacing between the FPGA’s internal elements and its external circuitry.
Block RAMs are on-chip memory based on Static RAM (SRAM) cells. Interconnection
buses are sets of wires responsible for electrically connecting the Logic Blocks, Block RAMs
and I/O Blocks. Actually, the fine-grained connection between those elements and the In-
terconnection Bus is performed by a set of multiplexers, namely Matrix Switches. By using
this architecture, for instance, it is possible for the FPGA to receive input signals, route
it to the Logic Block, perform a computation, and output the results. Obviously this is a
trivial example in face of the very complex designs currently supported by FPGAs.
FPGAs are produced by several manufacturers, such as Altera [41], Xilinx [84], Ac-
tel [36], QuickLogic [48], Atmel [44], and Lattice [47]. Most of them implement an archi-
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Figure 2.5: Traditional Logic Block Architecture
tecture similar to the one aforementioned.
FPGAs are available in different technologies: SRAM, Flash and Anti-fuse. One-time
configurable devices named structured ASICs are also currently available. The type of
FPGA is defined by the technology used to implement its configuration memory, which
also determines whether the device can be reconfigured. Independently of implementation
technology, most devices include Block RAMs traditionally constructed from SRAM cells.
Moreover, all devices implement registers within their Logic Blocks.
Advantages and disadvantages exist for each of those devices. Some may provide high
resistance against radiation and no reconfigurability. Others may provide high density and
reconfigurability, but no protection against radiation. For the whole majority of devices,
both SRAMs cells and registers are sensitive to SEUs and must be protected through the
use of mitigation techniques. According to the FPGA features, a given type of device
becomes more suitable to specific subsystems of the spacecraft.
SRAM-based FPGAs can provide reconfigurability, high density and high perfor-
mance. These features make these FPGAs attractive for space applications. Current
devices support the implementation of very complex systems while keeping satisfactory
performance. However, SRAM FPGAs consumes a considerable amount of power when
compared to ASICs. Besides, their configuration elements are based on SRAM memory
and can be affected by SEUs [71]. If an SEU occurs in a bit of a LUT, it can modify
the implemented combinational logic. Also, an SEU in a memory cell of a Matrix Switch
can connect (or disconnect) a wire, therefore compromising the correct signal routing. In
addition, an SEU in an I/O Block can turn an output pin into an input pin and vice-versa.
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In sum, an SEU in a configuration element can easily disrupt the functioning of an entire
design implemented in the device. Due to the vulnerability of their configuration elements
to SEUs, fault tolerant techniques must be carefully chosen to guarantee the functional-
ity of the design implemented within the device. Also, SRAM-based FPGAs tend to be
used in applications where some failures might be tolerated. Good examples are payload
systems which are usually complex in terms of functionality, but not crucial to the normal
operation of the spacecraft. Applications requiring high reliability such as control of the
spacecraft may be implemented using ASICs, flash and anti-fuse FPGAs.
Flash-based FPGAs employs non-volatile memory cells based on flash memory tech-
nology to store the device configuration. Since flash memory can be electrically erased and
reconfigured, the device can be reprogrammed. Additionally, radiation cannot easily mod-
ify the state of flash cells, which makes the device configuration resistant to SEUs. These
FPGAs can provide both low power consumption than SRAM-based FPGAs, although still
higher than anti-fuse devices. However, the frequency of operation of the latter is usually
lower than the former. Flash-based FPGAs do not currently provide such high density as
their SRAM counterparts do [62]. However, an advantage is that the configuration ele-
ments of flash-based FPGAs offer very high immunity to SEUs [32, 64]. As a result these
devices can be used to implement important subsystems, which require both reliably and
reconfigurability, as is the case of TT&C and attitude control.
Anti-fuse FPGAs use metal-to-metal connections to define their configuration. Given
that these connections are permanent, an anti-fuse FPGA is programmed only once and
cannot be reconfigured. Furthermore, metal-to-metal connections cannot be altered by
radiation. Thus, the configuration of anti-fuse FPGAs are immune to SEUs and more
reliable than reconfigurable FPGAs. Further, anti-fuse FPGAs consume very low power
compared to SRAM FPGAs. If no reconfigurability is needed, anti-fuse FPGAs is a very
good option to achieve high reliability and low NRE costs. This is normally the case of
TT&C and attitude control subsystems of spacecrafts.
Structured ASICs represent another promising technology for space application. Ex-
amples include HardCopy [37] and EasyPath [80] from Altera and Xilinx, respectively.
Structured ASICs combine both the high flexibility and low NRE costs of FPGA design
with ASICs features such as low power and high speed. The methodology consists of first
designing and verifying the project using FPGAs. Once all the design requirements are
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achieved, the project is migrated to structured ASIC device which becomes the final ver-
sion of the chip to be used by the target application. After that, its functionality cannot be
altered. Although the configuration of structured ASICs is immune to SEUs, registers and
memories must employ fault tolerance techniques to cope with bit-flips. Considering the
stringent requirements of space applications, structured ASICs have become an attractive
alternative to the traditional ASICs adopted in crucial spacecraft subsystems.
ASICs provide both higher performance and lower power consumption. A major draw-
back of ASICs is their high NRE costs. Furthermore, once the chip is manufactured, its
functionality cannot be modified. Any further modification or addition of features imply
in a costly chip re-spin, followed by testing and validation. The whole process may take
weeks to finish which can potentially impact the mission schedule. Since ASICs do not
utilize reconfigured elements such as SRAM-based FPGAs, the former provides a higher
immunity against SEUs than the latter in terms of circuit functionality. However, ASICs
memories and registers are still vulnerable to bit-blips caused by SEUs. ASICs have tradi-
tionally been used for crucial spacecraft subsystems requiring high levels of reliability such
as TT&C and attitude control.
In order to increase reliability, space systems computational platform employ hard-
ware devices that utilizes technological techniques such as radiation hardening. Examples
of radiation hardened FPGAs commonly found in space are the flash-based Actel RT
ProASIC3 [33] and its anti-fuse counterparts RTAX [34] and RTSX [35]. Besides, Xilinx
provides SRAM-based radiation-hardened FPGAs such as the Virtex-4QV [83] and the
recently released Virtex-5QV [82].
It is important to notice that, although the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Electronic
Parts Engineering Office [139] has performed radiation testing and qualification of some
devices produced by some manufacturers, it does not mean that devices produced by other
manufacturers cannot operate in space. For instance, Altera CycloneII [38] FPGAs utilized
in this research have not been broadly utilized in space applications. However, according to
Altera [42], they meet the requirements of military and aerospace customers. This FPGA
relies upon an automated mechanism to perform CRC checks over its own configuration
and demand the chip re-configuration if some error is found.
In summary, depending on the device used its functionality may or may not be immune
to SEUs. In spite of that, whatever the device used, fault tolerant techniques must always
be present to ensure protection of registers and memory elements against SEUs. Thus, if




Fault tolerance is an attribute of a system capable of performing its functions correctly in
the presence of faults within its constituting components [87]. In order to achieve fault
tolerance, fault mitigation techniques must be considered. They can be classified into
Technological techniques, Architectural techniques, and Recovery techniques.
Technological techniques consist of adopting different fabrication methodologies to
achieve higher protection against SEUs. Fabrication processes, such as Epitaxial CMOS,
Silicon on Sapphire and Silicon on Insulator [102], can help minimizing SELs and TID
effects. Even though, they are expensive processes to be adopted in the fabrication of chips
with low production volumes. Besides, those processes are unable to completely eliminate
the occurrence of SETs and SEUs. An example of FPGA using Epitaxial CMOS is the
Aeroflex’s RadTol Eclipse [77]. Xilinx and Actel also provide radiation hardened/tolerant
FPGAs such as the Virtex [83, 82], RTAX [34] and ProASIC [33]. Technological techniques
are out of the scope of this project given that they are applied during the chip fabrication.
This research considers the utilization of architectural and recovery techniques, as presented
next.
Architectural Techniques do not impose any changes to the device fabrication pro-
cess since they rely on design strategies to achieve fault tolerance. They are usually based
on some sort of redundancy, such as Hardware redundancy, Time redundancy and Infor-
mation redundancy, as further detailed in Sections 2.1.4.1, 2.1.4.2 and 2.1.4.3. Software
redundancy is another technique used, but it is out of scope of this research. Further,
architectural techniques can be applied to different levels of the design. Depending on how
the redundancy is implemented, only error detection is possible. However, according to
the level of redundancy employed, it is possible to detect and correct one or more errors.
Recovery Techniques have the major goal of either keeping or bringing the system back
the normal regime of operation. It can be preventive or corrective. Preventive strategies
avoid the accumulation of upsets, whereas corrective ones tends to fix uncorrectable effects
of upsets. Further details on recovery techniques are shown in Sections 2.1.4.4 and 2.1.4.5.
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2.1.4.1 Hardware Redundancy
Hardware Redundancy consists of the replication of hardware modules along with a voter.
Actually, the voter has an important role in this technique, since it is responsible for
comparing different results and detect whether an error has happened. According to the
number of modules employed, errors can be masked out by the voter so that the right
computation is output. Depending upon the implementation particularity, designers may
decide to replicate only small structures such as gates and registers, or entire functional
units.
A widely used scheme to perform error detection is DMR, which is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.6. In this case, two hardware modules send their computational results to a compara-
tor. If the partial results match, the comparator knows that the computation has been
performed correctly. Hence it asserts the DMR output. However, if the partial results
diverge, the comparator is not able to tell which computation is erroneous. As a result, it
is only able to tell that an error happened, but no result is output.
Figure 2.6: Dual Modular Redundancy
Another traditional scheme used for error detection and correction is TMR. As shown
in Figure 2.7, this approach employs three hardware modules and a voter. Differently than
DMR, the voter must assert the output by evaluating three results. The result is determined
by majority voting, i.e. the result repeated twice is elected as correct by the voter. Notice
that the voter does not check the validity of the repeating result. However, it is much
less likely to have two similar wrong results than two correct ones. As a consequence, it
is probable that the repeating result is the correct one. It is also possible to have three
different results. In that case, the voter only knows that errors have happened, but cannot
determine the output. TMR can be generalized to an N -modular redundancy scheme. If
N is odd and N ≥ 3, it is possible to employ majority voting to determine the output.
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Figure 2.7: Triple Modular Redundancy
2.1.4.2 Time Redundancy
Instead of utilizing extra hardware, it is possible to detect errors using time redundancy.
The basic idea is to employ the same hardware to repeat the computation two or more times
at different points in time, as illustrated in Figure 2.8. The result of each computation is
stored in registers. In the end, the results are analyzed by a voter to resolve discrepancies
and determine the output. If majority voting is not possible, the computation can be
repeated until a consensus is achieved. Although this approach permits the detection of
errors caused by SETs, it cannot be used to detect permanent hardware failures. That can
be accomplished, however, by encoding the operands before the computation and decoding
them afterwards [87]. Given that this research addresses only soft-errors, recomputation
with encoded operands is not further considered.
2.1.4.3 Information Redundancy
Information redundancy utilizes the strategy of adding extra information to the data in
order to achieve fault tolerance. That is usually achieved by the use of error detecting and
correcting codes. A code consists of a set of rules to represent data into a code word. A
code word is basically a set of symbols representing the data. For instance, a binary code
has its symbols formed by digits 0 and 1. Furthermore, a code word is said to be valid if
it obeys a set of rules defining the code. Otherwise, it is said to be invalid. The encoding
process takes the data in its original form and, by following the rules of a code, transforms
it into a code word. The decoding process, in turn, takes a code word and transform it
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Figure 2.8: Time Redundancy
back to the original data. It is possible to create binary codes which have the valid codes
as a subset of the total number of combinations of 0s and 1s. Then, if a valid code word is
modified by some means, an error for example, it becomes an invalid code word. Therefore,
the decoding process will detect the error given that the code word is not valid. Actually,
this is the concept behind error detecting codes. Furthermore, error correcting codes are
made possible through the use of extra information into the code word. As a consequence,
it is possible to determine the correct code word from the corrupted one.
A term used for both error detection and error correction codes is the Hamming dis-
tance. It refers to the number of bits in which two words differ. If the Hamming distance
of two code words is one, a single bit-flip transforms the first code word into the second
one. If the Hamming distance between the two code words were two, it would have been
necessary to have two bit-flips to transform one code word into the other. The minimum
distance between two valid code words is defined as the code distance. For instance, a
code distance of three would make it possible to correct one bit-flip (distance one from
the correct code word) and detect two bit-flips (distance two from two valid code words).
Generally speaking, up to c bit-flips can be corrected and up to d bit-flips can be detected
if and only if 2c+ d+ 1 ≤ H, where H is the Hamming distance of the code.
Parity code is one of the simplest forms of an error detecting code. It consists of adding
an additional bit of information in the data word, so that the code word contains either
an even or an odd number of 1s. In the case of having an even number of 1s, it is called
even parity. Otherwise, it is called odd parity. Assuming an even parity is used and
suppose that a code word suffer a bit-flip. Then, the final number of ones in the code
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word is going to be odd. Hence, a single error can be detected. Notice, however, that
parity code will take a double bit-flip as a valid code word. Parity code can be employed
in digital circuits in many different ways. One possibility is to encode registers so that
single bit-flips can be detected. Also, it is possible to use parity prediction to check the
result of computations against single bit-flips. In this scheme, as shown in Figure 2.9, the
operands are analyzed by a parity prediction module, which outputs the expected parity of
the computation. Then, if the parity of the result does not match the expected parity, an
error has happened. Further, if both parities match the computation was either performed
correctly or two bit-flips happened in the result.
Figure 2.9: Parity Prediction
Hamming code [75] is an example of an error detecting and correcting code based
on overlapping parity codes. Hamming code is a very interesting scheme for single bit
correction. The encoding and decoding processes are relative simple and inexpensive,
respectively, in terms of circuit complexity and computational time. Also, the code does
not require much redundancy to provide single error correction. For single error correction
over a d-bit data, a Hamming code utilizes c parity bits, which results in a code word of
size d+ c. Precisely, the relation between d and c is 2c ≥ c+ d+ 1.
The overlapping parity is organized in such a way that the c parity bits have one
combination for each erroneous data bit and for each erroneous parity bit, as well as
one combination for the error free case. To illustrate that, consider a 4-bit data word,
represented by (d3, d2, d1, d0). In order to be able to provide single bit correction, it becomes
necessary to use 3 parity bits (c1, c2, c3). The parity and data bits are then partitioned in
three groups: (d3, d1, d0, c1), (d3, d2, d0, c2), and (d3, d2, d1, c3). Each parity bit is responsible
to keep the parity of some of the data bits. The encoding process takes the original data,
and according to the bit groupings, computes the respective parity bits (c1, c2, c3). During
the decoding process, the parity bits will tell whether the data suffered a bit-flip. For




2 computed in the decoding process will not
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match with c1 and c2 in the code word. Table 2.1 lists all parity bits affected by single
bit-flips.
Table 2.1: Parity Bits Affected by Bit-Flips in a Hamming Code
Erroneous bit Parity bits affected Syndromes
d0 c1, c2 110
d1 c1, c3 101
d2 c2, c3 011




Since each erroneous bit causes a unique parity combination, this information is called
a syndrome and can be used to locate and correct erroneous bit. If the data and parity bits
are organized as in Figure 2.10, the syndrome will refer to the position of the erroneous
bit within the code word. After that, it is just a matter of flipping the erroneous bit back
to its correct value.
Figure 2.10: Hamming Code-Word Structure
In this research the following terminology for Hamming codes is used: (w,v), where v
is the number of data bits (d), and w is the number of data bits along with parity bits
(d+ c).
2.1.4.4 Scrubbing
Scrubbing is an example of preventive strategy to avoid the disruption of the FPGA oper-
ation due to accumulation of upsets. The strategy consists in reprogramming the FPGA,
from time to time, with a fresh configuration file. On the one hand, this will restore the
integrity of the configuration file if some upset has corrupted it. On the other hand, since
no integrity check is involved, the FPGA is reconfigured even when it holds an intact
configuration file.
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2.1.4.5 Configuration Check and Reconfiguration
In order to reduce unnecessary FPGA reconfiguration, some strategies try to first determin-
ing whether the FPGA needs to be reconfigured. This can be accomplished by Read-Back
operations as supported by Xilinx [21] FPGAs. A read-back operation consists of reading
the configuration file in operation within the FPGA, subsequently checking its integrity
against a default configuration file. The FPGA is reconfigured only if some discrepancy
appears. Moreover, the reconfiguration can be partial or total. If only part of the de-
sign is affected by upsets, partial reconfiguration can be performed without disrupting the
entire operation of the FPGA. In some other cases, depending on how compromised the
configuration file is, it may be necessary to perform a total FPGA reconfiguration.
Instead of utilizing read-back, some FPGAs produced by Altera and Atmel utilizes an
approach based on automated integrity checks [13, 39]. In order to keep the integrity of
the configuration of the FPGA, cyclic redundancy check (CRC) is commonly used. In this
scheme, the CRC value of the current configuration of the FPGA is continuously computed
and compared to an expected stored value. If they do not match, a signal is issued ordering
the reconfiguration of the FPGA.
2.2 Space Systems
The history of artificial satellites begun in October 4, 1957 when the (former) Soviet Union
launched Sputnik I [117]. It was a small satellite with 58cm of diameter, weighting 83.6Kg,
whose elliptical orbit was performed in 98 minutes. Sputnik I continuously transmitted
frequencies of 20.005 and 40.002MHz, so that it could be confirmed that it was successfully
launched and that it was in Earth’s orbit. The first communications satellite was the
SCORE (Signal Communications by Orbiting Relay Equipment) satellite [70, 69], launched
in December 18, 1958 by NASA. SCORE carried a message of the U.S. president Eisenhower
stored on two tape recorders, which was intended to be transmitted to the North-American
population. In its first pass over California, the primary tape recorder did not respond
properly. Then, on December 19, 1958, the second tape recorder finally responded to
the control center commands and broadcasted the president’s message. SCORE’s also
transmitted in real time and store-and-forward voice and teletype messages between ground
stations in the U.S. during 12 days.
Since late 50’s, satellites revolutionized the way communications are performed. Nowa-
days these spacecrafts are heavily employed in communications infrastructures, as well as
for many other applications. Currently, spacecrafts can be classified into five classes [115,
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24]: scientific research, meteorological, communications, navigation, and military. Space
systems comprise of two segments: space segment and the ground segment. The space
segment consists of the spacecraft itself and the means used for launching the spacecraft.
The ground segment, consists of the ground stations, communication networks, control
centers, and the infrastructure to manage and operate spacecrafts and associated mission
data. Usually, a command originates in a control center, travels through communications
networks until it reaches a ground station. The antennas pertaining to the ground station
beams up the command to the spacecraft. The inverse path is utilized when the spacecraft
is sending data to the control center.
The path on which a satellite revolves around Earth (or around any other celestial
body) is called orbit. Orbits shapes can be of two types: (nearly) circular and elliptical.
Further, according to their altitude, orbits can also be categorized as Low Earth Orbit
(LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), Geosynchronous Orbit (GSO), Geostationary Orbit
(GEO), and High Earth Orbit (HEO) [137]. Low Earth orbits may achieve up to 1700
Km of altitude. Medium Earth orbits vary between 1700 and 35700 Km. Geosynchronous
and Geostationary orbits refer to orbits of altitudes of 35700 Km. High Earth orbits are
considered orbits above 35700 Km. Deep space is another term very often used for distances
beyond the gravitational influence of Earth.
Spacecraft links can be classified according to the direction of the communication:
uplinks carry data from Earth to space, downlinks carry data from space to Earth, and
cross-links carry communication between spacecrafts. Regarding to the type of data of each
link, they can be divided in two groups: 1) Data links, and 2) Telemetry, Tracking and
Control links (TT&C). Data links carry communications between communications stations
and the spacecraft. The TT&C link is used by control stations to send commands and
receive telemetry and tracking data to/from the spacecraft.
2.2.1 Spacecraft Subsystems
A spacecraft is consisted of various subsystems. The mechanical structure is considered
a subsystem and is designed to provide mechanical support and assist in the thermal
control of the constituent parts of the spacecraft. The communications subsystem is re-
sponsible for receiving, amplifying and retransmitting radio frequency (RF) signals. The
following sections provide further information on additional subsystems such as the Teleme-
try, Tracking and Control subsystem (Section 2.2.1.1), Electrical Power subsystem (Sec-
tion 2.2.1.3), Thermal Control subsystem (Section 2.2.1.2), and Attitude Control subsystem
(Section 2.2.1.4).
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2.2.1.1 Telemetry, Tracking and Command
The telemetry, tracking and command subsystem is responsible for monitoring the state and
the health of the spacecraft, as well as for commanding its operations. Telemetry is used
to collect information from other subsystems of the spacecraft, such as voltage, current,
pressure, temperature, attitude sensors, accelerometers, etc. Tracking is used to collect
data related to the spacecraft positioning in space. Based on that, operators can compute
future orbital positioning and perform corrections in the spacecraft’s trajectory. Both
telemetry and tracking may perform on-board processing on the collected data, modulate
it in RF, and send it to the ground station. Command include functions such as controlling
on-board equipment, setting operational modes, and correcting the spacecraft orbit. It
can also be used to reprogram on-board components such as processors, FPGAs, and
reconfigurable devices, as well as to communicate and perform computations related to the
spacecraft payloads.
In some cases, TT&C along with a Command and Data Handling (CDH) unit is treated
as the same subsystem, as in [70]. In other cases, as in [168], they are considered separate
subsystems with interconnected functions.
Figure 2.11: TT&C Subsystem
While the telemetry link may tolerate small errors, a bit-flip in the control of a spacecraft
may lead to undesirable consequences. As a result, a command has a long way to go until
it is in fact executed in the spacecraft. Traditionally, a command is created, modulated in
RF, and sent to the spacecraft. The spacecraft’s command subsystem receives the signal,
demodulates and stores it. Then, the stored command is sent back to the control center
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via the telemetry link, where it is verified. Only after a final verification, the control
center orders the command execution. After that, the command subsystem distributes
the appropriate signals to different parts and other subsystems of the spacecraft. A block
diagram of the TT&C subsystem is shown in Figure 2.11.
In order to achieve a secure operation of the spacecraft, it becomes fundamental to
implement strong security mechanisms to achieve confidentiality, data integrity and au-
thentication in the TT&C link.
2.2.1.2 Thermal Control
Given the absence of air and other fluids surrounding the spacecraft, it is impossible to
rely on convection to dissipate heat during the spacecraft operation in space. Heat transfer
must be exclusively carried out by conduction and radiation, making the thermal balance
of the spacecraft quite challenging. Spacecrafts receive heat radiated by the Sun, and
depending on its orbital position, they may also receive a small portion of heat reflected by
the Earth. In addition, internal subsystems dissipate power during their normal operations,
which is then carried to the exterior of the spacecraft through conduction by its mechanical
structure. The thermal balance is achieved by radiating heat into space. Radiation depends
upon the shape and surface properties of the spacecraft.
The spacecraft’s temperature is determined by the amount of incident energy, internal
dissipation, and thermal radiation into space, as illustrated in Figure 2.12. Given the strin-
gent constraints to achieve the thermal balance, low power dissipation is an important issue
to be addressed when implementing security mechanisms for space applications. Actually,
since the power dissipation of a circuit is closely tied to power consumption, both issues
should be addressed carefully.
Figure 2.12: Thermal Balance
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2.2.1.3 Power
The power subsystem is basically consisted of solar panels, re-chargeable batteries, and
control electronics. When the spacecraft is facing some source of light, the silicon photo-
voltaic cells on the solar panels supply electrical power to the batteries and the rest of the
spacecraft. When the spacecraft is in such orbital position where light is blocked by any
celestial body (Earth, Moon, etc.), re-chargeable batteries provide the required electrical
power.
Actually, things are not that simple. Solar panels, batteries and loads may operate
at different voltages. Solar panels generates no power during an eclipse and can produces
higher voltages when facing the Sun. Batteries operate at different voltages while charging
and discharging. Additionally, battery’s charge/discharge cycles must be controlled in
order to avoid either an over-charge or a deep discharge. Spacecraft’s on-board subsystems
may also demand different loads, varying over time. In order to orchestrate this complex
system, a control electronics is required. A block diagram of the power subsystem is shown
in Figure 2.13.
Figure 2.13: Power Subsystem
The amount of power generated by the solar panels depends on the intensity and the
angle of incidence of light, as well as on the characteristics of the photovoltaic cells. Due
to the rotational movement of the spacecraft while in orbit, the angle of incidence of light
varies, and so does the amount of power generated. In order to maximize the power
generation, rotational movement of the solar panels are mandatory to keep them oriented
to the Sun. This requires a motor to rotate the panels and slip rings to transfer the power
from the solar cells to the spacecraft electronic systems.
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Moreover, given that the Sun radiates a fixed amount of light, power generation is
limited. For example, a GEO satellite may receive in the average 1370 W/m2 of power
radiated from the Sun [70]. On the one hand, the higher the power requirements of a
spacecraft, the bigger the solar panels must be. On the other hand, the bigger the solar
panels, the heavier they are, thus resulting in additional launch costs.
Furthermore, the more power is consumed, the more heat is generated, and the latter
impacts on the spacecraft’s thermal balance. Even though processors and FPGAs may
demand less power than RF transmitters, for example, the heat created by the former
elements has to be carried to the exterior of the spacecraft by conduction. This is mainly
done through a thermally conductive medium. Thus, the more heat is generated, the
higher is the demand on the mechanical elements utilized for heat transfer. Therefore, it
is crucial to design security mechanisms so that their implementation (either in software
or in hardware) minimize power consumption, and consequently power dissipation.
2.2.1.4 Attitude Control
In order to spacecrafts accomplish their intended mission goals, they must keep their
correct orbit and orientation. For example, communications satellites must keep their
planned orbits not only to avoid collisions with other spacecrafts and space debris, but
also to keep their antennas always pointed towards Earth. Other examples include ESA’s
Rosetta [55] and NASA’s Cassini [119] spacecrafts, which are intended to perform fly-by
of asteroids and planets. That requires maneuvering operations to keep the spacecraft
pointed to the target object. Moreover, spacecrafts are subject to disturbances caused
by several factors. Common factors are pressures due to solar radiation, misalignment of
thrusters, gravitational and magnetic disturbances, etc. Consequently, spacecrafts must
be capable of detecting orientation errors and re-positioning themselves.
The correction of orbital and spatial trajectories is performed by the attitude control of
the spacecraft. Pointing errors can be detected by instruments such as Earth/Sun sensors,
rotation wheels, RF sensors, gyroscopes, and star trackers. The attitude of the spacecraft
can be corrected by actuators such as reaction wheels (which spin both ways) and mo-
mentum wheels (which spin in only one way). If the reaction/momentum wheels are not
capable of performing the attitude control, thrusters must be fired. Although the utiliza-
tion of thrusters is very efficient, it requires fuel consumption. In order to minimize fuel
consumption, additional schemes can also be employed. For instance, magnetic torquing
coils and solar flaps produces a weak, but steady torque, which are useful in the attitude
control.
29
The coordinate system used for attitude control is shown in Figure 2.14. It has three
axes (x, y, z) and its origin is located at the spacecraft’s center of mass. A spacecraft
can rotate around three different axes while in orbit. Similarly to airplanes, spacecrafts’
attitude control uses the names roll, pitch and yaw, to represent the movement around the
axes x, y, z, respectively.
Figure 2.14: Attitude Control: Pitch, Roll and Yaw
By using the orientation detection mechanisms, spacecrafts can measure their deviation
from a reference point (Earch, Sun, stars, etc). Some spacecraft carry some on-board
capabilities to automatically perform roll, pitch, and yaw movements, through rotation
wheels and thrusters. Some others, rely these tasks on their control center. When a
control center is involved, the TT&C link is used to read telemetry and send commands
to the spacecraft. It is important to emphasize the importance of attitude control, given
that they perform crucial and very sensitive movements of the spacecraft.
2.2.2 Space Missions
Space missions can divided into several types, based upon the mission goals. Also, they
can be categorized according to their security requirements, which are basically driven by
the cost and importance of the mission.
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2.2.2.1 Missions Types
Spacecrafts can be classified into five main types: communications, scientific research, me-
teorological, navigation, and military [24]. Military spacecrafts are out of the scope of
this research. Most mission have traditionally been deployed with limited, if any, secu-
rity [23, 24, 26, 29, 25].
Communication satellites are fundamental building blocks of the international com-
munication infrastructure. They are involved, for example, with the transmission of voice,
video, and data over long distances. The absence of this kind of satellite may disrupt an
important world wide communication channel, thus causing severe losses.
Scientific spacecrafts are not considered part of a national asset infrastructure. Al-
though scientific missions suffer from the same threats than any other space mission, they
involve much less risks compared to communications satellites and manned space flight.
However, loss of important data and large investments may incur if this kind of spacecraft
is either attacked or compromised.
Meteorological satellites have traditionally been involved with Earth observation mis-
sions. These spacecrafts, sometimes called Earth Observation satellites, are employed on
climate study and prediction, as well as weather forecast. Outages in this type of service
may cause loss of scientific data and also result in life threatening conditions.
Navigation satellites were originally intended to provide positioning and navigation for
enterprises such airlines, maritime, trucking and the military. In the last few years, these
systems became more and more popular among civilian applications such as automobile
navigation systems, emergency location through cell-phones, and hand-held devices for
hunting, fishing, exploring and hiking. Examples of navigation satellites are the North-
American GPS, the European Gallileo [54], and the Russian GLONASS [7]. Given the
current importance and widespread use of these systems, any threat against navigation
satellites may be translated as a risk to the navigation infrastructure and potential threat
to human life.
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2.2.2.2 Mission Security Levels
Space missions can be categorized in three main levels of security [23]: high, moderate
and minimal security. Actually, an additional “insecure” category could be considered for
spacecrafts without any kind of protection.
High Security missions are generally involved with government and military programs,
and are mandatory for manned space flight. Navigation and high cost communication
satellites might also fall into this category. In high security missions, the secure access and
control of the spacecraft is mandatory under any operational or environmental conditions.
More precisely, all data involving the command and telemetry of the spacecraft, as well
as the ground data system must employ access control, confidentiality, data integrity and
authentication, and also have high availability.
Moderate Security missions are usually considered for communication, meteorological
and non-critical navigation missions. In this category, data systems are protected against
unauthorized access, e.g. sensitive or critical data related to commercial and operational
purposes. In this category, data integrity and authentication of spacecraft commands are
mandatory, and confidentiality might be required in some cases. Telemetry data require
confidentiality and data integrity. All systems in the ground segment must utilize data
integrity and authentication, and possibly confidentiality and access control.
Minimal Security includes the remaining missions, not covered by high and moderate
security levels. Minimal security missions require data integrity and authentication for
commands, whereas confidentiality might be required in some cases. Confidentiality and
data integrity may be used to protect some telemetry data and parts of the ground segment.
The ground segment may also include access control for data protection.
2.2.3 Threats Against Space Missions
As any other computer system, there are many threats against the computational platform
of space missions [24], which have the potential of compromising the entire mission. In
order to achieve higher levels of protection in space data systems, a set of cryptographic
primitives has been proposed to be adopted as standard by CCSDS [30]. In addition, it is




According to the capabilities of attackers, threats can be classified as passive and active
threats. Passive threats refers to threats where the attacker can only monitor and listen to
the communication channel to acquire some information. Active threats requires a more
sophisticated attacker, who must be able to insert, delete and alter messages in the channel
to compromise the communication. These threats are present in both space segment and
ground segment.
Data Corruption: Data can get corrupted in several, if not all, constituting elements of
space systems. For example, it can happen in the control center, during the transmission to
and from the spacecraft, or while on-board of the spacecraft’s subsystems. Data corruption
may be caused by multiple factors, such as software and hardware failures, unintentional
and intentional data modifications, or due to SEUs. The corruption of data can lead
to serious consequences to a space mission, including its loss. For instance, a corrupted
command has the potential of accidentally firing thrusters which could put the spacecraft
spinning out of control. Data corruption can be avoided by using integrity check schemes.
Further, due to the harsh space environment the spacecraft immersed, fault tolerance
techniques are also of extreme importance to prevent data corruption from occurring.
Data Interception: Data sent by either the ground station and the spacecraft can be
intercepted even by a modest, passive attacker. Since communications utilizes specific
radio frequencies, it would be possible to use an appropriate antenna and find the right
frequency to be able to listen the communication. By listening to communications, an
attacker can gain knowledge of protocols and data structures, which can be useful to
mount an attack. Moreover, attackers can determine when entities are communicating by
performing a traffic analysis of the communication channel. Interception of data can be
avoided by using spread spectrum and frequency hopping techniques, and also by applying
cryptographic techniques such as data encryption.
Replay: A common product of data interception is the so called replay attack. In this
kind of attack, old messages are replayed to mislead a given target, which can be a ground
station or a spacecraft. An example of this kind of attack would be an attacker intercept-
ing maneuvering commands, storing them for some time, and at his/her own discretion
re-transmitting them to the spacecraft. As a result of this unauthentic maneuvering com-
mand, the spacecraft could repeat a thruster burn resulting in an incorrect orbital position.
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Replay attacks can be avoided by employing authenticated commanding and using counters
and time stamps in messages.
Jamming: An active attacker can interfere with wireless communications by using an RF
signal of frequency similar to the original one. This is a serious threat to communication
link between the spacecraft and ground station. Moreover, the advent of jamming during
critical and emergency commanding may have disastrous consequences. Since the control
center cannot perform any better than wait for the interference to terminate, it might be
too late to recover the commanding action, leading to the loss of the spacecraft. Jamming
can be reduced by using frequency hopping and spread spectrum techniques. Also, multiple
uplinks/downlinks and multiple access points allow for additional communication channels
in case one of them is jammed.
Unauthorized Access: Due to the complexity of current space missions, several tasks
are divided among different teams, not necessarily at the same physical location. Each
team has its own privileges and is able to operate upon its designated part of the system.
Unauthorized access happens when authentication is weak enough to allow someone to per-
form actions that he/she was not supposed to. For example, a group of control operators
may be responsible for analyzing telemetry data, and based on that, perform commanding
actions. A sub-group of this team may be eligible to exclusively access telemetry data,
but not to send commands to the spacecraft. In this case, an unauthorized person, who
is only able to read telemetry data, can may put the mission at risk by sending unautho-
rized commands. Unauthorized access can be addressed by implementing access control
in control centers. Another important countermeasure against unauthorized access is the
implementation of encryption and authentication over the TT&C link.
Masquerade: An attacker can lie about his/her identity, and impersonate a legitimate
user to the system. In this case, the system would not realize that the communication is
taking place with an illegitimate entity. As a consequence, an attacker would be assumed
as a valid user, and therefore provided all the capabilities of the impersonated entity. An
attacker may also try to masquerade as a legitimate entity by performing replay attacks.
Masquerade can be avoided by using strong access control in the spacecraft control center.
Also, data origin authentication in the TT&C link should be enforced.
Ground Facility Physical Attack: A brutal way of compromising space systems is the
physical attack against a ground facility. A terrorist attack has the potentiality of disabling
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the entire ground station or control center headquarters for a long period of time. This
may also happen due to natural disasters. If no backup control station exist to take place
of the original one, permanent damage to the mission goals is almost certain. Other attacks
may target antennas to disrupt communications, or even taking control over the facility
to control the spacecraft. Reinforced access control, guards and gates can help with the
security of ground facilities. However, it is also important to count with backup sites in
case the main facility is disabled.
Software and Hardware Threats: Space systems are composed of multiple subsys-
tems, which in turn are constituted of software and hardware parts. For instance, ground
segment networks may be vulnerable to system invasion and infection by viruses and worms.
Another example is the TT&C subsystem of spacecrafts, which may be composed by sev-
eral special purpose hardware and general purpose processors. As any kind of computer
system, spacecraft software and hardware might contain bugs and security holes. An at-
tacker can exploit those issues to break into the system and take complete control over the
spacecraft. Intensive testing, simulations and evaluations is a way of reducing the number
of bugs and security holes in on-board software and hardware.
2.2.3.2 Reported Attacks Against Satellites
Companies involved with the multi-billion dollar space business may suffer financial losses
if the reliability of their systems is questioned. Although one cannot be certain about the
existence of “cover ups”, a number of attacks against satellites have been reported by the
media. This clearly reflects the consequences of deploying spacecrafts without appropriate
security mechanisms. It would not be surprising, though, if we had an astonishing number
of satellites being compromised every month. Fortunately, this is currently not the case.
However, given to advances in communications technology and its associated cheap access,
communications security is becoming a more common requirement in the concept of new
space missions.
One of the first known cases dates back to November, 1985, when a Disney Channel
was superimposed for 90 seconds by an adult TV broadcast. Disney kept it secret until the
“Captain Midnight” incident on April 27, 1986 [103]. In fact, until January 15, 1986, dish
owners used to receive the HBO channel for free. After that date, HBO started encrypting
its transmission, so that users had to buy a $385 decoder and pay a fee of $12.95 per
month to be able to continue watching the channel. It was then on April that Captain
Midnight interrupted the transmission of TV signal to 1.7 million satellite dish owners
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in the eastern USA. The broadcasted the message “$12.95/month? No way!”, and also
threatened interrupting other paid programs starting on May. Captain Midnight had not
even bothered breaking the encrypted transmission; He sent his protest by simply beaming
up a signal to the HBO satellite strong enough to override the original channel’s signal.
Given the strength of that signal, it was estimated that it did not come from a backyard
reception dish. The attacker would have to have utilized a 30 feet satellite dish. Thus,
investigators believed that Captain Midnight was an employee/engineer at a commercial
satellite uplink site. After this incident, HBO increased the strength of its signal to avoid
other pirates doing the same. Even though, other cases like Captain Midnight are expected
to happen again. At that time, HBO used to employ geosynchronous satellites like Hughes
Galaxy 1 and RCA Satcom 3R to transmit their signals. The problem was that anyone
that knew the correct communication frequencies and how to send commands to those
spacecrafts, could put them spinning out into space. No need to mention that this would
be feasible by simply listening to previous communications with the satellite. By the way,
threats like that were received by HBO.
Another serious incident happened in March, 1999, involving one of the UK Ministry
of Defense’s (MoD) Skynet satellites. This spacecraft was used by defense planners and
military forces around the world and also to coordinate bombing raids in Iraq. Initial
reports [56, 72] claimed that an attacker had seized control over the satellite, altering
its course. The attackers would have also blackmailed the MoD demanding £3 million
in order not to definitively compromise the spacecraft. Other source [126] reported that
the group of attackers neither moved the satellite nor blackmailed MoD. However, it was
claimed that hackers intercepted the link between the ground station and the satellite
and reprogrammed the Skynet’s control subsystem. Special precaution was taken by the
attackers not to lose control of the spacecraft. The strategy used by the attackers was to
follow a sort of recipe, which had been published years earlier by other hackers. Again, it
was just a matter of learning control codes and beaming up a custom signal to take control
over the spacecraft.
From June 23 to 30, 2002, the Chinese spiritual practice Falun Gong attacked the
satellites Sinosat 2A and 3A. In this incident they interfered with the regular transmis-
sion of nine channels of the China Central Television Station (CCTV) and ten provincial
TV channels for rural and remote areas [138]. In one of the occasions, they substituted
the transmission of the final match of the World Cup with Falun Gong’s propaganda and
material containing reference to the cult. Besides TV signals, the Sinosat satellites also
carried signals for weather forecast and telecommunications. If one of those signals were
sabotaged, it would have not only bored soccer fans, but also endangered lives and poten-
tially caused a bigger economic impact. In this case, several people were convicted and
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punished with long jail sentences. Again, on November 20, 2004, Falun Gong transmitted
cult’s promotion contents using an AsiaSat 3S satellite from Asia Satellite Telecommunica-
tions Co. Ltd (AsiaSat) [124, 49]. A following assault happened on March 14, 2005, when
the same AsiaSat 3S satellite was used to transmit Falun Gong’s propaganda [142]. This
caused the interruption of the regular transmission of provincial TV channels in China.
The last two attacks were denied by the Falun Gong cult [85].
Another recent incident involving minority groups refers to the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Tamil Tigers is a separatist group in Sri Lanka classified as
a terrorist group by 32 countries [141]. In April, 2007, they hacked an Intelsat’s satellite
orbiting over the Indian Ocean to transmit propaganda [153, 113] referring to the group.
In face of all these attacks, it is quite clear that space systems are at the risk of attacks.
Furthermore, as technology evolves, more attacks should be expected. Thus, in order to
assure the security of those spacecrafts, strong security mechanisms should be adopted.
2.2.4 Security Requirements
In order to properly address the threats against space systems, security mechanisms should
be employed in both ground and space segments. Although CCSDS has been surveying
practices for implementing security in space systems [23, 28, 27], there exist only drafts of
the final recommended practices for encryption [29], data integrity and authentication [26]
and key management [25]. As of April of 2011, no final recommendation has been done
yet.
The recommended practices should be employed on communication links and data
being processed or stored within a space system. The implementation of the recommended
practices are directed by the mission security level, and can be applied on a point-to-
point, hop-by-hop, or end-to-end basis. In the point-to-point case, security mechanisms
are provided between two communicating entities. For example, a control center and
the TT&C subsystem. In the hop-by-hop case, security mechanisms are applied between
each hop of the communication path, until the information reaches its final destination.
Finally, in the end-to-end case security mechanisms are used between the source and the
destination, without the intervention of intermediate entities. For instance, between the
spacecraft instrument and the control operator/scientist.
37
2.2.4.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality is a service used to address the problem of making information accessible
only to an authorized entity. It is usually achieved by using encryption. Encryption
can be classified as symmetric or asymmetric. In symmetric systems, the communicating
entities uses mathematically related keys (usually the same) to perform encryption and
decryption. Asymmetric systems employs a pair of mathematically related keys, named
public and private keys. In this case, the public key is used to encrypt a message, whereas
the private key is used to decrypt it.
A preliminary CCSDS survey on encryption algorithms [29] basically follow the rec-
ommendations of the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), as defined in [128], is preliminarily recommended
to be used as a standard encryption algorithm for space data systems. The minimum
recommendation for the key size is 128 bits, but larger keys such as 192 and 256 bits may
also be used for higher levels of security. So far, no recommendations have been done for
public-key cryptosystems.
2.2.4.2 Data Integrity and Authentication
Data integrity is a service that allows for the recipient of a message to certify that the
received data was not modified, either unintentionally or intentionally, while in transit.
Data origin authentication, in turn, allows for the receiver to certify that the received data
came from the claimed sender.
Preliminary algorithm survey done by CCSDS [26], indicates that Message Authenti-
cation Codes (MACs) and digital signatures could be appropriate for space applications.
More specifically, digital signatures should follow the specifications of the Digital Signa-
ture Standard (DSS) provided in [134]. HMAC should be adopted as the keyed-hash MAC
algorithm as specified in [129]. The hash function used for both DSS and HMAC should
be the Secure Hash Standard (SHS) as specified in [133]. More precisely, at least SHA-1
should be utilized, but the use of SHA-2 is highly recommended. Encryption-based MACs,
such as DES-CBC-MAC [127], CMAC [131], and CCM [130] are also considered in [26]. It




A frequent problem with cryptographic systems is the key management. Keys must be
established and maintained for all the algorithms being used within a system. Space
systems have multiple factors which should be taken into account when deciding on a key
management scheme. These factors also vary according to the type of orbit and the type
of mission.
The huge distances in space may imply long transmissions delays, which may take tens
of minutes. In order to cope with that, the key management handshaking should be kept
as simple as possible. Further, communications may be windowed due to the spacecraft
orbit and failures, therefore interrupting the execution of protocols. This requires the key
management to be performed very quickly and be able to recover from broken commu-
nications. Due to the limited bandwidth, the key management should also use the least
bandwidth possible. Since spacecraft’s hardware does not have as much computational
power as their terrestrial counterparts, algorithms must target efficiency. Finally, as space-
crafts often operates for longer periods than originally planned, the key management must
support extensions of missions lifetimes.
As a consequence, complex key management schemes involving either several message
exchanges or third parties should be avoided. A preliminary recommended practice for the
ground segment is based on the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [25]. For the space segment,
which is mainly addressed in this research, the preliminary recommendation is to employ
a Secret Key Infrastructure (SKI) [25].
The SKI would be based on master keys installed on-board of the spacecraft prior to
launch, whose function is to be employed as Key Encryption Keys (KEKs). More precisely,
the KEKs would be used exclusively in the secured communication with the control center
while uploading session keys to the spacecraft. The number of KEKs would be determined
based on the mission type and lifetime, on the frequency that session keys are uploaded, and
also on the lifetime of the KEK itself. The session keys are categorized in different classes
according to the security mechanism and type of link that they are involved. They could
be divided as Command Authentication Keys, Command Encryption Keys, Telemetry
Authentication Keys, and Telemetry Encryption Keys. Each of those can be further sub
divided into classes for each of the components and payloads of the TT&C subsystem.
2.2.4.4 Emergency Commanding
Spacecrafts are subject to faults and problems while in space. There are multiple fac-
tors that can bring a spacecraft out of control. Faulty sensors and actuators may pro-
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vide an erroneous positioning measurement or an under/over actuation on the spacecraft
movements. Power outages and temperature may disturb the normal functioning of elec-
tronics. Particles coming from space may cause upsets disturbing the correct functioning
of the spacecraft. Further, operators on the ground may unintentionally send erroneous
commands to the spacecraft. In addition, attackers may send their own commands to
intentionally compromise the spacecraft operations. Independently of the case considered,
countermeasures must be taken to re-gain the control of the spacecraft.
A common practice usually employed by space agencies is to bring the spacecraft to
a “safe mode” when a failure is detected. Actually, if some major failure happens, the
spacecraft autonomously put itself in “safe mode” and wait for further commanding from
the control station. In other cases, the control station can do this by sending commands
to the spacecraft. After that, a reset is performed and/or a backup system is activated.
In this case, it is interesting to keep the commands as short and simple as possible, so
that minimal transmission time and processing power is consumed while transmitting and
decoding the command.
In fact, “safe mode” has been used very often as a recovery technique. Some ex-
amples of well known spacecrafts which recently utilized “safe mode” to recover from
failures are: Deep Impact [159], Hubble Space Telescope [160], Spirit Mars Rover [154],
Mars Odyssey [156, 4, 163, 162, 158, 148], Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter [116, 118, 164],
Cassini [155, 161, 98], Kepler Space Telescope [165], and the Dawn Spacecraft [157].
In the event of a tumbling spacecraft, the rotating solar panels may not receive the
enough power from the Sun. As a result, almost all the power to keep the spacecraft’s
operations is drained from the batteries, which start to discharge. Further, tumbling
movement can cause the spacecraft’s antennas not be correctly pointed to Earth. Actually,
the antennas may be oriented correctly for just a very short period of time. In this case,
the commands must be as short as possible, and be sent over and over again, so that the
spacecraft can hopefully receive them in a narrow communication window.
Emergency commanding typically bypasses the on-board computer and goes directly to
the hardware command decoder. However, this may represent a serious security hole if the
commands are not authenticated. An attacker, for example, could simply replay previous
emergency commands and restart the spacecraft later on. If such an unexpected reset is
issued, on-board data may be lost. Even worse, if attitude maneuvering is performed, the
spacecraft’s orbit may get seriously compromised. That can affect the spacecraft orbital
path, potentially dropping it down to the atmosphere or sending it into deep space. On
the other hand, authenticated commanding would imply bigger commands, thus increasing
communication time. As a result, it is interesting to have authenticated commanding, but
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at the same time, to keep them as short as possible so they can be received in the narrow
communication imposed by a spinning spacecraft.
2.2.4.5 Other Requirements
Besides all the security issues discussed above, space missions have to address other re-
quirements when implementing security mechanisms. The first one is the use of open
standards for algorithms, protocols and implementations. The architecture should also be
expandable to allow the use of new technologies and the inclusion alternative approaches.
Remote re-programmability/re-configuration is also highly desirable, so that the security
architecture can be updated to met new security standards, and also include patches and
fixes to bugs and security holes. In addition, the system should be made flexible enough
to be integrated with other systems in the future. Moreover, all the security mechanisms
should be implemented in a fault tolerant manner so that faults neither compromise data
nor disrupt the normal operation of the spacecraft.
2.2.5 Platforms for Space
Many spacecraft subsystems have traditionally been built using ASICs [63]. However, due
to the low production volumes of spacecrafts, this kind of approach tends to result in high
non-recurring engineering (NRE) costs and long design cycles. This impacts the project
budget and has the potential of delaying the mission schedule. With the advent of FPGAs,
it became difficult to disregard the utilization of these devices in space applications [74].
Actually, FPGA’s debut in space happened in 1996, on-board of the SAMPEX space-
craft [114]. Compared to ASICs, FPGAs favor relatively short design cycles and almost
zero NRE costs. Their reconfigurability provide higher levels of flexibility. These devices
make possible, for example, post-launch incorporation of features, updates and patches to
the spacecraft hardware. Reconfigurability also benefits cryptographic subsystems, which
can be updated to meet new security standards and to fix security holes. Moreover, the
reconfigurability of FPGAs can be further utilized as a SEU mitigation strategy.
2.2.5.1 FPGAs and Fault Tolerance
Several SEU mitigation techniques for SRAM FPGAs have been proposed in [22]. The first
one takes advantage of the high speed configuration capabilities of Virtex FPGAs. In this
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approach, the configuration of the FPGA is read and compared with an expected configu-
ration file. Then, if the current configuration of the FPGA is corrupted, a reconfiguration
cycle takes place. This scheme is often referred to as “read-back and reconfiguration”. For
instance, a Virtex V1000 FPGA whose configuration file size is 6.5 Mbits programmed in
approximately 20ms. Although that technique is very effective to correct SEUs happening
in the configuration elements of the FPGA, it would be desirable to decrease the amount
of time spent on the device re-configuration. Therefore, the second technique proposed
refers to partial reconfiguration. Partial configuration allows specific frames to be written
to the FPGA configuration memory. Furthermore, the entire device is kept active during
the partial configuration procedure, but the individual frame being rewritten.
Another technique recommended as a mitigation technique proposed in [21] is scrub-
bing. The advantage of this method is that it can be performed much faster than read-back
and reconfigure, since no comparison of bit-streams is performed. However, this also leads
to a disadvantage, which is reconfiguration of the FPGA even when its configuration has
not been corrupted. Hence, in order to make this approach efficient, the scrub cycle must
be chosen in accordance with an expected upset rate.
In addition to read-back and (partial) reconfiguration, a new method was introduced
in [22] to implement majority voting. Instead of using regular LUTs as shown in Figure 2.15
(a), the proposed scheme implements majority voters using tri-state buffers, as illustrated
in Figure 2.15 (b).
(a) (b)
Figure 2.15: Majority Voting Implemented with (a) LUTs and (b) Tri-State Buffers
from [22]
The Virtex tri-state buffer primitive, named BUFT, functions as an active low tri-state
buffer. Considering Figure 2.15 (b), and inputs A, B, and C all low, it is easy to observe
that the output of the voter is going to be low. In contrast, if A, B and C are all high, the
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tri-state are all disabled, allowing the resistor to pull the output to high. Further, when two
inputs are high, two BUFTs will be disabled but a third one will pull the output to high.
Now, if two inputs are low, one BUFT will be disabled, another one will output high, and a
third one will output low, therefore causing a contention. However, the Virtex implement
its bussing logic such that the described contention does not occur, and the voting scheme
works correctly. Although the interconnection of the three BUFTs rely on configuration
SRAM cells, an upset in a configuration cell can disconnect one input or output of one of
the BUFTs. However, this does not disrupt the functionality of the BUFT-based voter.
In a LUT-based voter, an SEU in a LUT can compromise its truth table therefore causing
the voter to fail.
Yet another scheme proposed in [22] is TMR. This approach is taken as “rock-solid” by
the authors and utilizes four devices. Three devices are used for computation and a forth
one employed for mitigation. Actually, SRAM FPGAs could be used as the computation
devices, and a small radiation hardened FPGA or ASIC would perform the majority voting.
The main drawback of this approach is the implementation area and power consumption
demanded by the utilization of three FPGAs along with a mitigation device.
2.2.5.2 Processor-Based Systems and Fault Tolerance
A processor frequently used in space applications is Leon3 [65]. The Leon3 processor is
a 32-bit synthetizable processor core based on the SPARC V8 architecture [166], which
can be implemented in both ASICs and FPGAs. The Leon3 processor was developed by
Aeroflex Gaisler [66] under contract with ESA and is currently distributed under the GNU
General Public License (GPL) [78].
A fault tolerant version of this processor, called Leon3-FT [67], is also available. The
Leon3-FT architecture is illustrated in Figure 2.16. Leon3-FT is normally implemented
on Actel RTAX anti-fuse FGPAs to achieve higher resistance against SEUs. Its memory
interface is capable of performing single-error correction and double-error detection in
32-bit data words. Also, its instruction and data cache memories are protected by 4 parity
bits per 32-bit words, allowing for the detection of up to 4 bit errors per cache word. Upon
error detection, the cache line is flushed and the instruction/data reloaded. Furthermore,
the processor register file is protected against errors by employing 4 parity bits per 32-bit of
data, plus a duplicated copy of the data word. If the register parity is inconsistent with the
register data, the erroneous register is overwritten with the data read from the redundant
location. In the case of having the redundant data also corrupted, a trap is generated to
indicate error in the register file.
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Figure 2.16: Leon3-FT Architecture from [67]
The underlying hardware platform provided by the Actel RTAX FPGA provides extra
protection against SEUs through two extra features. The first one is the FPGA configu-
ration, which is protected against SEUs due to anti-fuse technology. Second, the FPGA
registers cells, so called R-cells, employs three latches and a voting scheme which protects
their registers in a scheme similar to TMR.
An adaptive platform is presented in [99], which dynamically reconfigure itself to match
the environment currently faced by the computational platform. Such a system has been
prototyped using an Xilinx Virtex 5 FPGA and is based on PicoBlaze soft processors [81].
Depending on the radiation level as well as on the requirements of user applications, the
platform can switch among three different modes, namely fault tolerant, parallel processing,
and low power. Figures 2.17 (a) and (b) respectively illustrate the architecture of the fault
tolerant and parallel processing modes. The architecture of the low power mode is similar
to the parallel processing, except that it employs only one processor, only one output logic,
and no IRQ module.
A configuration ROM stores three different configuration files corresponding to each of
the aforementioned modes of operation. The main drawback of this approach is the entire
reconfiguration of the FPGA in order to switch from one mode of operation to another.
An approach to optimize the reconfiguration of the FPGA is proposed in [100]. It
consists of organizing and partitioning the configuration elements of the FPGA into tiles,
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.17: PicoBlaze Platform in (a) Fault Tolerant and (b) Parallel Processing Modes
from [99]
so that partial reconfiguration can be performed. It also considers the utilization of multiple
soft core PicoBlaze processors distributed among the multiple tiles of the FPGA. However,
at any time only three processors work in parallel to form a TMR scheme. In the event
of failure, a recovery procedure takes place which first attempts to reset, reinitialize and
re-synchronize the faulty processor. If this procedure is unsuccessful the tile of the FPGA
containing that processor is deactivated and is replaced by a fresh processor residing in
another FPGA tile. This procedure is followed by a partial reconfiguration which attempts
to recover the tile containing the faulty processor. If such a partial reconfiguration is
capable of restoring the integrity of the processor, it is reserved as a spare element and can
be re-utilized in the future. In the case of an unsuccessful partial reconfiguration, it may
be the case that the FPGA configuration elements may have suffered a permanent fault.
Thus, that tile is marked as damaged and is no longer used.
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2.3 Cryptographic Algorithms
Even though the implementation of security in space systems may require a large range of
cryptographic primitives, this work focuses on integrity checking and message authentica-
tion codes. Specifically, the algorithms employed are the SHA-2 family of hash functions as
well as the HMAC based on SHA-2. Hardware implementations of these algorithms along
with efficient mechanisms for fault tolerance are presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The
next two subsections provides a short description of the SHA-2 and HMAC algorithms.
2.3.1 SHA-2 Algorithm Description
The SHA-2 family of hash algorithms [133] comprises four algorithms, namely, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. Detailed information on the implementation of the
entire SHA-2 family of hash functions, including fault tolerant schemes, can be found in [93].
As can be observed in [93], the implementation of SHA-224 and SHA-256 leads to similar
experimental results due to several commonalities between the two algorithms. Similar
behavior is observed for SHA-384 and SHA-512. Thus, the remaining of the discussion
exclusively focuses on SHA-256 and SHA-512.
The SHA-256 and SHA-512 algorithms are one-way hash functions that able to process
messages of up to 264 and 2128 bits, respectively. These algorithms can be divided into
two computational parts, namely preprocessing and hash computation. The output of the
algorithms is an L-bit message digest. Moreover, the datapath bit-width of these functions
is denoted by D. Table 2.2 lists some numeric values for some SHA-2 parameters.








A complete set of SHA-2 parameters utilized throughout this document is presented
below.
B : SHA-2 input block size (in bits);
L : SHA-2 message digest size (in bits);
D : Datapath width (in bits);
N : Number of message blocks;
i : Message block index, where 1 ≤ i ≤ N ;
j : Number of algorithm iterations;
t : Iteration index, where 0 ≤ t ≤ j − 1;
M (1), ...,M (N) : Message blocks;
H
(0)
0 , ..., H
(0)
7 : Initial hash values;
H
(i)
0 , ..., H
(i)
7 : Intermediate hash values;
W0, ...,Wj : Message schedule words;
a, ..., h : Working variables;
K0, ..., Kj : Constants.
2.3.1.1 Pre-Processing
The preprocessing stage first splits the original message in N blocks, where each block
is B bits wide. These data blocks are denoted as M (1),M (2), ...,M (N). Then, padding is
performed if the message length is not a multiple of the underlying block size. Next, eight
initial hash values, H
(0)
0 , ..., H
(0)
7 , are set. Each algorithm uses a distinct set of initial hash
values reported in [133].
2.3.1.2 Hash Computation
The entire computation of the message digest is based on operations over D-bit words. The
SHA-2 algorithms comprise j message schedule words (W0, ...,Wj−1) and eight working
variables (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h). Besides, eight hash values (H
(i)
0 , ..., H
(i)
7 ) are utilized, where
H i is the i-th intermediate hash value and HN the final one. In addition, SHA-2 uses
D-bit constants K0, ..., Kj−1 as specified in [133]. Furthermore, six logical functions are
employed, as shown below. The operations ROTRn(x) and SHRn(x) are rotation and
shift of x by n bits to the right.
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SHA-256:
Ch(x, y, z) = (x ∧ y)⊕ (x̄ ∧ y),










Ch(x, y, z) = (x ∧ y)⊕ (x̄ ∧ y),









Further, for each message block i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , a four-step digest round is performed as
follows:
Step 1: Initialize the eight working variables
a = H
(i−1)
0 , b = H
(i−1)
1 , c = H
(i−1)





4 , f = H
(i−1)
5 , g = H
(i−1)
6 , h = H
(i−1)
7 .





t , 0 ≤ t ≤ 15
σ1(Wt−2) +Wt−7 + σ0(Wt−15) +Wt−16, 16 ≤ t ≤ j − 1.
The number of words processed by the message scheduler is given by j. Actually, j
corresponds to the number of iterations performed by the algorithm.
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Step 3: For t = 0 to j − 1 do:
T1 = h+
∑
1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) +Kt +Wt,
T2 =
∑








a = T1 + T2,





































After processing all N blocks of message M , the final message digest is obtained by
concatenating the hash values (H
(N)
0 , ..., H
(N)
7 ). More precisely, the message digest for each
algorithm is given by the concatenations shown below. The concatenation of words is


















2.3.2 HMAC Algorithm Description
The HMAC algorithm receives two inputs, a cryptographic Key and a message (named
Text), and produces a message authentication code (MAC). One of the goals of the HMAC
algorithm is to be independent of a given hash function, so that the latter can be easily
replaced to achieve higher security levels.
In this research, the SHA-2 family of hash functions is utilized. From now on, we denote
the combination of HMAC with SHA algorithms as HMAC/SHA-x, where x can be 2, 256,
or 512.
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Some HMAC parameters and symbols are listed below.
B : SHA-2 input block size (in bits);
L : SHA-2 message digest size (in bits);
Key : Secret key of the communicating parties;
K : Size of the Key (in bits);
K0 : Key after any necessary pre-processing;
Ipad : (Inner pad) Byte 0x36 repeated B/8 times;
Opad : (Outer pad) Byte 0x5C repeated B/8 times;
Text : The data on which the MAC is calculated;
T : Final size of the MAC (in bits);
min(x, y) : The minimum of x and y;
Hash(V ) : Hash of variable/value V ;
||(0..)z : Padding with z zeros.
Parameters B and L are inherited from SHA-2 algorithms. The hash of variable/value
V is symbolized by Hash(V ), whereas ||(0..)z indicates the padding with z zeros.
The length K of the Key has to be selected to ensure compatibility with the security
level of the underlying hash functions, and ultimately with the application utilizing HMAC.
According to [135], the security strength of HMAC is defined as min(K, 2L), and T between
64 and 96 bits is assumed to be sufficient for most applications. In [97], the minimal
recommendation is K ≥ L, whereas the MAC size should obey T ≥ L/2 and be not less
than 80 bits.
The Text can be n bits long, where 0 ≤ n < 2B/8 − B, whereas the size of a MAC
is L bits long. The HMAC algorithm is consisted of seven steps as shown below. Notice
that the hashes computed in Step IV and Steps VII can be split into two parts to facilitate
implementation. The MAC is in fact the message digest of Step VII.
Step I: Pre-process Key as follows:
K0 =

Key, K = B,
Key||(0..)B−K , K < B,
Hash(Key)||(0..)B−L, K > B.
Step II: Compute (K0 ⊕ Ipad).
Step III: Do (K0 ⊕ Ipad)||Text .
Step IV: Hash((K0 ⊕ Ipad)||Text).
Step V: Compute (K0 ⊕Opad).
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Step VI: Do (K0 ⊕Opad)||Hash((K0 ⊕ Ipad)||Text).
Step VII: Hash((K0 ⊕Opad)||Hash((K0 ⊕ Ipad)||Text)).
The computation of HMAC can be summarized as follows:
MAC = Hash((K0 ⊕Opad)||Hash((K0 ⊕ Ipad)||Text)).
Precisely, the L-bit MAC is obtained from the hash variables H. A common practice is
to truncate the MAC by using only its T leftmost bits. In this work, we consider that the
MAC is L bits long, and any truncation is performed at the user level obeying the security
requirements of the application.
2.4 Summary
This chapter introduced basic concepts on fault tolerance, described the radiation effects
on electronic circuits, and also presented several mitigation techniques. Although most
of design goals for fault tolerance are crucial for space systems, this research prioritizes
reliability. Reliability is especially important to keep the system operating for its whole
lifetime, otherwise, a fault could permanently disrupt all services provided by the space-
craft. Though numerous SEEs can occur in space applications, SEUs are one of the most
common results of radiation effects and are addressed in this research. Furthermore, mit-
igation techniques considered in this research are mostly architectural. More specifically,
techniques such as parity prediction, Hamming codes, TMR and re-computation are the
main mitigation techniques considered. Combinations of the previous techniques are also
taken into account, so that the resulting mitigation scheme is more efficient than the tra-
ditional TMR. Reconfiguration is considered as an option for recovery in some cases, but
not the main strategy. Unlike most related work which mainly target only error detection,
this research focuses on both error detection and correction.
This chapter has also shown how complex and delicate spacecrafts’ subsystems are. Any
minor problem in the attitude control has the potential of putting a spacecraft out of its
orbital path or spinning out of control. Obviously, that has a high probability of definitively
compromising the spacecraft and the entire mission. From recent events, it became clear
that attackers on the ground represents a constant and serious threat to space systems. In
order to provide means for more secure operations of spacecrafts, this research addresses
the problem of data integrity and authentication, as well as emergency commanding and
recovery. In spite of targeting mostly the TT&C subsystem, those primitives can also be
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applied to the payload and other subsystems. Besides, all the cryptographic mechanisms
aim at low power consumption in order to satisfy the severe restrictions imposed by the
power and thermal subsystems. Although this research is based on Altera SRAM FPGAs,
the proposed schemes are generic enough to be utilized by other FPGAs such as Xilinx
and Actel. Finally, this research follows the recommendations and standards proposed by
CCSDS as much as possible, given their widespread acceptance by the space community.
Next chapter presents previous research in hardware implementations of cryptographic
primitives, including hash, message authentication codes and trusted platforms. As high-
lighted in this chapter, fault tolerance is a mandatory feature in space systems. Therefore,
next chapter also presents some related work in fault tolerant implementation of crypto-
graphic algorithms, e.g. hash and encryption primitives. It also includes a section on fault
injection attacks, that could potentially be performed while systems are still on the ground




This chapter presents the state-of-the-art in security for space systems as well as a wide
variety of hardware implementations of cryptographic primitives. These implementations,
however, cannot be directly applied to space systems since they do not include any sort of
fault tolerance. Finally, fault tolerant hardware implementations of cryptographic primi-
tives are presented.
3.1 Hardware Implementation of Cryptographic Prim-
itives
Hardware implementation of hash functions have been proposed by several works. One
of the earliest SHA-256 implementation on FPGA is presented in [169], whose two main
goals are minimum implementation area and high performance. In order to achieve that, a
shift register approach was used to implement the SHA-256 algorithm [133]. Actually, the
algorithm is divided into three main blocks: Message Scheduler, Compression Function,
and Intermediate Hash.
The message scheduler, as shown in Figure 3.1, is implemented as a chain of sixteen
32-bit registers. It is responsible for receiving the incoming 512-bit message (Mt) and
computing the intermediate message schedule (Wt). The message scheduler is also in
charge of adding Wt with the constant Kt, and forwarding the result to the Compression
Function.
Similarly to the message scheduler, the compression function is also based on shift
registers, as depicted in Figure 3.2. The compression function receives the message schedule
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Figure 3.1: SHA-256 Message Scheduler Module from [169]
Wt and operates over the registers a through h during 64 clock cycles. In order to improve
the throughput, new blocks of data can be loaded in parallel to the processing of the
compression function.
Figure 3.2: SHA-256 Compression Function Module from [169]
The third block is the intermediate hash computation. As illustrated in Figure 3.3,
it obtains the eight variables a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h to compute the intermediate hash. If no
additional block of data is to be processed, the final hash is obtained from registers
H0, H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, H6, H7. The design was implemented in a Xilinx Virtex XCV300E-8
FPGA, and occupied 1261 slices. It obtained a throughput of 87Mbps and a maximum
frequency of operation of 88MHz. Notice that this implementation considers that message
padding is performed in software.
A more elaborate implementation of hash functions on FPGAs is provided in [104],
where a single chip implementation of SHA-384 and SHA-512 is introduced. That is
possible due to the similarities of SHA-384 and SHA-512 algorithms. More precisely, both
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Figure 3.3: SHA-256 Intermediate Hash Module from [169]




1, Maj, and Ch. Further, both use
a 64-bit datapath which is implemented similarly to the one proposed in [169]. As a matter
of fact, the central idea of the proposed approach is to share the entire datapath. The only
difference, though, refers to the SHA-384 and SHA-512 initialization variables which are
provided to the datapath through the use of multiplexers. Furthermore, the constants
Kt are stored in block RAMs (BRAMs). The design presented in [104] was implemented
on a Xilinx Virtex-E XCV600E-8 FPGA, and occupied 2914 slices. While operating at
the maximum frequency of 38MHz it could achieve a throughput of 479Mbps. The more
innovative aspect of this design is the reutilization of the datapath, which makes possible
the computing of both SHA-384 and SHA-512 utilizing the same chip.
Similarly to [104], a shared datapath implementation for SHA-256, SHA-384, and
SHA-512 was reported in [151]. The authors do not introduce any innovative technique
to increase throughput and decrease implementation area. However, since all algorithms
are implemented in the same platform, the results provide a good comparison in terms of
implementation area, frequency of operation and throughput. Specifically, all algorithms
implemented on a Xilinx Virtex V200PQ240-6 device required 2384 Configurable Logic
Blocks (CLBs). The maximum throughput achieved for SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
was, respectively, 291Mbps, 350Mbps, and 467Mbps.
In [8] alternative architectures are explored for the implementation of SHA-2 functions.
The proposed approach reduce the area requirements by narrowing down the bit width
of adders, e.g. 32, 16, and 8 bits. As a consequence, more than one addition becomes
necessary to add two 64-bit operands. In order to balance area and throughput, the
proposed architecture utilizes Carry Save Adders (CSAs). Precisely, CSAs are formed
by a set of Full Adder Array (FAA) for the intermediate additions, and a Carry Look-
Ahead Adder (CLA) to perform the final sum. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show, respectively,
the proposed design of the SHA-512 message scheduler and compression function using
CSAs. By using CSAs, the authors implemented a SHA-512 using 32 and 64-bit adders on
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an Altera Stratix EP1S10F484C5 FPGA. The SHA-512 utilizing a 32-bit adder employed
2800 Logical Elements (LEs) and achieved a throughput of 892.8Mbps. In turn, when a
64-bit adder was used, the implementation employed 4229 LEs and reached a throughput
of 1226.2Mbps.
Figure 3.4: SHA-512 Message Scheduler using CSAs from [8]
Figure 3.5: SHA-512 Compression Function using CSAs from [8]
There exist several others hardware implementations of SHA-2. Also, some optimiza-
tions based on pipelining, loop unrolling, operation rescheduling, hardware/software ap-
proaches, and hardware reutilization has also been proposed, e.g. in [109, 31, 90].
One of the earliest hardware designs of HMAC based on the SHA-1 hash function
is reported in [105]. This work introduces a single-chip processor for the IPsec protocol
which implements both HMAC/SHA-1 and AES on a Xilinx Virtex-E FPGA [1]. Although
AES is currently used as a standard, the use of SHA-1 may not longer satisfy the security
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requirements of several applications. Unfortunately, the area requirements of the individual
modules are not reported, so that it is not possible to determine the area requirements of
HMAC alone. Both cores can operate independently from each other, which results in a
minor impact (if any) on each other throughput. Actually, the throughput achieved by
this processor is 78Mbps when operating at 50MHz.
Another processor capable of performing both HMAC and SHA-1 is proposed in [149],
but low throughput is achieved. The authors in [170] propose an HMAC processor which
integrates both SHA-1 and MD5 algorithms, and is implemented on an Altera Apex 20K [2].
This processor occupies 5329 LEs and achieves a throughput of 34.7Mbps.
Yet another HMAC design is proposed in [94] and implemented on a Virtex-II [3]
device. Due to the several hash algorithms included (SHA-1, MD5, and RIPEMD-160),
this design utilizes a large implementation area (14911 slices). Besides, this processor
achieves a throughput of 137.40Mbps when operating at 43.47MHz.
An ASIC implementation of HMAC, also based on SHA-1, is presented in [96]. Even
though this design is implemented as an ASIC, it achieves low throughput. The architec-
ture of this processor is shown in Figure 3.6 and is consisted of a hash module, padding and
concatenation circuitry, controllers, constants and registers. Actually, the HMAC proces-
sors presented in [92], [105], [149], and [170] follows the similar architectural organization.
Figure 3.6: HMAC Processor Architecture from [96]
In [108] a high-performance HMAC/SHA-1 design is presented and implemented on
a Xilinx Virtex-E FPGA, whose architecture is shown in Figure 3.7. This processor has
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the highest throughput for HMAC hardware implementation reported in the literature
(1587Mbps) when operating at 62MHz. Such a high throughput is due to the employment
of two SHA-1 cores and pipelining techniques. However, the main drawback of this design
is its large implementation area (6011 slices).
Figure 3.7: HMAC Processor Architecture from [108]
In contrast, an area-efficient HMAC hardware implementation is introduced in [171],
which utilizes only 686 slices and achieves a throughput of 710.4Mbps. This high through-
put is due to architectural improvements such as loop unrolling. Unfortunately the authors
do not provide a discussion on how such a small area was achieved using loop unrolling.
Furthermore, the capabilities of the hardware module are not specified, which makes it hard
to know whether the module is fully compatible with the HMAC specification [129, 133].
Although the aforementioned researchers have explored architectural improvements to
increase throughput and reduce implementation area, they have mainly focused on SHA-1
and MD5 hash algorithms. By the time being, HMAC/SHA-1 and HMAC/MD5 may no
longer satisfy the security requirements of many applications. Hence, it becomes important
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to consider the utilization of stronger hash functions such as SHA-2 in order to satisfy higher
security requirements of recent applications.
As reported in [92], the proposed design outperforms all previous implementations of
HMAC processor, such as in [170, 104, 94], in terms of implementation area and throughput.
For the sake of fair comparisons, the proposed designs were cross-compiled to different
FPGAs (Altera Apex 20K, Xilinx Virtex-E and Virtex-II) in order to match the exact
device utilized by the aforementioned related work.
In recent years several desktop and laptops have utilized Trusted Platforms Modules
(TPMs) for the provision of security functions. TPMs have been specified by the Trusted
Computing Group (TCG) [73], which is an non-profit organization that aims at devel-
oping, defining and promoting open standards for trusted computing. Moreover, TPMs
are currently defined as a standard by the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) [61] under standards ISO/IEC 11889-1 [57], 11889-2 [58], 11889-3 [59], and 11889-
4 [60].
TPMs have been provided as integrated circuits by a number of manufacturers, e.g.
Atmel [44], Infineon [6], Broadcom [46], and ST Microelectronics [111]. In spite of slight
platform variations from one manufacturer to another, they usually follow the TPM archi-
tecture specified by ISO as depicted in Figure 3.8.
Figure 3.8: TPM Architecture from [57]
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A common set of features found in [43, 20, 45, 110] is the utilization of RSA as asym-
metric primitives for encryption and signatures as well as SHA-1 as the hash algorithm.
Furthermore, non-volatile on-chip storage is implemented using EEPROM and sometimes
ROM, whereas it is common to find SRAM for the implementation of volatile memories.
These TPMs are designed for ground applications and cannot be directly employed in space
applications.
Considering the overall space system security, some research [86, 146, 12] has proposed
the use of satellites for key distribution and authentication in communication systems.
However, the satellite security itself has not been addressed. There is limited research
focusing on incorporating security on satellites in spite of constant growth in applications
using them. Only in [143] a proposal is presented to generate cryptographic keys from
features and properties directly associated with the actual satellite. Hence, on-board key
storage could be eliminated. Even though this looks like a very interesting technique, no
algorithms or specific procedures were determined on how cryptographic keys could be
generated. Moreover, such a technique is only valid if we assume that an attacker never
discover the features/properties of a given satellite. Otherwise, an attacker could use that
information to derive future cryptographic keys.
3.2 Fault Tolerant Cryptographic Primitives
Even though the aforementioned work present a wide variety of hardware implementations
of cryptographic primitives, none of them consider fault tolerance. Actually, there is very
limited research on efficient fault tolerant hardware implementations of security algorithms
for space applications.
To the best of our knowledge, fault tolerance was considered for SHA-512 in FPGAs only
in [9]. This work is based on the same architecture presented in [8], and as such, utilizes
CSAs. Fault tolerance is achieved through parity prediction. Basically, the technique
consists of appending 8 parity bits to each SHA-512 64-bit word, i.e. 1 parity bit per
byte. These parity bits are used to predict the output parity of the SHA operations. If the
output parity does not match the predicted one, it means that either the data word or the
operation was corrupted. Thus, errors can be detected.
The design of the proposed scheme applied to the compression function is illustrated in
Figure 3.9. The proposed scheme was implemented on an Altera Stratix EP1S20F780C5
FPGA. Implementation results show utilization of 5038 LEs and a throughput of 372Mbps
for SHA-512. This scheme supports only error detection, while error correction is not
addressed at all.
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Figure 3.9: SHA-512 Datapath with Error Detection from [9]
Another fault tolerant cryptographic primitive found in the literature is presented
in [15]. It aims at providing AES with fault detection and correction capabilities so that it
can be used in space. Fault detection is achieved by employing parity prediction for each
round of AES, as illustrated in Figure 3.10 (a). In the end of each round, the predicted
parity is compared with the calculated parity. If they do not match, some remedial action
takes place.
The approach for fault detection and correction presented in [15] is based on Hamming
codes. Specifically, it encodes the word bytes with Hamming code. Also, as shown in 3.10
(b), this scheme predicts the Hamming code of a given round and compares with the
calculated code. If they differ, some error has happened, which demands the execution of
a remedial procedure to correct the bit-flip. Although the Hamming code scheme seemed
very interesting, no implementation data was provided by the authors. As a consequence,
its real implementation feasibility could not be evaluated.
Some fault tolerant techniques aim at performing re-computation with encoded operands.
A description of such a technique can be found in [87] and [101]. This approach is capable
of detecting permanent and transient faults happening in the circuit. One of the earliest
works employing such a technique is presented in [144], in which error detection in ALUs
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.10: AES Round with (a) Error Detection and (b) Error Detection and Correction
from [15]
are detected through the recomputation with shifted operands.
A more recent approach applied to scalar multiplication frequently used in elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC) is presented in [50]. Even though ECC is not currently used in
space applications, the fault tolerance technique presented in [50] can be useful in future
implementations of such primitives on-board spacecrafts.
The elliptic curve scalar multiplication (ECSM) takes as inputs a point (P ) and a scalar
(k) and computes another point (Q), i.e. Q = kP . The encoding technique proposed
in [50] relies on randomization of point P and scalar k in order to generate different
points and scalars. Due to the efficient way the point randomization is proposed, no point
decodification is required if projective coordinates are utilized. Hence, no point decoders
are necessary. A block diagram of an ECSM using full recomputation with point and scalar
randomization is shown in Figure 3.11.
The proposed encoding scheme, combined with the traditional TMR and DMR tech-
niques, makes it possible for the derivation or a wide variety of fault tolerance methods for
ECSM, as shown in Figures 3.12 (a) and (b).
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Figure 3.11: ECSM using Full Recomputation with Point and Scalar Randomization
from [50]
(a) (b)
Figure 3.12: ECSM using Point and Scalar Randomization with (a) DMR and (b) TMR
from [50]
Yet another scheme, denoted as parallel and recomputation, is proposed in [50] so that
both low area requirements (as in DMR) and low probability of incorrect results (as in
TMR) can be obtained. A block representation of such a technique is shown in Figure 3.13.
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Figure 3.13: ECSM using Parallel and Recomputation with Point and Scalar Randomiza-
tion from [50]
3.3 Fault Injection Attacks
The main issue being addressed by the fault tolerance techniques presented in Chapters 6
and 7 are random faults caused by SEUs. On the other hand, there are multiple ways for
an attacker to intentionally inject faults in order to compromise a cryptographic system.
Attackers may target a specific bit or byte, exploit injection of specific or random data,
and aim at data or control errors [95]. According to [76], fault injection can be categorized
as fault injection with contact or without contact.
In [16] a wide variety of types of attacks are listed, such as perturbations to the power
supply and the clock frequency, variations of temperature, bombardment by light, lasers,
eletromagnetic pulses and waves (although light can be considered electromagnetic ra-
diation), X-rays and ion beams. Perturbations to the power supply has the potential
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of causing the processor to skip or misinterpret instructions. Variations in the external
clock can cause the cause the processor to lose synchronism with the system bus and
advance/delay a memory read as well as advancing to the execution of next instruction
before completing the previous one. Moreover, temperature variations beyond the nomi-
nal thresholds of the target device can cause random data modification of RAM cells. In
addition, most non-volatile memories have different temperature thresholds for read and
write cycles. Therefore, attacks could rely on temperature variation to exploit this feature
and cause the memory to perform read but not write cycles, and vice-versa.
Photo-electric effects on electric circuits can also be exploited. In other words, silicon
illumination can potentially ionize semiconductor regions and cause a transistor to conduct.
As a result, a transient fault can be induced. The authors in [152], for instance, that
this attack can be performed with cheap equipment, such as a $30 photo-camera flash or
a $8 laser pointer. The first step consisted in removing the top packaging of a micro-
controller Microchip PIC16F84 [79] to expose its 68 bytes of SRAM. The attack consisted
in illuminating the memory region of the chip with a Vivitar 550FD photo flash lamp.
Through a mask made of aluminum foil, the authors were capable to change the state of
a single SRAM cell. This represents a fine granularity and give an attacker the power to
change any memory bit he/she may want to. This is specially important in attacks that
require a single bit-flip in a pre-determined position of a storage element, instead of having
a region of the device set or preset.
Another attack based upon illumination is presented in [147], in which the contents
of a non-volatile is erased through the utilization of ultra-violet light (254nm). Although
the presented approach is destructive (causing damages to the device), it shows that such
an attack multiple micro-controllers utilizing a variety of memory technology (EPROM,
EEPROM, Flash, Fuse bits) can be compromised. Furthermore, the authors have shown
how to apply such a technique to attack software implementations of AES by manipulating
256-bit S-box tables. They show through an 8-bit micro-controller that, by changing
a single bit in the AES S-box, it is possible to obtain 2500 pairs of correct and faulty
ciphertexts are enough to recover the key with a probability of 90%.
Although a number of other attacks targeting DES and AES have been proposed [18,
51, 19, 68, 112], there are, to the best of our knowledge, no fault injection attacks against
SHA-2 and HMAC reported in the literature.
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3.4 Summary
Apart from the research outlined above, there is very limited research addressing the
recovery of spacecrafts that have suffered failures due to SEUs or attacks. Thus, efficient
recovery techniques should be thoroughly investigated. Recovery techniques and integrity
checking may involve the computation of hash functions. However, due to the sensitivity
of cryptographic algorithms to bit-flips, and given the radiation effects found in space, any
cryptographic mechanism employed on-board should include fault tolerance. Although
hardware implementations of hash functions has been extensively researched, no error
detection and correction was ever considered for this cryptographic primitive. Even though
TMR has been traditionally used as an SEU mitigation technique in space applications,
it usually imposes the triplication of implementation area and power consumption. As a
consequence, more efficient schemes should be investigated to reduce implementation area
and power consumption of fault tolerant integrity checking and authentication schemes.
Next chapter introduces a trusted platform to enable control centers to recover space-
crafts from failures and attacks. Furthermore, Chapters 6 and 7 presents efficient fault
tolerance techniques to perform both error detection and correction in hardware imple-




This chapter addresses the problem of securely recovering spacecrafts’ computational plat-
form in case of major failures and attacks. Two approaches are proposed which are based on
different threat and trust models. The first approach is based on hash functions and can be
employed in current systems already in space. The second one is based trusted modules and
aims at achieving higher levels of security therefore addressing harsher threat models. The
trusted modules approach is analyzed against exhaustive search attacks which, to the best
of our knowledge, is the only way to break the system. Exhaustive search attacks against
the proposed mechanism are shown to be infeasible, independently of the computational
power and communications capabilities of ground-based attackers. Through experimental
results it has been shown that the proposed recovery strategy allow for the secure recov-
ery of spacecrafts, including contingency situations, demanding minimum implementation
area, power consumption and communication capabilities.
4.1 Reference Platform
The spacecraft’s computational platform considered in this chapter is assumed to be com-
prised of a general-purpose processor, an FPGA, volatile and non-volatile memories, com-
munication modules, a reconfiguration circuit, as well as payload modules. Those elements
are inter connected through a common bus. Additionally, a Joint Test Action Group
(JTAG) connection links the reconfiguration circuit to the FPGA. Such a platform is illus-
trated in Figure 4.1. Since this platform does not involve any trusted module, it is denoted
as Untrusted Computational Platform.
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Figure 4.1: Untrusted Computational Platform
The processor is employed in general-purpose computational tasks, including communi-
cations activities, commands and telemetry processing, collection and processing of mission
data from payload modules, and management of payload activities, to cite a few. The pro-
cessor is connected to the system bus, where it can access all the peripheral modules.
The FPGA provides a flexible hardware platform that can complement the processor
capabilities and provide hardware acceleration to more complex tasks. Like the processor,
the FPGA connects to the system bus. In addition, a JTAG connection links the FPGA
to the Reconfiguration Module.
A volatile memory, usually SDRAM, is available for storing the processor’s program
as well as application’s data. This memory can be accessed by the processor, FPGA,
communication modules, and payload modules through the system bus.
Besides, a non-volatile memory, usually a ROM, provides permanent storage of basic
functionalities of the spacecraft, which includes a standard program as well as a configu-
ration file to provide basic functionalities for both the processor and the FPGA.
The reconfiguration module is in charge of initializing the computational platform, i.e.
the processor’s program memory and the FPGA. The processor programs are copied from
the ROM to the SDRAM memory through the system bus. Besides, this module configures
the FPGA through a JTAG connection.
The communication modules performs the tasks of sending and receiving radio fre-
quency (RF) signals to and from ground stations. As such, these modules have a direct
connection with the spacecraft antennas. These modules are also in charge of interfacing
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the system bus by encoding and decoding RF signals into digital signals. The security level
of each mission will dictate the security requirements of the communications system, which
may or may not include encryption, data origin authentication and data integrity. These
functions can be provided by cryptographic mechanisms accommodated within the com-
munication modules, or within the processor stack of protocols for secure communications.
Security mechanisms and implementation details are individually defined in accordance
with mission-specific requirements.
Last but not least, the payload modules are responsible to execute the specific tasks for
which the spacecraft was designed. For instance, meteorological and scientific spacecrafts
may monitor different wave lengths coming from Earth and deep space. Communication
and navigation satellites may receive and send signals to conduct their respective tasks and
therefore may also connect to antennas. In sum, their functions varies with the mission
type and mission-specific requirements.
4.2 Hash Based Approach
It is important to mention that the hash-based approach targets contingency situations
where no secured channel is in place due to the loss of cryptographic key. Put differently,
if the spacecraft has the capability of performing key establishment based on private-key
or public-key primitives, that should be adopted as the preferred strategy.
4.2.1 Trust and Threat Model
The trust model considered in this approach assumes that:
• the spacecraft has some hardwired information, represented by k′, built-in during the
construction of its computational platform;
• k′ is known by the institution building the spacecraft’s hardware and is disclosed
solely to the agency controlling the spacecraft;
• k′ has to be readable by the processing elements of the computational platform such
as microprocessors and FPGAs;
• the medium storing k′ should be immune to SEUs; and
• the spacecraft has access to a hash algorithm on-board.
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Notice that it may happen in multiple occasions that the agency controlling the space-
craft is the same as the one that has built it. In other cases, the controlling agency can
provide hardware modules to the contractor, therefore reducing the risk of leaking k′.
Considering current spacecrafts, k′ could be serial numbers, ID numbers, or any other
data that only the spacecraft and the control center know. It would be even better if k′ was
randomly created during the spacecraft construction, so that the likelihood of guessing k′
would be minimized. Moreover, a bigger k′ could be formed by concatenating more than
one source of information. In new spacecrafts, k′ should be randomly generated.
It would not be appropriate to rely on k′ if it is stored in a volatile FPGA since it could
get corrupted by SEUs or lost during reconfiguration. Furthermore, k′ must never be used
as a key, but as a seed for deriving temporary keys.
The threat model considered for the hash-based approach assumes that an attacker:
• can listen to all RF signals used for communications (ground station–spacecraft,
spacecraft–spacecraft);
• has the capability of sending his/her own RF signals to the spacecraft;
• knows the data format of an authentic control signal used by a valid control center;
• does not know or have access to k′; and
• never breaks into the spacecraft. In other words, it is assumed that the attacker
cannot tamper or reconfigure elements of the on-board computational platform (e.g.
program memory and FPGA configuration).
The hash-based scheme is completely dependent on the secrecy of k′. Hence, this piece
of information must be kept secret at all times. Once this value is discovered or leaked by
any means, the hash based scheme can never be reused to re-establish a secured channel
with the control center. Once k′ is read by an attacker, he or she has learned the most
important piece of information that is used to create cryptographic keys. Actually, this is
the reason to assume in this threat model that an attacker cannot break into the spacecraft.
If someone is able to reconfigure the processor or the FPGA for example, it would be trivial
to command those elements to read k′ and send it to the attacker via RF.
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4.2.2 Key Generation Protocol
Given the aforementioned trust and threat model, the recovery can be performed by the
protocol shown in Figure 4.2. The control center and the spacecraft maintain an l-bit
counter, e.g. l = 32 bits, which is used to determine n. The control center sends n to the
spacecraft. Upon the reception of n, the spacecraft compares the received n with the value
of its internal counter. If they match, the key generation takes place.
To construct a new symmetric key k, the spacecraft concatenates k′ with n, and com-
putes its hash (represented by H()). More precisely, k := H(k′||n). In addition, the control
center performs the same computation. At this point, the spacecraft and the control center
share the same session key k. Upon finishing such a computation, the spacecraft sends a
status message to the control center informing that it is possible to re-establish a secured
channel. If a secured channel can be in fact established, both control center and spacecraft
increments the counter defining n.
Figure 4.2: Protocol for Hash-Based Key Generation
This approach is relatively simple, only requiring the computation of one hash. For
the procedure above, no encryption is utilized which contributes to speedup the procedure,
save processing power and reduce power consumption.
Encryption is only needed in the case of requiring key confirmation. Depending on
the space mission, such a step may be optional. It could be performed through the use
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of a nonce, n′, generated by the control center. The control center would perform the
encryption of n′, represented by EK(n
′), and send the cyphertext c1 to the spacecraft. The
spacecraft would decrypt c1, represented by DK(c1), to recover n
′. Next, the spacecraft
would create a cyphertext c2 by encrypting (n
′ − 1), and send c2 to the control center.
Finally, the control center could verify that it shares the same key with the spacecraft by
decrypting c2 and checking whether it received (n
′ − 1) from the spacecraft.
Observe that n brings freshness to the key generation, ensuring that every time n
changes, so does the key k. Thus, it is possible for the spacecraft to frequently change
the cryptographic keys. This feature is also useful to prevent replay attacks. The bit-
length of k′ and n has not been specified since those parameters are application-specific
and directly dependent on the security level of the space mission. The generated key k
should be long enough to match the mission security level and a hash function should be
chosen accordingly.
Assuming the utilization of cryptographic hash functions, it would be infeasible for an
attacker to compute k from n, if k′ remains unknown to the attacker. As a consequence,
only the control center and the spacecraft can generate the same key k since they are the
only two entities knowing k′. Due to its simplicity, it can be used in contingency situation
in either existing or new spacecrafts, and also reused as many times as it becomes necessary
by simply changing the nonce n.
The main disadvantage of the hash-based approach is that it does not tolerate any
attacker breaking into the spacecraft. Also, it always relies on cryptographic primitives
available for use such as hash functions and encryption. In this approach there is no
way to hide the k′ from someone controlling the processing elements of the computational
platform. Besides, it is not possible to recover the spacecraft from the hands of an attacker
since he/she can reconfigure the computational platform at his/her own benefit.
4.3 Trusted Module Approach
This section aims at providing a reliable methodology to recover the spacecraft from failures
or even if an attacker has gained control over it. The trusted platform allows for the
computational platform to be brought to a safe state as well as for the recovery of its
cryptographic capabilities, even when an attacker has gained control over the spacecraft.
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4.3.1 Trust and Threat Model
The trust model considered in this approach relies on on-board secrets to issue trusted
resets and temporary cryptographic keys. The trust model assumes that:
• the trusted modules store a set of secret information;
• only the control center (authentic entity) knows the secret information;
• once a secret information is used, it is destroyed;
• a recovery mechanism handles corrupted on-board secrets, so that the system stay
synchronized with the control center;
• a cryptographic hash is available to perform the integrity check of the untrusted
elements of the computational platform;
• there is a direct connection between the trusted modules and the communication
module; and
• the recovery can rely on a non-volatile memory that contains a default system con-
figuration data.
The secure path between the communications module and the trusted platform is
mandatory so that a man-in-the-middle attack within the spacecraft’s circuitry is im-
possible. This way, all the commands received from a control center are guaranteed to be
sent to the trusted modules unmodified.
A default system configuration is stored in a non-volatile memory (e.g. PROM), and it
contains basic functionalities that will provide the spacecraft with a safe operational state.
More precisely, the PROM stores a minimum program to be loaded into the processor’s
program memory and the FPGA configuration file. Even though this threat model assumes
that FPGA reconfiguration may occur, addressing the reconfiguration details is out of scope
for this research.
This threat model allows for the consideration of harsher scenarios compared to the
hash-based approach. However, it requires the utilization of trusted modules on-board
spacecrafts. Thus, the trusted module approach can only be applied to spacecrafts under
planning, and eventually, under construction.
Since the trusted modules described are meant to operate in space, they are made
fault tolerant. As such, besides being immune to SEUs their functionalities should not be
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modified by an attacker. The remaining of the computing platform, which might include
processors and FPGAs, is considered as untrusted. Therefore, the threat model assumes
that an attacker can:
• can listen to all RF signals used for communications (ground station–spacecraft,
spacecraft–spacecraft);
• has the capability of sending his/her own RF signals to the spacecraft;
• knows the data format of an authentic control signal used by a valid control center;
• explore security breaches and eventually break into the spacecraft to modify the
FPGA configuration and the program memory, which would give him/her plenty
control over the spacecraft’s untrusted computational platform;
• interface directly with the trusted modules.
Due to the way the trusted modules are implemented, such an attacker would not have
the ability to access the secrets stored within them. Even exhaustive search would be
infeasible for an attacker with direct access to the module interface. Hence, the trusted
modules can be used as a trust point in the event of a system recovery.
4.3.2 Trusted Computational Platform
The trusted computational platform is based upon the platform introduced in Section 4.1
with the addition of trusted modules (TMs). Man-in-the-middle attacks in the system bus
are avoided by splitting the system bus in two main sections which are interconnected by
the (TM), as shown in Figure 4.3.
Notice the all elements of the platform may be tampered with by an attacker, but the
TM. Therefore, the TM is always capable of performing integrity check, ordering system
reconfiguration, as well as receiving untampered commands from control centers without
the (man-in-the-middle) bus intervention of an attacker.
Furthermore, the TM divides the system bus in two segments. During normal operation
of the computational platform, the TM simply by passes the signals from one segment to
another. However, during recovery procedures, the TM can isolate the system bus from
crucial components of the platform such as the communication modules and SDRAM in
order to isolate the range of possibilities of an attacker controlling the processor or FPGA.
74
Therefore, it is possible for the TM to perform two fundamental tasks: 1) receive authentic
commands from the ground station to initiate the recovery process; 2) check the integrity of
the SDRAM and FPGA configuration, the latter performed through the JTAG connection.
Figure 4.3: Trusted Computational Platform
Main goal of each TM is to be as simple as possible to provide high reliability, efficient
hardware implementation, and allow for fast recovery procedures. The recovery sequence
is: 1) detect lack of integrity on the computational platform; 2) bring the platform to a
reliable state; and 3) restore a secured communication channel with the control center.
The TM is further subdivided in three main modules, namely Trusted Hash and Config-
uration Module (THCM), Trusted Reset Module (TRM), and Trusted Key Recovery Module
(TKM). A random number generator (RNG) is also considered part of the platform, but
since RNGs hardware modules are easily found nowadays, they are not discussed in this
research.
4.3.2.1 Trusted Hash and Configuration Module
The Trusted Hash and Configuration Module is responsible for checking the integrity of
the computational platform. More precisely, it is responsible for hashing the contents of
the program memory and the current FPGA configuration through the utilization of a
secure hash function such as SHA-2. This trusted module also contains some configu-
ration circuitry employed in the re-initialization of the processor’s program memory and
in the FPGA re-configuration. Basically, this is a similar approach to the read-back and
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reconfiguration technique introduced in Chapter 2. As can be noticed, fault tolerant hash
functions must be employed in this trusted module to perform cryptographic hashes. Ef-
ficient schemes for fault tolerant hash functions are presented in Section 6.
By relying on the THCM it becomes possible to detect when one of the spacecraft
processing elements gets corrupted. The following step is the recovery of the spacecraft
integrity. This process starts with the issue of a trusted reset. Next, the key recovery takes
place, which allows for the recovery of a secured channel with the control center. Although
the trusted key issue usually follows a trusted reset, the following two sections present first
the TKM and then the TRM. The reason for that, is the simplicity in understanding the
idea behind the TRM once the TKM is presented.
4.3.2.2 Trusted Key Recovery Module
The Trusted Key Recovery Module is responsible for recovering cryptographic keys. This
module employs a table to store l keys (k1, k2, ..., kl). This table is indexed by a number
n, which is b bits long, thus leading to an address space of size 2b. Actually, n is denoted
as One-Time Key Recovery Secret and is sent by a control center to the spacecraft in the
event of a key recovery (the recovery protocol is discussed in detail in Section 4.3.5). If the
memory position indexed by n holds a key, such a key is output. It is important to mention
that n should never be used as a key. Otherwise, any entity listening to the communication
could use n to decrypt future encrypted messages.
The strength of this module relies on two fundamental features: i) the l cryptographic
keys are randomly distributed throughout an address space of size 2b, and ii) b is big enough
to make it infeasible for an attacker to find a position containing a key through exhaustive
search. An abstraction of this module is presented in Figure 4.4.
Even though a huge address space is considered for this approach, only l elements
are necessary for key storage. Precisely, the number of key recoveries planned for the
system defines l. Therefore, the greater l, the longer the spacecraft protection against
key losses. On the other hand, the smaller l, the less storage is needed on-board. Some
scenarios considered in this chapter, for example, employs l = 64, 128, and 256, along with
b = 64, 128, and 256 bits and 128-bit keys.
A fundamental feature that implies in the security of TKM is that, once a given key is
read, it is removed from the secrets table and never used again. Thus, the reutilization of
n is automatically forbidden by the TKM. As a result, replay attacks are impossible to be
performed against the system.
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Figure 4.4: Trusted Key Recovery Module
4.3.2.3 Trusted Key Reset Module
The Trusted Reset Module is responsible for issuing authenticated reset signals, which is
subsequently used to bring the spacecraft to a reliable state from which the rest of the
system can be recovered. The reset signal causes the FPGA to be reconfigured (with
minimum capabilities) and the program memory to be restored. Although not always
necessary, the trusted reset would usually precede a trusted key recovery.
The TRM works similarly to the TKM. It receives an b-bit secret s, which is now
denoted as One-Time Reset Secret. Similarly to the TRM employs a table to store reset
secrets, which is in turn indexed by s. However, instead of outputting a key it issues a
trusted reset. More precisely, the reset signal is issued when the trusted module receives a
valid s.
Furthermore, once a reset position is used, it is automatically destroyed and therefore
can never be reutilized. This prevents an attacker from using an old reset secret s to
perform a replay attack.
4.3.3 Trusted Modules Hardware Design
The design of the TRM and TKM consists of main four components: control unit, address
counter, secrets table and compare secret unit. In particular, the TKM also employs a
table to store the cryptographic keys. The internal architecture of the trusted modules is
shown in Figure 4.5.
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The control unit is responsible for receiving the one-time secret and coordinating its
evaluation. The whole process takes four clock cycles to: 1) access to the secrets table;
2) compare the stored secret with the received one; 3) destroy the used secret; and 4)
increment the address counter. Even though the TRM and TKM have different functions,
their architecture are very similar. The only difference, represented by the dashed lines
in Figure 4.5, is the additional circuitry for managing the cryptographic keys within the
TKM.
Figure 4.5: Trusted Reset and Key Recovery Modules Architecture
The secrets table stores l secrets, each of them b bits wide, which are protected against
errors by the use of hamming codes. Actually, all secrets are stored in an encoded form,
by adding p parity bits for each storage element. When the memory is read, an internal
Hamming decoder corrects an eventual bit-flip caused by SEUs and sends the secret to
the secret compare unit. The implementation of TRM considered in this chapter explores
secrets as large as 64, 128 and 256 bits, which require the addition of 7, 8, and 9 parity
bits, respectively. Hence, the memory requirement to store the secrets is given by l∗(b+p).
In the case of the TKM, secrets and keys are stored together in the same storage
element. This joint storage allows for the saving of parity bits in its Hamming encoded
form, thus requiring only 8, 8, and 9 parity bits, respectively to encode the 64, 128 and
256-bit secrets along with the 128-bit keys. The memory requirement of TKM to store the
secrets along with the keys is l ∗ (128 + b+ p).
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Furthermore, if an unrecoverable error is found in the stored secret or key, e.g. two
bit-flips, the control unit is notified by the Hamming decoder. Consequently, the address
counter is incremented and the control center instructed to use the next one-time secret.
One-time secrets are indexed sequentially through a pointer generated by the address
counter unit.
The address counter unit consists of a fault tolerant (log2l)-bit counter, allowing for
up to l resets/key recoveries. It relies on a Hamming encoder/decoder pair to keep the
counter in an encoded form, so that it can correct any bit-flip that might have occurred in
the counter register.
Once the stored secret is read from the secrets table, it is sent to the compare secret
unit. The compare secret unit performs a bit-wise comparison between the stored secret and
the one-time secret under test. From the comparison results, the control unit determines
whether or not to issue a reset signal (a key, in the case of the TKM). If the one-time
secret was “guessed” correctly, i.e. it is a valid secret, the secrets table position where it
was stored is zeroed. In the case of the TKM, the corresponding key is also destroyed in
the keys table. Finally, the control unit increments the address counter therefore preparing
the trusted module for the next recovery process. In each counter increment, the counter
register is re-encoded to reflect its new value.
Yet another fault tolerant mechanism is adopted to protect the address counter, and
therefore increase the reliability of the trusted modules. In case of an uncorrectable error
in the address counter, its value can be reset by the control unit. In the sequence, the
control unit executes a series of counter increments, until it detects that the secret coming
from the secrets table is non-zero (all used secrets have been zeroed). This mechanism also
protects from the event of having a bit-flip in a zeroed element, which could potentially
be mistaken as a valid secret. However, its parity bits would not match and the Hamming
decoder would automatically discard such an invalid secret. At this point, it knows that
the address pointer has been recovered to its correct position.
4.3.4 Experimental Results
In order to analyze the feasibility of the proposed architectures, hardware implementations
of TRM and TKM were carried out utilizing an Altera CycloneII EP2C35F672C6 FPGA.
The tool employed for the hardware description, synthesis, place-and-route, as well as for
power estimations was QuartusII version 7.2.
As shown in Table 4.1, the simplest implementation of TRM is based on 64-bit secrets
and can issue up to 64 reset signals. In this configuration, the module occupies 502 LEs,
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uses 4608 memory bits to implement the secrets table. When operating at 62.24MHz this
module consumes 10.78mW of dynamic power. The sum of I/O power dissipation with
static power dissipation for TRM is about 81mW.
Table 4.1: TRM Implementation Results
Secret # of Area Memory Frequency Dynamic Power
(bits) Resets (LEs) (bits) (MHz) (mW)
64 502 4608 62.24 10.78
64 128 507 9216 63.50 11.03
256 512 18432 63.03 12.25
64 887 8768 59.01 14.83
128 128 892 17536 58.97 16.17
256 901 35072 58.83 16.80
64 1642 17024 57.14 17.37
256 128 1647 34048 56.06 19.28
256 1654 68096 54.18 20.56
The most secure version of TRM, which uses 256-bit secrets and is able to issue up to
256 reset signals, occupies 1654 LEs and utilizes 68096 memory bits. This module runs at
54.18MHz and at that frequency it consumes 20.56mW.
Compared to the least secure version, the more secure one demands 3.3 times more
area, almost 14.8 times more memory bits, and consumes 1.9 times more dynamic power.
For the sake of comparison, similar hardware implementation is performed for TKM,
i.e. using the same secret sizes and number of key recoveries as the TRMs. The results
reported in Table 4.2 are based on the same hardware implementation parameters employed
for the TRMs.
Furthermore, the results shown in Table 4.2 refer to the TKM issuing 128-bit keys.
In its simplest version, the module uses 64-bit secrets and can issue up to 64 keys. This
module occupies 1213 LEs and employs 12864 memory bits. While operating at 56.73MHz
this module consumes 21.34mW. Again, the I/O and static power dissipation of all TKMs
is about 81mW.
On the other hand, the most secure version of TKM is based on 256-bit secrets and
allows for 256 key recoveries. This module utilizes 2372 LEs and requires 100864 memory
bits. It consumes 40.65mW when operating at 50.73MHz. Moreover, this module occupies
1.95 times more area, and consumes 1.9 more dynamic power than its simplest version.
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Table 4.2: TKM Implementation Results (128-bit Keys)
Secret # of Area Memory Frequency Dynamic Power
(bits) Keys (LEs) (bits) (MHz) Power (mW)
64 1213 12864 56.73 21.34
64 128 1219 25728 55.34 20.92
256 1224 51456 58.33 23.33
64 1674 17024 55.78 29.81
128 128 1686 34048 55.19 29.97
256 1691 68096 57.57 31.96
64 2356 25216 52.97 38.05
256 128 2356 50432 51.75 39.23
256 2372 100864 50.73 40.65
The processing time of each module is listed in Table 4.3, from which it is possible to
observe that all modules are quite efficient in terms of processing time. The slowest and
the fastest TRM have processing times 73.83ns and 64.27ns, respectively. Similarly, the
slowest TKM executes a key recovery in 78.85ns, while the fastest one performs the same
operation in 68.58ns.
Table 4.3: TRM and TKM Processing Times
Secret # of Processing Time (ns)
(bits) Keys/Resets TRM TKM
64 64.27 70.51
64 128 62.99 72.28
256 63.46 68.58
64 67.79 71.71
128 128 67.83 72.48
256 67.99 69.48
64 70.00 75.51




From time to time, during the normal operation of the spacecraft, the THCM checks
the integrity of the SDRAM and the FPGA’s current configuration. This is based on
a cryptographic hash and cannot be disturbed by any attacker, even if he/she gained
control over the processor. That happens due to the bus isolation provided by the TM
as well as by the JTAG bus. Hence, if any lack of integrity of the program memory or
FPGA configuration will be discovered. Again, the lack of integrity may have been cause
unintentionally due to radiation, or intentionally by an attacker.
The computed hashes are then sent to the control center. Since the TM have a di-
rect hardware connection with the communications modules there is no means for an
attacker to disrupt the communication with the control center. Thus, the control center
will be informed of any data corruption on the system’s components, when it happens.
Given that the control center knows the hashes of the FPGA configuration and program
memory, a simple comparison determines whether the spacecraft has some crucial compo-
nent corrupted. If necessary, the recovery procedure will be initiated, as depicted by the
challenge-response protocol in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Protocol for Trusted Reset
In order to proceed with the trusted reset, the control center first requests the initiation
of the trusted reset protocol. Then the spacecraft generates a random number r and sends
it to the control center. After that, the control center picks a fresh one-time secret s,
performs an exclusive-or (⊕) of s with r, and responds (r⊕ s) to the spacecraft. Since the
spacecraft knows r and (r ⊕ s), it performs (r ⊕ s)⊕ r, and recovers s.
After determining s, the TRM indexes its secrets table. If s corresponds to a valid
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address, a general reset signal is issued. Next, the content of the accessed address is
destroyed. In other words, an attacker could listen to s but could never reuse it in a
replay attack to issue a new system reset. Therefore, this action is performed only once
and uniquely by the holder of the one-time reset secret s. As a result of the reset signal,
the THCM restores the contents of the FPGA and the program memory to a default
configuration. The default configuration includes cryptographic primitives that can be
used later to re-establish a secured channel with the control center.
In the sequence, the spacecraft will send a status message to the control center, which
contains information on the success of the reset operation. The spacecraft could optionally
compute a new hash of the FPGA and memory contents therefore providing confirma-
tion that the contents of the aforementioned elements have been restored to their default
configuration.
After these steps, the spacecraft has recovered the integrity of its computational plat-
form, i.e. it is in a safe state. However, it does not have a secured channel with the control
center. At this point the key recovery protocol takes place, as illustrated in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7: Protocol for Trusted Key Recovery
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Similarly to the trusted reset, the key recovery procedure starts with the control center
requesting the initiation of the protocol. For this protocol, the one-time secret is denoted
as n. The spacecraft generates a new random number r′ and sends it to the control center.
Then, the control center computes (r′ ⊕ n) and sends it back to the spacecraft. Next, by
knowing r′ and (r′ ⊕ n), the spacecraft recovers n. In the sequence, the TKM uses n to
index its secrets table. Finally, the secrets table outputs a cryptographic key, which is
followed by the re-establishment of a secured and authenticated channel with the control
center. Likewise the hash-based approach, key confirmation is optional and dependent on
the requirements of the space mission. Key confirmation would proceed exactly the same
as presented for the hash-based approach.
Additionally, the control center can use the (new) secured channel to send new program
and FPGA configuration files to the spacecraft. This may be an important step, since
attacks or failures may have occurred due to bugs or security holes in the previous system’s
embedded hardware (FPGA) or software (program memory).
Although a worst case scenario has been described, the recovery can be simpler de-
pending on the type of the failure. For example, it may be necessary only to recover a
cryptographic key, where the spacecraft reset may not be needed.
4.3.6 Resistance Against Attacks
The previous section discussed the recovery procedure considering a 3-way challenge-
response protocol. One may argue that it would be much faster and cheaper not to use the
challenge-response protocol, and instead of that, send s and n directly to the spacecraft.
That is a valid argument, however the challenge-response protocol helps to increase the
security of the system, and simultaneously lower implementation requirements by taking
into account the time t spent in the communications between the ground station and the
spacecraft. More precisely, the communication time t (in seconds) is determined by t = d/c,
where d is the distance (in Km) between Earth and the spacecraft, and c is the speed of
light in vacuum (299,792.458 Km/s).
This point becomes much clearer when observed from the perspective of an attacker.
Without the challenge-response protocol, an attacker could speedup a exhaustive search
attack by sending a stream of (invalid) one-time secret, one after the other, to the space-
craft. In fact, the delay between two trials would be the time spent by the spacecraft to
process the one-time secret, which is performed quite quickly. For instance, the trusted
modules take at maximum 78ns to perform a trusted key recovery.
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Now, considering the challenge-response protocol, an attacker cannot perform any bet-
ter than exchanging 3 messages with the spacecraft. As a consequence, by discarding the
status message, an attacker is forced to spend 3t seconds in communication time between
two trials.
Table 4.4: Recovery Protocol Delay
Orbit Distance d from Protocol Delay
Type Earth (Km) (3 messages) (s)
LEO 80 (minimum) 2.40x10−3
MEO 1,700 (minimum) 5.10x10−2
GEO/GSO 35,700 (minimum) 1.07
Mars 78,338,750 (average) 2.35x103
Table 4.4 shows the protocol delay, considering the exchange of 3 messages, for different
kinds of satellites [137], e.g. Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), and
Geostationary/Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO/GSO) satellites. An estimate of the average
communication time with a satellite orbiting Mars [122] is also included given the interests
of many space agencies on that planet. A control center that knows the one-time secrets
would spend 2.4ms on the challenge-response protocol while recovering a LEO satellite. If
the satellite was orbiting Mars, it would spend 2350s (about 39 minutes). We are assuming
that these communication delays are acceptable for control centers in most cases, and is
worth doing because of the extra security that it brings to the system.
Actually, the main point in utilizing an approach based on the challenge-response pro-
tocol is to reduce secrets size and as consequently implementation area. This approach
may not favor a fast recoveries in contingency situations. However, it does not necessarily
mean that control centers are forced to adopt the challenge-response protocol. The secret
size can be perfectly adjusted to provide the secure recovery without compromising the
security of the system. The appropriate secrets size would then be defined in accordance
to the security level required by the associated space mission.
In order to determine the strength of the modules against exhaustive search attacks, the
delay caused by the recovery protocol must be taken into account. Because of the trusted
modules’ processing times are quite small in face of the protocol delay, the former can be
disregarded in the determination of the total time spent in an exhaustive search attack
discussed next. Additionally, the total number of trials that an attacker must perform
in an exhaustive search attack is 2b, where b is the number of bits of the one-time secret.
Moreover, an attacker must wait for the end of each protocol run in order to launch another
trial. Thus, the total time (in seconds) spent in an exhaustive search attack is 2b∗3t, where
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3t is the time spent exchanging 3 protocol messages as given by Table 4.4. The total time
(in years) spent in an exhaustive search attack against the trusted modules are presented
in Table 4.5. Notice that such an exhaustive search is completely independent of the
computational power of attackers.
Table 4.5: Exhaustive Search Attack against Trusted Modules
Secret Exhaustive Search Attack (years)
(bits) LEO MEO GEO Mars
64 1.40x109 2.99x1010 6.27x1011 1.38x1015
128 2.59x1028 5.51x1029 1.16x1031 2.54x1034
256 8.82x1066 1.87x1068 3.94x1069 8.64x1072
The least secure system is obtained when 64-bit secrets are used in conjunction with
LEO satellites. In this case, an exhaustive search attack would take 1.40x109 years. How-
ever, the farther the spacecraft is, the more secure the scheme becomes for the same secret
size. For instance, a spacecraft implementing the same modules, but orbiting Mars, would
raise the total time of an exhaustive search attack to 1.38x1015 years. If the construction
constraints of the spacecraft allows for the use of more hardware area, 256-bit secrets could
be used. As a result, an exhaustive search attack would become in the order of 1057 harder.
For example, it would take 8.82x1066 for an attacker to break such a system implemented
in LEO satellites, where as this number would increase to 8.64x1072 years for satellites
orbiting Mars.
Man-in-the-middle attacks would require an attacker spacecraft to be positioned in
such a way that it is possible to intercept RF signals that an authentic spacecraft is receiv-
ing/transmitting. Besides, jamming should be performed with precise timing. Specifically,
he/she should be capable of receiving the incoming signal to acquire data (e.g. r,r′,r⊕n, or
r′⊕n), as well as jamming it in the direction of the target entity so that it is not properly
received. If these conditions are met, such an attacker could discover the one-time secret for
future attacks, e.g. to improperly perform a reset. Notice that, if the attacker is not in the
proper orbital position, such a signal interception may not be possible. In addition, since
spacecrafts may follow different orbital paths, such an attacker would have a limited time
frame to perform a man-in-the-middle attack. This research considers that anti-jamming
techniques are employed in the communication channels between the spacecraft and the
control center, so that man-in-the-middle attacks are not feasible.
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4.4 Summary
This chapters introduces a set of techniques to recover spacecrafts from attacks or severe
failures caused by SEUs. Hardware implementation of the trusted modules were performed
using FPGAs, which took into account various levels of security and number of possible
recoveries.
It has been shown that a TRM working with 256-bit one-time secrets and allowing for
256 trusted resets, utilizes 1654 LEs and 68096 memory bits. It issues a reset signal in only
73.83ns when operating at 54.18MHz, while its dynamic power consumption is 20.56mW.
In contrast, a TKM allowing for 256 key recoveries and using 256-bit one-time secrets,
occupies 2372 LEs and 100864 memory bits. This module can recover a key in 78.85ns
when operating at 50.73MHz, with dynamic power consumption is 40.65mW.
Considering the implementation of these modules in LEO satellites, an exhaustive
search attack against them would take 8.82x1066 years. Notice that the time spent in an
exhaustive search attack is completely independent of the computing power of attackers.
In summary, this research efficiently addresses the problem of bringing spacecrafts to a
safe state after major failures or attacks with the subsequent restoration of their crypto-
graphic capabilities.
Since the trusted platform relies on cryptographic hash functions to perform integrity
checks, efficient fault tolerant hardware implementation of such a primitive should be
researched. Besides, integrity checks and message authentication codes are both utilized
to achieve secure communications. Therefore, HMAC algorithm is also investigated. Non-
fault tolerant versions of SHA-2 and HMAC are presented in Chapter 5, which also includes
efficient HW/SW partitioning for such primitives. Fault tolerant versions of SHA-2 and





This chapter explores several levels of hardware/software (HW/SW) partitioning to im-
plement SHA-2 and HMAC. The lowest level counts with simple operations implemented
as custom instructions, whereas the highest one relies on the whole SHA-2 and HMAC
algorithms implemented as peripherals. It shows that custom instructions can provide
considerable computational speed up with minimum implementation area, whereas the pe-
ripherals approach can lead to a better trade-off in terms of speedup per area utilization
and provide higher throughput.
5.1 Hardware/Software Partitioning
High performance systems, e.g. servers, can perform fast cryptographic processing by
employing multi-processors and co-processors. However, that comes at the cost of a con-
siderable increase in implementation area and power consumption/dissipation. Although
servers may have enough resources to afford such an approach, this may not be the case
for most constrained environments. Embedded systems, for instance, comprise limited
computational environments, where area and power is a premium. Thus, the utilization of
cryptographic mechanisms must be done in such a way that it does not cause large demands
in terms of implementation area, though providing satisfactory processing performance.
Instruction set customization can be appropriate to constrained environments. In this
approach, custom hardware modules are inserted into the processor datapath to acceler-
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ate application-specific functions. Hence, it provides a good trade-off between custom-
hardware designs and general-purpose processors. Moreover, since the module is within
the processor datapath, interfacing with the hardware module is relatively simple therefore
resulting in minimum communication overhead. The main drawback is that implementing
complex functions as custom instructions may slow down the entire processor datapath.
In contrast, co-processors (often used as peripherals) can execute its functions inde-
pendently from the main processor. As a result, this approach allows for a higher level of
freedom to implement more complex operations in hardware. The downside of peripherals
is that they communicate with the processor through a bus. Consequently, the lack of ef-
ficiency of the bus can impose considerable overheads while transferring data to and from
peripherals.
Given the aforementioned context, this chapter focuses on the specialization of a com-
putational platform aiming at the processing requirements of SHA-256 and HMAC. By
employing a reconfigurable environment, it becomes possible to experiment with different
strategies to accelerate hash and MAC computations, such as custom instructions and
peripherals. Moreover, through hardware/software implementations it is possible to deter-
mine efficient ways to implement SHA-2 and HMAC, not only in terms of speedup, but
also in implementation requirements.
The prototyping platform utilized is based on the NIOS2 processor [40]. This platform
allow us to write programs in C and easily move parts of the application execution to the
hardware modules. Hardware modules, in turn, can be implemented as custom instruc-
tions or peripherals. Thus, all communication overhead with the hardware modules are
considered, allowing us to precisely determine the gains of performance achieved with each
HW/SW partitioning.
The architecture specialization presented in this chapter considers five HW/SW parti-
tioning levels for HMAC and SHA-256 algorithms. Depending upon the partitioning level,
certain operations are implemented in hardware, which vary from very simple functions as
custom instructions to entire algorithms as peripherals.
NIOS2 custom instructions comprise two 32-bit input ports (dataa and datab), whereas
peripherals have only one (data) port. Both approaches receive a selector (n) and output
one 32-bit value (result).
Although SHA-256 utilizes symbols as functions names, the remainder of this chapter





σ0 and σ1, respectively. Rotations and shifts to the right are represented, respectively, by
>> n and >>∗ n, where n specifies the number of bits rotated/shifted.
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5.2 Custom Instructions
The first three partitioning levels explores several functions utilized in the SHA-2 algorithm,
namely ROTR, Sum0, Sum1, Sig0 and Sig1. These functions were implemented as NIOS2
customs instructions, as described in the following sub-sections.
5.2.1 Level 1: Instruction ROTR
The first partitioning level comes from the fact that rotations consume 39% of the SHA-256
execution. Therefore, the ROTR operation is implemented in hardware as a NIOS2 custom
instruction. Precisely, the hardware module contains all rotations used by the SHA-256
algorithm, as shown in Figure 5.1. Each rotation is individually selected through selector
n. A single instruction call is needed to perform a rotation. The argument is sent through
port dataa, and the rotated argument obtained from port result.
Figure 5.1: Block Diagram of Instruction ROTR
5.2.2 Level 2: Instructions Sum Sig and Ch Maj
Besides the 39% of execution time spent in the ROTR operation, the SHA-256 execution is
divided among the functions Sum0, Sum1, Sig0, Sig1, Ch, Maj, which consume 11%, 11%,
7%, 7%, 10%, and 6% of the processing time respectively. Hence, the second partitioning
level targets the implementation of those functions in hardware. The shift operation SHR
consumes 9% of the execution time. However, the NIOS2 general-purpose instruction set
already includes such an operation. Furthermore, implementation area can be saved by
merging similar functions. As a result, functions Sum0, Sum1, Sig0 and Sig1 are merged
into a single custom instruction called Sum Sig, as shown in Figure 5.2 (a). Also, functions
Ch and Maj are merged into Ch Maj as illustrated in Figure 5.2 (b).
Instruction Sum Sig receives a 32-bit operand, which can be variables a, e, Wt−15 and
Wt−2. Selector n defines the corresponding operation (Sum0, Sum1, Sig0, Sig1) to be
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.2: Block Diagrams of Instructions (a) Sum Sig and (b) Ch Maj
performed. Instruction Ch Maj operates upon three operands, which can be either a, b, c
or e, f, g. More precisely, the first instruction call sends the first variable (either a or e) to
be stored into an internal register. Next, the second call sends the remaining two variables
(either b, c or f, g), and returns the result of the computation.
5.2.3 Level 3: Instructions Sig and Sum Ch Maj
The third HW/SW partitioning level aims at improving performance by reducing the num-
ber of instruction calls. For instance, the SHA-256 algorithm adds Sig0 and Sig1. Hence,
one instruction could perform Sig0(Wt−15) + Sig1(Wt−2). Figure 5.3 (a) depicts the block
diagram of such an instruction denoted Sig. Moreover, notice that variable e is used in both
Sum1 and Ch functions. Similarly, a is employed in both Sum0 and Maj. The hardware
module illustrated in Figure 5.3 (b) results from merging the aforementioned functions,
where selector n specifies which operation is to be performed, i.e. either Sum1 + Ch or
Sum0 +Maj. This instruction, named Sum Ch Maj, requires two calls. The first call sends
the first variable (either a or e) which is stored into an internal register. Next, the sec-
ond call sends the remaining two variables (either b, c or f, g), and returns a 32-bit value
corresponding to the result of the computation.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.3: Block Diagrams of Instructions (a) Sig and (b) Sum Ch Maj
5.3 Peripherals
This section presents the SHA-2 and HMAC algorithms implemented as a NIOS2 pe-
ripheral. The custom instruction is not utilized in this case since this module introduces
significant delay to the processor datapath, thus reducing its frequency of operation.
5.3.1 Level 4: Peripheral SHA 256
The fourth partitioning level relies on the utilization of the entire hash algorithm as a NIOS2
peripheral. When a message authentication code computation utilizes this peripheral,
the hash is performed in hardware and the remainder of the computation is executed in
software. Similarly to other SHA-2 hardware implementations cited in Chapter 3 this
hardware module does not perform message padding in hardware.
Although this chapter focuses on SHA-256, similar hardware architecture can be utilized
for SHA-512. Actually both SHA-256 and SHA-512 were implemented, and will be further
discussed in the next chapters. Besides, the hardware module discussions presented below
are applicable to both SHA-256 and SHA-512 designs.
The architectural elements of the SHA-2 implementation is shown in Figure 5.4. It
basically consists of shift-registers, logical operations, D-bit adders, and a memory to store
the algorithm’s initialization values and constants. For SHA-256 D = 32, whereas D = 64
for SHA-512. The hardware module is divided into four main blocks: Intermediate Hash
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Computation, Compressor, Message Scheduler and Constants Memory. It is important to
notice that this hardware design is non-fault tolerant, and as such is denoted as NoFT.
Figure 5.4: SHA-2 NoFT Architecture
The block of text to be processed is written into the hardware module through port
data, while selector n indicates the number of the W register being written. For instance,
a B-bit text requires a total of B/32 write calls, where B is a multiple of 512 and 1024
respectively for SHA-256 and SHA-512. The message scheduler’s registers W0, ...,W15 are
initialized by shifting in the first 16 words of the message M ; this processing takes 16
iterations. Simultaneously, the constants memory provides the initialization values for the
working variables (a, ..., h). Initial hashes (H0, ..., H7) are also set within this period of
time. After writing the entire text into register W the execution starts automatically.
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During execution, the compressor employs the current values of a, ..., h, as well as Wj
and Kj to determine the new values of a, ..., h. This is performed in j iterations. In each
iteration, registers W0, ...,W15 and a, ..., h are shifted in the direction of the arrows shown
in Figure 5.4.
In the end of j iterations, the intermediate hash computation must be performed. This
operation could be executed in a single clock cycle, where eight additions would be per-
formed in parallel. However, such an approach would require eight adders. Alternatively, in
order to save implementation area, only two adders are utilized. This way, the computation
of the intermediate hash is spread over the last 4 iterations by computing two additions
per clock cycle. More precisely, the additions are performed when t = j − 4, ..., j − 1. For
instance, in SHA-256, when t = 60, H3 and H7 are computed, when t = 61, H2 and H6
are computed, and so on.
Whenever hashing a multi-block message, the new execution cycle initiates with 16
more D-bit words being shifted into the module, and the same procedure described above
is executed. After the last message block is processed, it is necessary to perform 8 read
calls to the peripheral to obtain a the message digest from register H.
The total memory requirements to store the constants Kj and H
(0)
0 , ..., H
(0)
7 is 2304 bits
for SHA-256, and 5632 bits for SHA-512. In addition, registers W0, ...,W15, a, ..., h and
H0, ..., H7 utilized in SHA-256 and SHA-512 require a total of 1024 and 2048 register bits,
respectively.
5.3.2 Level 5: Peripheral HMAC SHA 256
The last partitioning level considers the entire HMAC as a peripheral. Again, although
this section focuses on HMAC/SHA-256, an HMAC/SHA-512 hardware module was also
implemented and will be further discussed in the next chapters. The HMAC module is
capable of performing both HMAC and SHA-2 functions. In addition, while performing
HMAC, the module is capable of processing long messages and keys of different sizes
(K ≤ B and K > B). Moreover, the module allows for efficient key reutilization therefore
favoring increased throughput. In order to achieve key reutilization, internal registers
K0 Ipad Hash and K0 Opad Hash must be employed.
As illustrated in Figure 5.5, the proposed HMAC architecture consists of a SHA-2
core, multiplexors, logical operations, and registers. In Figure 5.5, the SHA-2 registers
W0, ...,W15, a, ..., h, and H0, ..., H7 are referred to as W , a..h, and H respectively. Besides,
HMAC utilizes three additional registers, namely K0 Ipad Hash, K0 Ipad Text Hash,
and K0 Opad Hash.
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Figure 5.5: HMAC NoFT Architecture
Similarly to the SHA-2 module, the HMAC peripheral receives both key and text
through the 32-bit port data, and reads the hash value and MAC from port result. In
the actual implementation, the input port data is connected to the module’s input port
Key Text In, whereas result is connected to its output port MsgDigest MAC Out.
Register K0 Ipad Hash stores the first half of the hash computation performed in Step
IV of the HMAC algorithm. Since this first half of Step IV depends only on the current
key, register K0 Ipad Hash can be utilized when the same key is reutilized. The final hash
of Step IV, whose value is text dependent, is stored in register K0 Ipad Text Hash. Thus,
such a computation has to be performed every time a new key or a new text is used. In
turn, register K0 Opad Hash stores the first half of the hash in Step VII, which is also
text-independent. Therefore, K0 Opad Hash can also be utilized while reusing the same
key.
So, key reuse is supported by utilizing registers K0 Ipad Hash and K0 Opad Hash.
Furthermore, register K0 Opad Hash is also employed for temporary key storage in the
beginning of the HMAC computation, which helps to decrease register requirements. The
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sizes of the aforementioned registers vary with the hash algorithm used and are listed in
Table 5.1.






K0 Ipad Hash 256 512
K0 Opad Hash 512 1024
K0 Ipad Text Hash 256 512
The memory requirements of HMAC are based upon the memory requirements of the
underlying SHA-2 algorithm. Since a D-bit constant is utilized in each of the j iterations
of the SHA algorithm, a total of D ∗ j bits are necessary to store the algorithm constants.
Due to efficiency reasons, HMAC module does not utilize memory to store the initialization
constants of the underlying hash function.
As a result, HMAC/SHA-256 utilizes 2048 memory bits, where as HMAC/SHA-512 em-
ploys 5120 bits. It can be noticed that HMAC has lower memory requirements than SHA-2.
The register requirements of the non-fault tolerant HMAC/SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-512
hardware modules utilize, respectively, 2048 and 4096 registers.
The interfacing with the HMAC module is very similar to the SHA-2 one. More pre-
cisely, a K-bit key requires K/32 write calls, where K is a multiple of 512 and 1024
respectively for SHA-256 and SHA-512. Text to be processed, is sent to the module in the
same way as it is done for the SHA-2 module. A B-bit text, for example, requires a total
of B/32 write calls, where B is a multiple of 512 and 1024 respectively for SHA-256 and
SHA-512.
Besides, the HMAC module allows for the user to directly interface with the built-
in SHA-2 core. In the case of a hash computation, the message is written into register
W through port Key Text In, similarly to the SHA-2 module. After the last word is
written, the hash computation starts, which utilizes j clock cycles. Upon its completion,
the message digest can be read from register H through port MsgDigest MAC Out.
The HMAC processing is divided into five stages which are denoted as NewKeyHash,
KeyIpadHash, TextHash, KeyOpadHash, and MACHash. The stages are executed in that
order, but not all stages are necessarily used. In fact, the number of stages utilized is
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determined by the size of the key, the size of the text, and whether or not a key is being
reused. The five aforementioned stages are represented as states in the state machine
diagram represented in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: HMAC Finite State Machine Diagram
5.3.2.1 Short Keys
If a new key is used and K = B, then no padding is needed and K0 = Key. However, if
K < B, padding is performed to create K0 as described in Section 2.3.2. Since the key is
written into W , this register is temporarily used to perform any necessary pre-processing,
such as padding.
The execution proceeds to the KeyIpadHash stage. Note that, since stage KeyOpadHash
utilizes K0 (which has been written into W ) as well, its value is also temporarily stored
into register K0 Opad Hash; otherwise it would be erased during the hash computation.
Stage KeyIpadHash performs one hash computation, which corresponds to the execution
of Hash(K0 ⊕ Ipad). The result is stored into register K0 Ipad Hash.
Next, the message text is written into the module, followed by the execution of stage
TextHash. Stage TextHash can be re-entered as long as there are message blocks to be
processed. More specifically, if the message is Nm blocks long, TextHash is executed Nm
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times. This stage is responsible for the computation of Hash((K0 ⊕ Ipad)||Text), whose
result is stored into register K0 Ipad Text Hash.
In the sequence, KeyOpadHash is performed, which corresponds to the computation of
Hash(K0 ⊕ Opad). Before of its execution, however, it loads K0 (previously stored in
K0 Opad Hash) onto W . This stage computes a single hash and stores its result back into
K0 Opad Hash. Notice that at this point, registers K0 Ipad Hash and K0 Opad Hash
hold the hash of K0 with Ipad and Opad, respectively. As mentioned before, those hashes
can employed in future computations utilizing the same key.
Finally, stage MACHash is performed. In order to accomplish that, K0 Ipad Text Hash
is padded with 0x8000...0300 to form a 512-bit value when computing HMAC/SHA-256.
In the case of HMAC/SHA-512, it is padded with 8000..0600 to form a 1024-bit string.
After that, the padded value is loaded onto W and the last hash computation of the HMAC
algorithm begins. Upon the completion of this stage, the MAC is available in register H.
The MAC can be read through port MsgDigest MAC Out.
5.3.2.2 Long Keys
In the case of utilizing a new long key (K > B), the computation begins in stage NewKeyHash
in order to perform key pre-processing. Before each NewKeyHash execution, one block of
the key must be written into W . Furthermore, if a Nk-block key is used, this stage is
executed Nk times. After the NewKeyHash completion, K0 becomes available in register H.
At this point, K0 is padded with zeros and loaded onto register W , thus allowing for stage
KeyIpadHash to start. The remaining HMAC processing is identical to the one described
for short keys.
5.3.2.3 Key Reuse
Finally, in the case of key reuse, the module takes advantage of previous computations to
speed up the HMAC execution. The only computation needed are those dependent on the
new message being processed. Since K0 Ipad Hash and K0 Opad Hash were previously
computed, the processing starts in the TextHash stage. Before its execution, though,
K0 Ipad Hash is loaded onto H. Again, this stage is executed as long as there are message
blocks to be processed. In other words, if the message is Nm blocks long, TextHash is
executed Nm times. The result of this stage is not stored into K0 Ipad Text Hash, but
loaded onto W instead. Next, K0 Opad Hash is loaded onto H and stage MACHash starts
its execution. Upon the completion of MACHash the MAC is made available in H.
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5.4 Experimental Results
The experimental results of the proposed partitioning schemes are presented in this section,
which takes into account the execution of SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-256 algorithms.All
partitioning levels are analyzed in terms of implementation area (in LEs), program size
(in bytes), execution performance (in µs), throughput (in Mbps), speedup, and speedup
per area ratio. In order to obtain precise comparisons between hardware and software,
a standardized platform is utilized. The platform is consisted of a six-staged pipelined
NIOS2 processor [40] running at 85MHz. All peripherals, in turn, operate at 70.83MHz.
The program code and data are stored in a 32KB on-chip memory implemented internally
to the FPGA. Furthermore, a 4KB instruction cache and a 2KB data cache are employed.
Similarly to most related work, message padding is performed in software.
Performance measurements are standardized by utilizing all operations as C functions.
Within each C function there is either a block of C code utilizing the NIOS2 general-purpose
instruction set, or a set of calls to the custom instructions and peripherals. All programs
are compiled with the GCC compiler (version 3.4.6) ported to the NIOS2 (version 9.0)
processor, utilizing optimization level -02. This optimization level was employed since it
provided better results (small size and high performance) for most of the programs utilized
in the experimental setup. Moreover, all custom NIOS2 systems were implemented on an
Altera DE-2 prototyping platform [10] based on an Altera CycloneII EP2C35F672C6 [38],
and synthesized using the QuartusII (version 9.0) tool [11].
5.4.1 Custom Instructions and Peripherals Implementation
As Table 5.2 shows, a basic NIOS2 system (without custom instructions and peripherals)
occupies 3426 LEs. When the ROTR instruction is used the total system area increases
1.09 times (3734 LEs). For the second HW/SW partitioning level, the Ch Maj and Sum Sig
instructions cause an area increase of 1.06 and 1.10 times, respectively. If both instructions
are implemented in the same NIOS2 system, the total area requirements becomes 3852
LEs, thus occupying 1.12 times more area than the basic system. In the case of level 3,
the maximum area increase (1.13 times) results from the inclusion of instructions Sig and
Sum Ch Maj into the NIOS2 datapath. When the entire SHA-256 algorithm is implemented
as a peripheral, the system area increases 1.62 times, therefore occupying 5547 LEs. Finally,
by utilizing the HMAC/SHA-256 hardware module as a NIOS2 peripheral, 11695 LEs are
needed, which represents an area increase of 3.41 times.
Besides implementation area, other two parameters to be taken into account are speedup
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Table 5.2: HW/SW System Implementation Area
HW/SW Custom Instructions System Area System Area
Part. Level and Peripherals (LEs) Increase
- None 3426 -
1 ROTR 3734 1.09
Ch Maj 3626 1.06
2 Sum Sig 3760 1.10
Ch Maj & Sum Sig 3852 1.12
Sig 3612 1.05
3 Sum Ch Maj 3746 1.09
Sig & Sum Ch Maj 3855 1.13
4 SHA 256 5547 1.62
5 HMAC SHA 256 11695 3.41
and the ratio speedup/area. These parameters are discussed in detail in the next two sub-
sections. A good reference model for the speedup/area ratio is the utilization of two
modules in parallel to achieve a speedup of 2. Then, by doubling implementation area, its
speedup/area ratio becomes 1. Hence, speedup/area lower than 1 for the proposed schemes
indicate that it is not as appropriate as modular duplication. From now on, we refer to
the speedup per area increase ratio as speedup/area ratio for short.
5.4.2 SHA-256 Results
Table 5.3 lists the execution results referring to the hashing of a 1024-bit random text (two
512-bit data blocks) with SHA-256. A basic NIOS2 processor executes such an operation
in 136.49µs, which represents a throughput of 7.50Mbps. The utilization of the ROTR
instruction in HW/SW partitioning level 1 accelerates the computation in 1.09 times, i.e.
a hash is computed in 125.54µs. In this case there is a slight increase in the program size.
Also, the area used to implement the instruction leads to a speedup per area increase ratio
of 1.
Considering partitioning level 2, one can notice that the best performance is obtained
by implementing only the Sum Sig instruction. In this case, a SHA-256 is computed in
102.29µs, which can be translated to a throughput of 10.01Mbps. Compared to the basic
NIOS2 processor, this level achieves a speedup of 1.33 therefore resulting in a speedup/area
ratio of 1.22. In turn, partitioning level 3 offers slightly better performance with Sig and
Sum Ch Maj instructions. More precisely, a SHA-256 computation is performed in 98.72µs
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Table 5.3: HW/SW SHA-256 Results (1024-Bit Text)
Part. Custom Instructions Prog. Size Prog. Size Execution Throughput Speedup Speedup /
Level and Peripherals (bytes) Reduction (%) (µs) (Mbps) Area
- None 5864 - 136.49 7.50 - -
1 ROTR 5872 -0.14 125.54 8.16 1.09 1.00
Ch Maj 5844 0.34 137.51 7.45 0.99 0.94
2 Sum Sig 5804 1.02 102.29 10.01 1.33 1.22
Ch Maj & Sum Sig 5804 1.02 105.07 9.75 1.30 1.16
Sig 5784 1.36 119.66 8.56 1.14 1.08
3 Sum Ch Maj 5800 1.09 113.42 9.03 1.20 1.10
Sig & Sum Ch Maj 5760 1.77 98.72 10.37 1.38 1.23
4 SHA 256 4900 16.44 12.67 80.79 10.77 6.65
5 HMAC SHA 256 4896 16.51 12.70 80.64 10.75 3.15
which represents a throughput of 10.37Mbps. In other words, level 3 achieves a speedup
of 1.38 and a speedup/area ratio of 1.23. Besides, this HW/SW partitioning level reduces
the program size in 1.77%. Notice that the area increase is similar for level 2 (Sum Sig)
and level 3 (Sig and Sum Ch Maj). Respectively, 1.10 and 1.13 times as much area as the
basic NIOS2 system.
A hash is computed in 12.67µs when utilizing peripheral SHA 256, resulting in a through-
put of 80.79Mbps and a speedup of 10.77. Although it occupies 1.62 as much area as
the basic module, this peripheral provides the highest speedup/area ratio (6.65) amongst
all hardware modules. Furthermore, the program size is reduced in 16.44%. Periph-
eral HMAC SHA 256 is also capable of computing hashes. Actually, the performance of
HMAC SHA 256 is very close to the SHA 256 one, i.e. a hash is computed in 12.70µs. The
main difference is that HMAC SHA 256 employs 3.41 as much are as the basic system therefore
reducing its speedup/area ratio to 3.15.
5.4.3 HMAC/SHA-256 Results
The execution results referring to the MAC computation along with a 512-bit key and a
512-bit text (message) are organized in Table 5.4. When utilizing the original general-
purpose instruction set of a NIOS2 processor, a MAC is computed in 276.98µs therefore
corresponding to a throughput of 1.85Mbps. Instruction ROTR provides a 1.08 speedup in
the MAC computation, but leads to a low speedup/area ratio (0.99). Partitioning levels 2
and 3 result in similar speedups and speedup/area to the ones obtained in the computation
of SHA-256. For instance, level 3 with Sig and Sum Ch Maj allow for a MAC computation
to be performed in 203.58µs, which represents a speedup of 1.36 and a speedup/area ratio
of 1.21.
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Table 5.4: HW/SW HMAC/SHA-256 Results (512-Bit Key, 512-Bit Text)
Part. Custom Instructions Prog. Size Prog. Size Execution Throughput Speedup Speedup /
Level and Peripherals (bytes) Reduction (%) (µs) (Mbps) Area
- None 7560 - 276.98 1.85 - -
1 ROTR 7568 -0.11 255.56 2.00 1.08 0.99
Ch Maj 7540 0.26 280.39 1.83 0.99 0.93
2 Sum Sig 7500 0.79 210.44 2.43 1.32 1.20
Ch Maj & Sum Sig 7500 0.79 216.12 2.37 1.28 1.14
Sig 7480 1.06 245.03 2.09 1.13 1.07
3 Sum Ch Maj 7496 0.85 232.02 2.21 1.19 1.09
Sig & Sum Ch Maj 7456 1.38 203.58 2.52 1.36 1.21
4 SHA 256 6692 11.48 37.31 13.72 7.42 4.58
5 HMAC SHA 256 5572 26.30 14.62 35.02 18.94 5.55
When peripheral SHA 256 (level 5) is employed, a MAC is performed in 37.31µs. That
means a 7.42 speedup over the basic NIOS2 processor thus leading to a 4.58 speedup/area
ratio. Additionally, the program size could be reduced in 11.48%. Finally, partitioning
level 6 utilizes the peripheral HMAC SHA 256 and computes a MAC in 14.62µs. In other
words, this approach is 18.94 faster than the basic NIOS2, which results in a speedup/area
ratio of 5.55. Moreover, this level also allows for a program size reduction of 26.3%.
5.5 Summary
This chapter presents several HW/SW partitioning schemes to accelerate the computation
of SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-256. A thorough analysis of each HW/SW partitioning
based on a NIOS2 processor is performed so that it is possible to precisely determine
the gains of performance and the costs involved with the hardware implementations. We
conclude that if the main task of the processor is to execute general-purpose applications,
where integrity check and MAC computations are not performed very often, the custom
instruction approach can accelerate the latter computations with low area footprint. Our
experimental results show that the best performance and area utilization is obtained with
partitioning level 3 through the utilization of instructions Sig and Sum Ch Maj. In this case,
the SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-256 algorithms can be accelerated respectively in 38% and
36%, with a system area increase of only 13%.
On the other hand, peripherals are well suited to processors dedicated to hash and
MAC computations. Moreover, if integrity checks are the most frequent operation to be
performed, the proposed SHA 256 peripheral can speedup the computation 10.77 times,
while reducing the program binary code in 16.44%. The implementation of this peripheral
increases the system area by a factor of 1.62. Peripheral HMAC SHA 256 can also be used for
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integrity checks, but it is best suited to applications performing mainly MAC computations.
Although this approach employs 3.41 times as much area as the basic NIOS2 system, it
reduces the program size in 26.30% and allows for a computational speedup of 18.94 times.
These results allow for the tailoring of a computational platform of constrained envi-
ronments to the processing requirements of integrity checks and message authentication
codes based on SHA-256 and HMAC. To the best of our knowledge, it introduces the first
implementation of a HMAC processor based on the SHA-2 family of hash functions.
Due to high speedup/area provided by the peripherals, this is the approach adopted in
the remainder of this research project. Besides, the non-fault tolerant SHA-2 and HMAC
hardware designs will serve as a base platform to conduct the implementation of fault




This chapter focuses on the proposal of efficient fault tolerant mechanisms for SHA-2 algo-
rithms. Fault tolerant mechanisms are presented, which includes modular redundancy at
the architectural and register levels as well as information redundancy based schemes em-
ploying Hamming codes. Further, FPGA implementations of the aforementioned schemes
are analyzed in terms of implementation requirements, area utilization, frequency of oper-
ation, throughput and power consumption. In summary, this chapter demonstrates how
information redundancy can be employed to devise efficient fault tolerant implementations
of SHA-2 with lower area and power requirements than traditional methods such as TMR.
6.1 Fault Tolerance Schemes
The fault tolerant schemes investigated in this research are based on hardware redundancy
and information redundancy, as well as on hybrid schemes combining both techniques.
Differently from previous work that proposed only error detection, this research targets
the achievement of both error detection and correction.
The main goal of the fault tolerant designs presented next is to decrease implementation
area and power consumption, as well as to achieve higher resistance against SEUs than
traditional approaches such as TMR. The condition for failure and resistance against SEUs
of each fault tolerant scheme are discussed in detail in Chapter 8.
Three fault tolerant schemes are analyzed in this research, namely Triple Modular Re-
dundancy (FullTMR), Register TMR with Hamming-encoded memory (TMRRegs&HCMem),
and Hamming-encoded registers and memory (HCRegs&HCMem). Given that FullTMR has
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been a common technique utilized in space, this scheme is utilized as a baseline for com-
parisons with the proposed schemes.
Each of the aforementioned schemes are applied to both SHA-256 and SHA-512. The
memory and register requirements mentioned in the following sections are summarized in
Tables 6.1 and 6.2.














6.1.1 Full Triple Modular Redundancy
Triple modular redundancy consists in triplicating the circuit and using a voter to deter-
mine the output. In this work, three SHA-2 hardware modules are instantiated sharing the
same inputs as depicted in Figure 6.1. During the data writing cycles, all three modules
receive the same data in parallel. Likewise, the message digest of each module are read
and sent to the voter. Based upon the three received results, the voter defines the output
of the computation. The condition for failure of this scheme is described in Section 8.1.1.
During the implementation of FullTMR, special attention was paid to the design parti-
tioning in order to avoid the synthesizer to merge common circuitry and registers, which
would lead to misleading synthesis results.
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Since FullTMR is widely used in space systems, it is taken as a reference model for
further comparisons with the proposed schemes in terms of implementation area, frequency
of operation, power consumption, throughput, and resistance against SEUs.
Figure 6.1: SHA-2 FullTMR Architeture
Since FullTMR uses three instances of NoFT, it employs, as expected, three times as
much memory and registers as the non-fault tolerant module. Precisely, the memory
requirements of FullTMR are 6912 bits for SHA-256, and 16896 bits for SHA-512. The
register requirements become 3072 bits for SHA-256, and 6144 bits for SHA-512.
Due to parallelism, an advantage of FullTMR is that it does not cause a big impact
on the module’s frequency of operation. On the other hand, a drawback is the big area
penalty imposed by replication. Thus, other schemes are proposed to reduce the memory
requirements and to achieve smaller implementation area and lower power consumption.
6.1.2 TMR for Registers and Encoded Memory
Given the concern in protecting only the data being processed, an optimization to FullTMR
is to move the redundancy from the modular level to the register level. Additionally, in
order to scale down the number of memory bits, only one memory is utilized in this scheme.
However, in order to protect the memory contents against SEUs, fault tolerance techniques
must be used. Such a scheme is named TMRRegs&HCMem.
Instead of triplicating entire SHA-2 modules, TMRRegs&HCMem employs only one module,
but triplicates all its registers as illustrated in Figure 6.2. Besides, each word of memory
is encoded with Hamming Codes. Specifically, the memory of SHA-256 employs a (38,32)
Hamming code, whereas the SHA-512 one utilizes a (71,64) Hamming code. For each
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Figure 6.2: SHA-2 TMRReg&HCMem Architecture
memory read, a Hamming decoder detects and corrects any potential bit-flip and then
sends the value to the SHA-2 module.
Even considering all the parity bits that are attached to each memory word, the mem-
ory requirements of TMRRegs&HCMem are decreased in comparison with FullTMR. As a re-
sult, TMRRegs&HCMem requires 2736 memory bits for SHA-256 and 6248 memory bits for
SHA-512. A downside of utilizing Hamming codes for error detection and correction is the
inclusion of a Hamming decoder between the memory and modules. Such decoder causes
a longer critical path in the circuit therefore decreasing its frequency of operation.
The register requirements are exactly the same as in FullTMR, i.e. 3072 bits for SHA-256
and 6144 bits for SHA-512. Incidentally, this scheme demands one voter for each trio of
registers in order to mask out registers errors. As a result, a total of 32 D-bit voters is
needed (D = 32 for SHA-256 and D = 64 for SHA-512).
6.1.3 Encoded Registers and Memory
As an alternative to modular redundancy, Hamming codes can also be used to protect
registers. This technique leads to the efficient fault tolerant mechanism proposed in this
research denoted as HCRegs&HCMem. Likewise TMRRegs&HCMem, this scheme utilizes Ham-
ming codes to protect the memory. The goals are to detect and correct potential bit-flips
happening in SHA-2 registers and achieve efficiency by optimizing when error detection
and correction is performed.
A design decision is how often error detection and correction should be performed. They
can be done, for example, in every clock cycle, therefore increasing resistance against SEUs.
However, that demands a higher number of Hamming decoders and encoders and reduces
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the module speed. On the other hand, if they are performed less often, higher throughput
and lower implementation area can be achieved at the cost of less SEU resistance.
Besides, there are multiple ways of encoding registers. For instance, the thirty two 32-bit
registers of SHA-256 can be encoded individually using a (38,32) Hamming code. Using
that strategy, a total of 192 parity bits would be necessary. Alternatively, all SHA-256
registers could be merged into a single 1024-bit register. By treating the registers as one
1024-bit register, a (1035,1024) Hamming code can be used and only 11 parity bits are
needed, therefore reducing register requirements. The savings are even bigger in the case
of SHA-512. Encoding all 64-bit registers separately using a (71,64) Hamming code, a total
of 224 parity bits would be needed. In contrast, merging all registers into a single 2048-bit
register and using a (2060,2048) Hamming code, only 12 parity bits are needed. Notice,
however, that although larger Hamming codes reduce the number of parity bits required,
they demand more complex encoders and decoders. As a consequence, the circuit critical
path will be increased resulting in slower modules.
The utilization of large Hamming codes along with error detection and correction per-
formed in every clock cycle has been evaluated in [89, 93]. It has been shown that, although
such a scheme is extremely resistant against SEUs, it results in larger area utilization,
higher power consumption and lower throughput when compared to TMR. Such an exper-
iment motivates the optimization on the frequency in which error detection and correction
is performed, as well as in the size of the Hamming code.
The proposed optimization was devised by analyzing how registers are utilized during
the SHA-2 execution. The schedule of register utilization influences directly the way the
registers are encoded and how often error detection and correction should be performed.
By observing Figure 5.4, it can be noticed that in a given algorithm iteration, only registers
a, ..., h, H0, H4, W0, W1, W9, and W14 are involved in the SHA-2 functions computations.
Thus, those are the only registers that need to be decoded for error detection and correction.
By the same token, only a, e, H0, H4, and W15 are updated with new values. Therefore, it
is only necessary to encode the data to be written into those registers. This feature leads
to the architecture depicted in Figure 6.3.
In this scheme, each D-bit register is encoded individually. The main reason for encod-
ing individual registers is to facilitate the shift of their contents, along with the associated
parity bits, through the D-bit datapath without the need of encoding/decoding data.
Specifically, SHA-256 encodes each of the thirty two 32-bit registers separately using a
(38,32) Hamming code, demanding a total of 192 parity bits. Similarly, SHA-512 encodes
each of the thirty two 64-bit registers separately using a (71,64) Hamming code, which
requires a total of 224 parity bits. Hence, the total register requirements are 1216 bits for
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SHA-256, and 2272 bits for SHA-512.
Since all registers are kept encoded, they are protected against SEUs until the next
decoding operation. From Figure 6.3 it can be observed that error detection and correction
is only performed when reading registers a, ..., h, H0, H4, W0, W1, W9, and W14. The data
present in these registers have been waiting for a number of clock cycles. The period of
time between encoding and decoding operations are denoted as idle period.
The idle period varies from 1 (for a, ..., h) to 60 (for H0 and H4) for SHA-256, or 76 in
the case of SHA-512. A failure will occur if two bit-flips happen in the same data word
(a, ..., h, H0, H4, W0, W1, W9, W14) while they are in their idle period. This case is further
explained in Section 8.1.3.
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HCRegs&HCMem uses an encoded memory to keep the constants protected against SEUs,
exactly as in TMRRegs&HCMem. For that reason, the memory requirements of SHA-256 and
SHA-512 are respectively 2736 and 6248.
6.2 Experimental Results
In order to better evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each fault tolerant scheme,
a thorough analysis was performed in terms of implementation area, throughput, frequency
of operation, and power consumption. Hence, the proposed schemes were described using
the VHDL hardware description language and implemented on FPGA. The tool employed
in the description, synthesis, simulation and power consumption estimation of all hardware
modules was QuartusII version 9.0 [11]. The target device for all implementations was an
Altera SRAM FPGA CycloneII EP2C35F672C6 [38]. The synthesis parameters targeted
low implementation area and low power consumption.
6.2.1 Implementation Area
Implementation area is measured in terms of the number of logic elements (LEs) used to
implement a given scheme in the FPGA. According to Table 6.3, the non-fault tolerant
(NoFT) SHA-256 occupies 2166 LEs. In turn, SHA-512 uses 4279 LEs.







Not surprisingly, modular replication causes FullTMR to occupy approximately three
times as much area as NoFT. More precisely, FullTMR SHA-256 and SHA-512 occupies,
respectively, 6530 and 12892 LEs.
Although TMRRegs&HCMem does not triplicate the SHA-2 datapath, it occupies slightly
more area than FullTMR. In other words, the implementation area of SHA-256 is 6811 LEs,
whereas SHA-512 utilizes 13530 LEs. Such increase in implementation area is justified by
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the number of registers and voters employed in the hardware design. Hence, LEs end up
being exclusively for implementing registers and voters.
The HCRegs&HCMem scheme provides considerable savings in implementation area. The
SHA-256 module utilizing this scheme employs only 2.06 times as much area as NoFT, i.e.
4471 LEs. Moreover, SHA-512 employs 8400 LEs, which means 1.96 as much area as NoFT.
In other words, HCRegs&HCMem allows for the implementation of SHA-256 and SHA-512 to
employ respectively 32% and 35% less area than FullTMR.
6.2.2 Frequency of Operation
The frequency of operation of the schemes considered in this research is measured in MHz
and is obtained after the synthesis tools have performed place-and-route. Due to the high
estimation precision of the QuartusII timer analyzer, the reported frequencies are very
reliable and thus can be used as a reference in further stages of system design.







As listed in Table 6.4, SHA-256 and SHA-512 NoFT run respectively at 74.46MHz and
60.60MHz. It is possible to notice that FullTMR can operate almost as fast as NoFT due
to parallelism allowed by the former. For instance, SHA-256 operates less than 1% slower
than FullTMR, whereas SHA-512 faces only a 2% slowdown.
Because TMRRegs&HCMem uses a Hamming decoder between the memory and the data-
path, its critical path is impacted negatively. Besides a memory decoder, TMRRegs&HCMem
has its frequency of operation slightly impacted by register voters placed after each trio of
registers. As a consequence, it operates about 38% slower than NoFT and 37% slower than
FullTMR.
Multiple encoders and decoders in HCRegs&HCMem causes a similar impact on the fre-
quency of operation to the multiple voters in TMRRegs&HCMem. Precisely, SHA-256 and
SHA-512 HCRegs&HCMem operate respectively at 44.94 and 36.08MHz. In the average,
HCRegs&HCMem runs 40% slower than NoFT, and 39% slower compared to FullTMR.
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6.2.3 Throughput
The throughput of SHA-2 is defined as the amount of text processed per unit of time, which
is given in bits per second (bps) in this research. It can be determined from the message
block size (B), module’s frequency of operation (F ), and the number of clock cycles (c)
utilized to compute a message digest.





For the purpose of computing the throughput of SHA-2 modules, the hash of one block
of message was considered. The block size of SHA-256 is 512, whereas SHA-512 utilizes
1024 bits. Moreover, SHA-256 and SHA-512 take respectively 64 and 80 clock cycles to
compute a message digest of a block of text.







As can be noticed from Table 6.5, the frequency of operation has a strong influence
on the modules’ throughput. In other words, the higher the frequency, the higher the
throughput. Not surprisingly, FullTMR has highest throughput among the fault tolerant
modules. The throughput of SHA-256 using this scheme (593.28Mbps) is is about 1%
lower than NoFT (595.68Mbps). In turn, the SHA-512 throughput is only 2% below the
throughput of NoFT, i.e. 759.04Mbps.
Further, the throughput of TMRRegs&HCMem suffers a reduction of 38% when compared
to NoFT, for both SHA-256 and SHA-512. Moreover, the throughput of HCRegs&HCMem is
about 40% lower than the NoFT throughput. More precisely, when SHA-256 and SHA-512
employs this scheme, their throughput achieve, respectively, 359.52Mbps and 461.82Mbps.
This corresponds to a reduction of 39% in the throughput when compared to FullTMR.
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6.2.4 Power Consumption
Power is yet another very important parameter to be considered due to the severe con-
straints in power consumption and dissipation in space systems. The power consumption
of each module is obtained from the PowerPlay Power Analyzer Tool [11] through the uti-
lization of random text with the module running at the maximum frequency of operation.
The power analyzer tool estimates the FPGA static, dynamic, and input/output power.
Static power is defined as the power consumed by the FPGA regardless of signal activity
(no switching) and results from current leakage inside transistors. It can be interpreted as
the power consumed to maintain the configuration of the FPGA. Dynamic power is defined
as the power consumed due to signal activity (switching). Put differently, this is the power
consumed to perform data processing. Input and output power consumption is the power
consumed by the FPGA interfacing elements (I/O). Since the designs considered in this
research may be implemented in a system-on-a-chip, I/O power is of minor importance
and can be discarded in the analysis. The average static power consumption of SHA-256
and SHA-512 modules are, respectively, 82.6mW and 84.4mW.







Table 6.6 reports the dynamic power consumption of the implementations performing
one hash computation at their maximum frequency of operation. For instance, SHA-256
FullTMR (280.89mW) consumes 2.8 times more power than NoFT (101.07mW). The power
increase for SHA-512 is 2.7 times, as expected, since FullTMR triplicates the datapath.
By moving redundancy to the register level and encoding memory, the power consump-
tion of SHA-256 utilizing TMRRegs&HCMem was 1.47 times higher than NoFT, i.e. 148.38mW.
Moreover, HCRegs&HCMem consumes 141.85mW, which means an increase of 1.4 times in
relation to NoFT. In the case of SHA-512, the power consumption of the last two fault
tolerant schemes is 1.6 times as high as NoFT.
If FullTMR is taken as a reference, it is possible to notice that HCRegs&HCMem allows for




This chapter presented three approaches for achieving fault tolerance in hardware imple-
mentations of SHA-2 algorithms, namely FullTMR, TMRRegs&HCMem and HCRegs&HCMem.
The main goal was to show that information redundancy can provide more efficient FPGA
implementations than the traditional modular redundancy. Experimental results were
obtained through FPGA implementation, which permitted the characterization of perfor-
mance and implementation requirements of each module. As a consequence it was possible
to determine the advantages and disadvantages of each fault tolerance scheme.
Not surprisingly, FullTMR generally demands three times as much resources as the non-
fault tolerant approach. Its main advantage, though, is a very high throughput provided
by modular parallelism.
In an attempt to reduce memory requirements and provide higher resistance against
SEUs, TMRRegs&HCMem moved the triple modular redundancy to the register level and
encoded the memory with Hamming codes. This approach allowed for an average decrease
of 62% in memory requirements. Besides, it allows for an average power reduction of
45%. However, its main drawback was the extra number of logical elements required to
exclusively implemented all the triplicated registers and the associated registers.
By taking advantage of some features of the SHA-2 algorithm HCRegs&HCMem allowed for
an efficient fault tolerance technique to be devised. This scheme resulted in the best trade-
off amongst register and memory requirements, implementation area, power consumption
and throughput. Furthermore, it allowed for an average saving of 62% in memory and
register requirements. Moreover, in the average, its implementation employs 34% less area
and consumes 46% less power than FullTMR. Although its average throughput is 39% lower
than the ones provided by FullTMR, it may be high enough for most space applications.
As a result, it has been shown that HCRegs&HCMem can successfully provide fault toler-
ance in FPGA implementations of the SHA-2 family of hash functions. Besides, it favors
lower power and lower implementation area, which are crucial in space applications. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first implementation of the SHA-2 family of hash
functions providing both error detection and correction reported in the literature.
Next chapter will explore the aforementioned schemes to provide fault tolerance for
FPGA implementation of the HMAC algorithm. Before we can recommend the proposed
scheme for space applications, a resistance analysis must be carried out to determine the
robustness of the fault tolerance mechanisms in face of SEUs. Such a resistance analysis




This chapter focuses on efficient fault tolerant mechanisms for the Keyed Hash Message
Authentication Code (HMAC). Fault tolerant mechanisms are presented, again comprising
modular redundancy at the architectural and register levels as well as information redun-
dancy based schemes employing Hamming codes. Besides, the discussion of experimental
results takes into account implementation requirements, area utilization, frequency of op-
eration, throughput and power consumption. In summary, this chapter shows that the
proposed fault tolerance scheme based on information redundancy provides even better
efficiency when applied to more complex hardware designs such as the HMAC algorithm.
7.1 Fault Tolerance Schemes
The fault tolerant schemes presented in this section are the same as the ones introduced
in Chapter 6. Basically, Triple Modular Redundancy (FullTMR), TMR for Registers with
Encoded Memory (TMRRegs&HCMem), and Encoded Registers and Memory (HCRegs&HCMem).
Again, the main goal of the fault tolerant designs is to minimize implementation area
and power consumption, and maximize resistance against SEUs. Detailed analysis of the
condition for failure and resistance against SEUs of each scheme can be found in Chapter 8.
The aforementioned fault tolerant schemes were applied to HMAC utilizing SHA-256
and SHA-512 as the underlying hash functions. The memory and register requirements
mentioned in the following sections are listed in Tables 7.1 and 7.2, respectively.
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7.1.1 Triple Modular Redundancy
The TMR design of HMAC consists of three instances of the NoFT module, which share
the same input (Data In), as illustrated in Figure 7.1. Their outputs are sent to a D-bit
voter so that the result (Result Out) can be determined (D = 32 in HMAC/SHA-256 and
D = 64 in HMAC/SHA-512). This design is named FullTMR for short.
Special attention was paid to the design partitioning in order to guarantee that the
synthesis tool would not merge subcomponents of the three instances of NoFT, which would
consequently lead to misleading results. Precisely, the hardware design was partitioned into
four blocks: one partition for each NoFT module and one partition for the voter.
Given that FullTMR utilizes three NoFT modules along with a voter, it triplicates the
register and memory requirements of the NoFT module. Similarly to SHA-2, the FullTMR
implementation of HMAC is used as a reference model for the comparisons performed in
the next sections.
Specifically, as listed in Table 7.1, the memory requirements for HMAC/SHA-256 are
6144 bits, and for HMAC/SHA-512 they are 15360 bits. Moreover, as reported in Ta-
ble 7.2, the register requirements of FullTMR are 6144 and 12288 bits, respectively, for
HMAC/SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-512.
Although there are replication penalties in terms of implementation area, FullTMR
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Figure 7.1: HMAC FullTMR Architecture
allows for three modules to run in parallel therefore causing little impact on the modules’
performance. Notice, however, that error detection and correction is performed by the
voter at the end of the HMAC computation. The conditions for failure of this scheme is
described in Section 8.1.1.
7.1.2 TMR for Registers and Encoded Memory
This scheme moves redundancy to the register level instead of keeping it at the modular
level. The underlying hash module is exactly the same as the one presented in Section 6.1.2.
This approach is denoted as TMRRegs&HCMem.
As shown in Figure 7.2, this scheme triplicates all registers and utilizes voters (striped
boxes) to perform error detection and correction. Precisely, a voter is used for each trio of
registers, whose bit width varies according to the bit width of the associated registers, as
listed in Table 7.2.
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Since all HMAC registers, besides all the underlying SHA-2 registers, are triplicated, it
is easy to notice that this scheme results in the same register requirements as FullTMR. For
instance, HMAC/SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-512 employs, respectively, 6144 and 12288
bits. Furthermore, error detection and correction is executed in each clock cycle therefore
being performed more often than in FullTMR. The conditions for failure of this scheme is
discussed in Section 8.1.2.
Figure 7.2: HMAC TMRRegs&HCMem Architecture
The memory requirements are reduced by encoding the constants memory of the under-
lying SHA-256 and SHA-512 with Hamming codes, exactly as presented in Section 6.1.2.
Essentially, the constant memories of the underlying SHA-256 and SHA-512 utilize, re-
spectively, (38, 32) and (71, 64) Hamming codes. Due to the utilization of Hamming
codes, TMRRegs&HCMem demands considerable less memory bits than FullTMR. Specifically,
TMRRegs&HCMem utilizes respectively 2432 and 5680 bits.
118
7.1.3 Encoded Registers and Memory
Differently from modular redundancy, this approach employs information redundancy as a
technique to protect registers and memory against SEUs. The strategy utilizes Hamming
codes to keep HMAC and SHA-2 registers encoded all the time. This scheme is denoted
as HCRegs&HCMem for short.
The number of encoding and decoding operations are optimized so that it is possible to
reduce the number of Hamming encoders/decoders while keeping a high level of protection
against SEUs. Such a level of optimization is possible by analyzing when specific registers
are used in the HMAC and SHA-2 execution, similarly to the description in Section 6.1.3.
However, the utilization of multiple encoders and decoders in the HMAC/SHA-2 datapath
increases the circuit’s critical path. Consequently, lower frequencies of operation are ex-
pected for HCRegs&HCMem compared to the ones achieved in FullTMR and TMRRegs&HCMem.
The type of Hamming code to be used for SHA-2 registers depends directly on how
HMAC interfaces the underlying hash function. It is true that the encoding large amounts
of data result in big savings in terms of the number of Hamming parity bits. For example,
1024-bit registers could be encoded with (1035, 1024) Hamming code, which would use only
11 additional bits to store the parity. Similarly, 2048-bit registers would require only 12
additional bits if the (2060, 2048) Hamming code is employed. Notice, however, that the
number of parity bits is only one factor in the definition of the Hamming code.
A more important aspect to be considered is how tightly coupled HMAC and SHA-2
become given a specific Hamming code. In other words, the size of the code has to be
defined in such a way so that it facilitates the movement of data between HMAC to SHA-2
registers. As a result, the Hamming code plays a fundamental role in achieving efficiency
in terms of area, processing time, which ends up resulting in lower power consumption and
higher throughput.
As explained in Section 5.3.2, HMAC constantly interfaces registers H and W in read
and write operations. For instance, stage KeyOpadHash loads a pre-processed K0 (stored
in register K0 Opad Hash) onto W . Stage TextHash loads K0 Ipad Hash onto H. Stage
MACHash loads K0 Ipad Text Hash onto W . If a key is reused, stage TextHash loads
K0 Opad Hash onto H. After a hash computation is completed, register H is loaded onto
HMAC registers K0 Ipad Hash, K0 Opad Hash and K0 Ipad Text Hash .
In order to allow for the utilization of larger Hamming codes, registers a..h, H and W
could be merged together. However, loading values onto H or W would require decoding
of the entire merged register. Similarly, to transfer a value from those registers to one of
the HMAC registers would require an encoding operation. That approach would cause
119
inefficient 32 and 64-bit rotations, which are often utilized by the respective SHA-256 and
SHA-512 algorithms. Such a scheme would demand for the merged register to be decoded
and re-encoded prior and after each rotation. On the other hand, the encoding of small
portions of data such as 4, 8 and 16 bits facilitates the aforementioned rotations and register
transfers, but ends up utilizing too many Hamming parity bits.
The utilization of (38, 32) codes for HMAC/SHA-256, and (71, 64) for HMAC/SHA-512
results in a better trade-off amongst parity bits, area efficiency, and minimization of encod-
ing/decoding. Precisely, HMAC/SHA-256 encodes its registers in 32-bit blocks therefore
demanding a total of 192 parity bits. Likewise, HMAC/SHA-512 encodes 64-bit blocks,
which ends up utilizing a total of 224 parity bits.
Hence, the main reasons to choose codes (38, 32) and (71, 64) were: 1) Encoding small
blocks of data causes encoding and decoding to be fast and efficient; 2) It makes it possible
to re-utilize the optimized fault tolerant SHA-2 design therefore minimizing the number
of encoding and decoding; 3) It facilitates the frequent D-bit rotations of SHA-2 without
decoding and re-encoding; 4) Facilitates complete or partial loads of HMAC registers and
associated parity bits onto SHA-2 registers therefore dispensing decoding/re-encoding.
The total register requirements for HMAC/SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-512 are respec-
tively 2432 and 4544 bits, as shown in Table 7.2. Figure 7.3 show all HMAC and SHA-2
registers with their associated parity bits (striped boxes).
Another optimization of this fault tolerant scheme refers to the computation of par-
ity bits of W after performing the xor with Ipad and Opad in the KeyIpadHash and
KeyOpadHash stages. The binary Hamming parities of a 32-bit word of Ipad and Opad
used in HMAC/SHA-256 are respectively 110111 and 011001, where the rightmost digit
corresponds to the least significant bit. In the case of HMAC/SHA-512, the respective par-
ities are 0110011 and 0011111. Since Ipad, Opad and the message pad are constants, it is
possible to avoid the computation of the Hamming parity bits of W by properly adjusting
them. This is accomplished by performing the xor of the parity bits of W with the ones
of Ipad and Opad.
The parity bits of W have also to be adjusted when the message is padded at the
beginning of the MACHash stage. In this stage, the contents of K0 Ipad Text Hash is
loaded onto the first half of W , while the second half of receives the message pad, which
is 0x8000...0300 for HMAC/SHA-256 and 0x8000...0600 for HMAC/SHA-512. Since
the registers are encoded in D-bit blocks the parity bits of K0 Ipad Text Hash are copied
into the first half of the parity bits of W . Given that the message pad is constant, its
parity bits are also constant and therefore loaded onto the second half of the parity bits
of W . The binary value of the message pad parity bits are 100110000000...000011 and
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10001110000000...0000001 respectively for HMAC/SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-512. The
HMAC stages of this scheme utilize one additional clock cycle after each hash computation
to update the parity of register H.
In order to corrupt the computation of HMAC, two bit-flips must happen in the same
encoded register within the time frame that no error detection and correction is performed.
During the HMAC processing the maximum idle period is faced by the K0 Opad Hash.
This register is written in the end of the NewKeyHash stage and read in the beginning
of KeyOpadHash stage, which also loads its value onto W . Hence, the total idle period
corresponds to the duration of the execution of stages KeyIpadHash and TextHash, plus 7
clock cycles referring to the transfer time between W8 and W1 where it is finally decoded.
Thus, the condition for failure is to have two bit-flips in the same register within that time
frame. Further discussion on the conditions for failure is provided in Section 8.1.3.
Similarly to TMRRegs&HCMem, HCRegs&HCMem uses an encoded memory to keep the SHA-2
constants protected against SEUs. The memory requirements of HMAC/SHA-256 and
HMAC/SHA-512 are respectively 2432 and 5680 bits.
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7.2 Experimental Results
The HMAC hardware modules are analyzed identically to SHA-2. Again, implementa-
tion area, frequency of operation, throughput and power consumption are the parameters
considered the comparisons and evaluations throughout this section.
It was fundamental to maintain the same experimental setup (e.g. FPGA device, tools
version and settings) to make it possible to perform fair comparisons between HMAC
and SHA-2 hardware implementations. The tool utilized for the hardware description,
synthesis, simulation and power estimation of all hardware modules was QuartusII version
9.0 [11]. The synthesis and simulation parameters are exactly the same as the ones utilized
for SHA-2. The target device was also maintained, i.e. an Altera SRAM FPGA CycloneII
EP2C35F672C6 [38].
7.2.1 Implementation Area
The FPGA implementation of HMAC/SHA-256 NoFT employs 4266 LEs, as listed in Ta-
ble 7.3. HMAC/SHA-512, in turn, occupies 9265 LEs. As expected, FullTMR scheme
utilizes approximately three times as much area as NoFT. Precisely HMAC/SHA-256 and
HMAC/SHA-512 FullTMR demands respectively 12899 and 28744 LEs.







The area utilization of HMAC/SHA-256 TMRRegs&HCMem (14006 LEs) is 3.3 times as
high as the area of the NoFT, which is justified by the large number of logical elements
to implement all triplicated registers and associated voters. Surprisingly, the synthesis of
HMAC/SHA-512 utilizing such fault tolerant scheme resulted in slightly lower area (27838
LEs) than FullTMR, however still 3 times bigger than NoFT.
Once again, HCRegs&HCMem leads to considerable savings in implementation area. Pre-
cisely, HMAC/SHA-256 employs 6840 LEs, which represents an area increase of 1.6 times
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over NoFT. The results is slightly better in the case of HMAC/SHA-512, whose implemen-
tation area (13477 LEs) is only 1.5 times as big as NoFT. Remarkably, the utilization of
this scheme allows for implementations of HMAC/SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-512 to be
respectively 35% and 53% smaller than the ones employing FullTMR.
7.2.2 Frequency of Operation
The frequencies of operation of the HMAC hardware modules are listed in Table 7.4.
The NoFT modules of HMAC/SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-512 are capable of operating in
67.13MHz and 55.87MHz, respectively. By analyzing Table 7.4, it is possible to realize that
the second fastest approach is FullTMR. Since FullTMR utilizes all three modules running
in parallel, it suffers a minor impact on the frequency of operation. As a result, this fault
tolerant scheme allows for HMAC to operate, in the average, only 4% slower NoFT.







The utilization of a Hamming decoder between the memory and the module datapath
has a big impact in the frequency of operation of TMRRegs&HCMem. When employing this
fault tolerance scheme, HMAC runs in the average 34% slower than NoFT. Moreover, this
means that TMRRegs&HCMem is about 31% slower than FullTMR.
Finally, the utilization of HCRegs&HCMem as a fault tolerant mechanism results in fre-
quencies of operation similar to TMRRegs&HCMem. For example, HMAC/SHA-256 runs at
44.69MHz whereas HMAC/SHA-512 performs at 35.99MHz. In the average, this represents
a frequency slowdown of 35% compared to NoFT, and 32% compared to FullTMR.
7.2.3 Throughput
Given that the HMAC processor designed in this research is based on SHA-2, its through-
put ends up being a function of the hash throughput, as defined by Equation 6.1. As
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traditionally considered in the literature, the cryptographic key is not taken as an input
while computing throughput of HMAC. In other words, although some time is necessary
to process the key, only the message is considered as input for the HMAC execution.
As described in Section 5.3.2, if a new key is used, 3 hashes are always computed
(KeyIpadHash, KeyOpadHash, and MACHash). If a new Nk-block key is used (K > B),
NewKeyHash is performed Nk times to pre-process the key. If (K ≤ B), NewKeyHash is not
performed, i.e. Nk = 0. Also, it the message is Nm blocks long, TextHash is executed Nm
times. In sum, when a new key is used, the computation of 3 + Nm + Nk hash functions





If the key is reused, TextHash is performed Nm times and MACHash once. As a result,





The number of clock cycles taken by the SHA-2 within HMAC modules vary with the
type of fault tolerant scheme and hash function utilized. In all cases (except HCRegs&HCMem)
a hash computation over a 1-block message takes 65 clock cycles with HMAC/SHA-256
and 81 clock cycles with HMAC/SHA-512. Notice that the number of clock cycles refer to
one hash computation. In the case of HCRegs&HCMem, an additional clock cycle is used to
compute the parity of H in the end of each hash computation. Consequently this scheme
takes 66 and 82 clock cycles respectively for HMAC/SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-512. While
computing a MAC, the total number of clock cycles depends on the key and message sizes.
Table 7.5 lists the number of clock cycles taken in different scenarios of hash and MAC
computations.
In order to determine the throughput of each hash and MAC operation, the maximum
frequency of operation of the hardware modules, as listed in Table 7.4, where utilized.
Equation 6.1 was employed to determine the throughput of the hash operation, whereas
Equation 7.1 was utilized to compute the HMAC throughput. Key reuse can be computed
through Equation 7.2, but is not reported in this section. The HMAC modules are employed
in two scenarios: 1) Hash computation of a 1-block message; 2) MAC computation of a
1-block message using a 1-block key.
Table 7.6 lists the throughput of the HMAC modules operating in the two aforemen-
tioned scenarios. When computing a hash, HMAC/SHA-256 NoFT reaches a throughput
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Table 7.5: HMAC/SHA-2 Clock Cycles for Hash and MAC Computations
Hash MAC, 1-Block New Key
1-Block Message 1-Block Message
Scheme HMAC/ HMAC/
SHA-256 SHA-512 SHA-256 SHA-512
(Clock Cycles)
NoFT 65 81 260 324
FullTMR 65 81 260 324
TMRRegs&HCMem 65 81 260 324
HCRegs&HCMem 66 82 264 328
of 528.78Mbps. If a MAC of a 1-block message is computed utilizing a new key, the
maximum throughput drops to a fourth of the hash one, i.e. 132.19Mbps. In the case
of HMAC/SHA-512 NoFT, the throughput a hash computation is 706.31Mbps. Although
HMAC/SHA-512 has a lower frequency of operation compared to HMAC/SHA-256, the
throughput of the former is increased by the message size (1024 bits for HMAC/SHA-512
against 512 bits for HMAC/SHA-256).
In general, HMAC/SHA-512 follows the same throughput trends of HMAC/SHA-256.
In other words, the computation of a MAC over a 1-block text with a new key reduces
the hash throughput to one quarter. That trend also holds for all fault tolerant schemes
considered in this work. The following discussions and comparisons focus on the second
scenario, i.e. on the computation of a MAC using 1-block text and a 1-block key.
Table 7.6: HMAC Throughput
Hash MAC, 1-Block New Key
1-Block Message 1-Block Message
Scheme HMAC/ HMAC/
SHA-256 SHA-512 SHA-256 SHA-512
(Mbps)
NoFT 528.78 706.31 132.19 176.58
FullTMR 506.56 684.44 126.64 171.11
TMRRegs&HCMem 348.08 473.06 87.02 118.27
HCRegs&HCMem 346.09 449.44 86.67 112.36
In the average, the throughput of FullTMR is about 4% lower than NoFT. For instance,
HMAC/SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-512 FullTMR achieves 126.64 and 171.11Mbps. In con-
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trast, when utilizing TMRRegs&HCMem the throughput drops to 87.02Mbps and 118.27Mbps
respectively for HMAC/SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-512. In other words, the throughput
of TMRRegs&HCMem is in the average 34% lower than NoFT and 31% lower than FullTMR.
The throughput of HCRegs&HCMem is the lowest one amongst all HMAC hardware mod-
ules. HMAC/SHA-512 reaches 112.36Mbps, while HMAC/SHA-256 achieves 86.67Mbps.
In the average, this represents a 35% reduction compared to NoFT, and a 33% reduction
compared to FullTMR.
7.2.4 Power Consumption
Power consumption is also discussed using the two scenarios introduced in the previous
section. The static power consumption of HMAC/SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-512 are re-
spectively 83mw and 85.3mW. As reported in Table 7.7, the dynamic power consumption
of HMAC/SHA-256 NoFT while computing a hash is 119.39mW, whereas HMAC/SHA-512
demands 232.54mW. If a MAC computation is considered, HMAC/SHA-256 demands
137.09mW while HMAC/SHA-512 consumes 255.42mW. In general, HMAC/SHA-256 and
HMAC/SHA-512 modules consume, respectively, 14% and 10% more power for computing
a MAC than they do for a hash.
Table 7.7: HMAC Dynamic Power Consumption
Hash MAC, 1-Block New Key
1-Block Message 1-Block Message
Scheme HMAC/ HMAC/
SHA-256 SHA-512 SHA-256 SHA-512
(mW)
NoFT 119.39 232.54 137.09 255.42
FullTMR 333.12 659.78 378.48 730.00
TMRRegs&HCMem 186.99 312.59 203.50 336.03
HCRegs&HCMem 166.59 310.10 191.21 340.99
Again, the following discussions and comparisons focus on the computation of a MAC
of a 1-block text utilizing a 1-block key. The datapath triplication in FullTMR causes this
scheme to consume, in the average, 2.8 times more power than NoFT. The highest power
consumption (730mW) is due to HMAC/SHA-512 employing FullTMR.
The power consumption of HMAC/SHA-256 TMRRegs&HCMem is only 1.5 times as high
as the NoFT one. Moreover, HMAC/SHA-512 consumes even less power, i.e. 1.3 as much
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as its non-fault tolerant version. In the case of HCRegs&HCMem, HMAC/SHA-256 consumes
191.21mW to perform a MAC computation, which represents 1.4 as much power as NoFT.
Furthermore, if this fault tolerant scheme is applied to HMAC/SHA-512 the power con-
sumption (340.99mW) is only 1.3 as high as the NoFT one.
Significant savings are obtained with TMRRegs&HCMem and HCRegs&HCMem. Surpris-
ingly, by utilizing the TMRRegs&HCMem scheme, HMAC/SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-512
consume respectively 46% and 54% less power than FullTMR. In the case employing
HCRegs&HCMem, the power reductions in relation to FullTMR are 50% and 53% respectively
for HMAC/SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-512.
7.3 Summary
This chapter presented application of the three fault tolerance approaches first introduced
in Chapter 6 into the HMAC based on SHA-2 hash functions. Again, experimental results
are obtained through FPGA implementations from where a comprehensive analysis of the
modules characteristics has been derived.
The traditional FullTMR approach utilizes three times as much registers and memory,
implementation area and consumes twice as much power as the non-fault tolerant design.
TMRRegs&HCMem, in turn, leads to similar implementation requirements, i.e. 3.1 times as
much area and 3 times as many registers as in NoFT. Although the throughput provided by
TMRRegs&HCMem is 31% lower than FullTMR, the power consumption of the former scheme
is in the average 50% lower than the latter.
By applying the HCRegs&HCMem approach to HMAC, the reduction of memory and
register requirements were exactly the same as in SHA-2, i.e. 62% in the average. How-
ever, this scheme allowed for the achievement of even bigger savings in implementation
area and power consumption in the case of HMAC. Precisely, the implementation area of
HCRegs&HCMem is only 50% of the FullTMR one. Moreover, the former approach consumes
in the average 52% less power than the latter. In order to achieve such efficiency with
HCRegs&HCMem, it was necessary to compromise its throughput, which is 33% lower than
FullTMR. However, the throughput obtained with such a scheme may be sufficient for most
space applications.
These results show that the utilization of information redundancy to protect registers
and memory elements can lead to efficient fault tolerant implementations of HMAC. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first proposal of fault tolerant techniques for the keyed-
hash message authentication code in the literature. We have shown that the proposed
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scheme become even more effective than FullTMR as the algorithm complexity increases.
In spite of that, it is necessary to conduct an SEU resistance analysis before finally arguing
that HCRegs&HCMem can successfully replace FullTMR in the implementation of HMAC in
space applications.
A resistance analysis for evaluating the fault tolerance mechanisms is proposed and
discussed in Chapter 8. Besides, next chapter also presents a quantitative approach to




Resistance against SEUs is another crucial factor to be considered when designing digital
hardware for space systems. This chapter introduces a method based upon probability of
failure for evaluating the resistance against SEUs of the fault tolerant schemes introduced
in Chapters 6 and 7. Besides, a comprehensive analysis of memory and register resistance
is performed for all fault tolerant designs of SHA-2 and HMAC. In addition, a normalized
analysis is also performed which takes TMR as a reference model. In summary, this
chapter shows that the proposed scheme based on information redundancy provides not
only implementation efficiency, but also higher resistance against SEUs than the traditional
TMR approach.
8.1 Probability of Failure
The resistance analysis proposed in this chapter is based on the probability of failure of
memory and registers. Such an analysis takes into account the total amount of resources
available in a given device, implementation requirements and frequency of operation of
each design as well as an hypothetical bit-flip rate. Since the bit-flip rate would vary with
the environment in which the hardware device is operating, it is taken as literal variables
that can be easily substituted for precise results. Moreover, the proposed probability of
failure allows for different fault tolerant schemes to be compared. The strategy relies on the
comparison with a reference model and is denoted as normalized analysis. The following
sections take FullTMR as a reference model since this has been a traditional fault tolerance
scheme employed in space applications.
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It is important to mention that this probability of failure analysis was first proposed
in [93] and [91]. However, the frequency of operation of the hardware modules were not
taken into account in those publications. As a consequence, the accuracy of the resis-
tance analysis ends up being compromised. That happens because faster modules, such as
FullTMR, usually execute their computations in less time than other approaches, i.e. they
leave their registers and memories exposed to bit-flips for a shorter period time. Although
high performance is the main advantage of employing modular redundancy, it can be ar-
gued, though, that the robustness of each individual approach should be determined by
employing the same frequency of operation. In any case, by considering different frequen-
cies of operation, FullTMR, the reference model, will be situated in its best operational
scenario. Thus, if other schemes can be shown to be more resistant than FullTMR in this
context, the same conclusion can be drawn when all modules operate at the same frequency.
It is assumed that only one fault tolerant design is implemented per device and that the
device resources are utilized uniformly. It is further assumed that the hardware devices
are subject to the same bit-flip rate. Also, as just explained, all modules run at their
maximum frequency of operation. The following literals are employed in the probability
of failure equations:
Therefore, the following terms are defined:
M : Total memory resources in bits,
R : Total number of registers in bits,
m : Used memory resources in bits,
r : Used registers in bits,
ω : Bit-flip rate per memory bit per second,
ε : Bit-flip rate per register bit per second,
F : Frequency of operation (Hz),
nS : Period of time in which bit-flips may occur expressed in number of clock cycles
for a given scheme S,
l : Total number of memory bits employed by an individual encoded word,
t : Total number of register bits utilized by a trio of registers,
i : Number of clock cycles without performing error detection and correction,
g : Number of bits employed by an individual encoded register,
P (X1) : Probability of the first bit-flip in X, where X can be either memory or
register elements,
P (X2) : Probability of the second bit-flip in X,
P (FM) : Probability of a memory failure,
P (FR) : Probability of a register failure.
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These definitions and conditions for failure allows for the determination of the individual
probability of failure of memory and register elements for each fault tolerant scheme.
In order to compute the probability of bit-flips (P (X1) and P (X2)) the bit-flip rate ω
(ε) is expected to cause no more than a single memory (register) bit-flip within the time
frame nS/F . Therefore, conditions (nSω)/F ≤ 1 and (nSε)/F ≤ 1 must be obeyed while
computing the probability of failure of each fault tolerant scheme.
8.1.1 Triple Modular Redundancy
In this scheme a failure will occur if two bit-flips happen in two different modules during
the processing. In this case the voter would receive three different values from the modules
and therefore would not be able to determine the correct output. Notice, however, that if
two bit-flips happen in the exact same module, the voter will receive only one corrupted
computation result and will be able to determine the correct output. It doesn’t matter
if the bit-flips happened in two registers, two memory elements, or even one bit-flip in a
register and another one in a memory element.
In order to determine the memory resistance, it is assumed that the triplicated memory
utilizes m bits out of the total M bits available in the device; that the device is subject to
a bit-flip rate ω; that error detection and correction is performed after n clock cycles; and
that the module runs at its maximum frequency of operation F . Figure 8.1(a) represents
such assumptions.
(a) (b)
Figure 8.1: SEU Resistance Analysis for FullTMR’s Memory (and Registers)
Considering that the memory modules themselves do not rely on any fault tolerant
mechanism, a single bit-flip in the contents of one of these memories causes the computation
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of the corresponding NoFT module to become corrupted. The probability of the first bit-flip
to happen in m memory bits during the n clock cycles taken by the processing is given
by P (M1) = mnω/(MF ). The first bit-flip is represented by an X in Figure 8.1(b). The
computation of the corresponding module (represented in black) is compromised.
A second bit-flip in any other location of the other two memories (2m/3 bits), as
represented in dark gray in Figure 8.1(b), compromises the entire FullTMR scheme. The
probability of failure of the second bit-flip is given by P (M2) = 2mnω/(3MF ).
Therefore, the probability of a memory failure is given by
P (FM) = 2m
2n2ω2/(3M2F 2). (8.1)
The same condition for failure applies to the registers; in order to have a register failure
in FullTMR it is necessary to have a first bit-flip in a register of one of the modules and a
second bit-flip in any of the registers of the other two modules. The condition for failure
assumes that r register bits are used out of the total R, that n clock cycles are spent before
error detection and correction is performed, along with a bit-flip rate ε.
The probability of the first bit-flip to happen in the r register bits is determined by
P (R1) = rnε/(RF ), whereas the probability of the second register bit-flip (in the remaining
2r/3 bits) is given by P (R2) = 2rnε/(3RF ).
As a result, the probability of register failure is
P (FR) = 2r
2n2ε2/(3R2F 2). (8.2)
8.1.2 TMR for Registers and Encoded Memory
In this scheme, fault tolerance is obtained by encoding each memory word with Hamming
codes. The main advantage of this approach is that each encoded word tolerates up to one
bit-flip without leading to a failure. The condition for memory failure in TMRRegs&HCMem
is to have two bit-flips happening in the same encoded word, within the n clock cycles
required by the computation. It is assumed an usage of m memory bits out of the total M
available together with a bit-flip rate of ω, as shown in Figure 8.2(a).
Therefore, the probability of having the first bit-flip in any of the memory bits, as
represented by an X in Figure 8.2(b), is P (M1) = mnω/(MF ).
Given that each memory position is encoded individually, the condition for failure is
to have a second bit-flip exactly in the same encoded word that received the first bit-flip.
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(a) (b)
Figure 8.2: SEU Resistance Analysis for TMRRegs&HCMem’s Memory
Assume that each encoded memory location utilizes l bits and that the first bit-flip, repre-
sented by the black box in Figure 8.2(b), happened in one of these l bits. Then, a failure will
happen if a second bit-flip happens in the remaining (l−1) bits, as illustrated in dark gray
in Figure 8.2(b). Thus, the probability of a second bit-flip is P (M2) = (l − 1)nω/(MF ).
The final probability of having a memory failure in TMRRegs&HCMem is given by
P (FM) = m(l − 1)n2ω2/(M2F 2). (8.3)
Due to the employment of TMR at the register level, bit-flips happening in each trio
of registers are masked out by the voters in every clock cycle. Hence, in order to cause a
register failure in TMRRegs&HCMem, two bit-flips must occur, in the same clock cycle, in two
different registers pertaining to a trio. In this case, the corresponding voter would not be
able to decide for the correct result.
Consider a total register usage of r bits out of R bits available and a register bit-flip
rate of ε, as illustrated in Figure 8.3(a). The probability of the first register bit-flip, that
can happen in any of the r register bits, is given by P (R1) = rε/(RF ).
Assuming that a trio of registers occupies t bits and that one of these registers suffered
a bit-flip, as represented by a black box with an X in Figure 8.3(b). Thus, the probability
of having a second register corrupted in the trio (2t/3 bits), as represented in dark gray in
Figure 8.3(b), is determined by P (R2) = 2tε/(3RF ).
Therefore, the final probability of register failure is




Figure 8.3: SEU Resistance Analysis for TMRRegs&HCMem’s Registers
8.1.3 Encoded Registers and Memory
The HCRegs&HCMem scheme employs Hamming codes to protect the memory, similarly to
TMRRegs&HCMem. Therefore, the probability of having a memory failure is given by Equa-
tion 8.3, i.e. P (FM) = 2m
2n2ω2/(3M2F 2).
The register resistance analysis presented next is based on one HMAC computation
with a 1-block key and 1-block text. The condition for a register failure is to have two
bit-flips in the same encoded register while they are in their idle period, i.e. within the i
clock cycles where no error detection and correction is not performed.
During the HMAC processing the maximum idle period is faced by the K0 Opad Hash.
This register is written in the end of the NewKeyHash stage and read in the beginning of
KeyOpadHash stage, which also loads its value onto W . Thus, the condition for failure is
to have two bit-flips in the same register within that time frame.
Assume that the encoded registers employ r bits out of the R bits available and consider
a bit-flip rate of ε, as illustrated in Figure 8.4(a). Then, the probability of the first bit-flip
in these r register bits is P (R1) = riε/(RF ).
Consider that a bit-flip occurred in one of the g bits of the encoded register, as shown
by an X in Figure 8.4(b). A failure will occur if a second bit is flipped in the same encoded
register during i clock cycles. Then, as represented in dark gray in Figure 8.4(b), the
second bit-flip must happen in one of the (g−1) remaining bits. Therefore, the probability
of failure of the second bit-flip is given by P (R2) = r(g − 1)iε/(RF ).
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Thus, the probability of register failure in HCRegs&HCMem is given by
P (FR) = r(g − 1)ε2i2/(R2F 2). (8.5)
(a) (b)
Figure 8.4: SEU Resistance Analysis for HCRegs&HCMem’s Registers
8.2 Quantitative Analysis
The probability of failure of each scheme is computed by taking into account device-specific
parameters such as total number of registers (R) and memory (M) bits. The device utilized
for the hardware implementations is an Altera CycloneII EP2C35F672C6 FPGA, whose
M and R parameters are respectively 33216 and 483840 bits. Memory (m) and register
(r) requirements of each fault tolerant scheme applied to SHA-2 are shown in Tables 6.1
and 6.2, respectively. In turn, HMAC memory and register requirements are reported
in Tables 7.1 and 7.2, respectively. Parameters employed in the equations defining the
probability of failure are listed in Table 8.1. Bit-flip rates ε and ω are treated as literals
since they are common for all designs.
8.2.1 Memory Resistance Results
The probability of memory failure can be determined by utilizing the parameters listed in
Tables 6.1, 7.1 and 8.1 along with Equations 8.1 and 8.3. Table 8.2 shows the probability
of memory failure, in terms of ω2, for all fault tolerant schemes considered in this work.
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Table 8.1: Resistance Analysis Parameters
Parameter SHA- HMAC/SHA-
256 512 256 512
M 33216
R 483840
nFullTMR (cycles) 64 80 260 324
nTMRRegs&HCMem (cycles) 64 80 260 324
nHCRegs&HCMem (cycles) 64 80 264 328
l (bits) 38 71 38 71
t (bits) 96 192 96 192
i (cycles) 60 76 139 171
g (bits) 38 71 38 71
Table 8.2: Probability of Memory Failure
SHA- HMAC/SHA-
Scheme 256 512 256 512
(x10−3ω2)
FullTMR 0.10133 1.47960 1.75710 24.06252
TMRRegs&HCMem 0.00084 0.00845 0.01331 0.12733
HCRegs&HCMem 0.00088 0.00919 0.01341 0.14107
As can be observed in Table 8.2, the probability of failure of FullTMR SHA-256 and
SHA-512 are respectively 0.10133x10−3ω2 and 1.4796x10−3ω2. In the case of applying
FullTMR to HMAC/SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-512 their probabilities of memory failure
become respectively 1.7571x10−3ω2 and 24.06252x10−3ω2.
In turn, TMRRegs&HCMem and HCRegs&HCMem provide similar probabilities of memory
failure since both use exactly the same strategy to encode the memory. For instance,
HCRegs&HCMem SHA-256 and SHA-512 have probabilities of memory failure 0.0088x10−3ω2
and 0.00919x10−3ω2, respectively. In turn, HMAC/SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-512 have
probabilities of memory failure 0.01341x10−3ω2 and 0.14107x10−3ω2, respectively.
In general, the probability of memory failure increases as the modules get more complex.
Put differently, the more memory that is employed, the higher the number of bits that
can be flipped. By the same token, the slower the frequency of operation the larger the
processing time frame and so the more likely to have bits flipped during operation. Thus,
one interesting aspect to be analyzed is how the probability of memory failure of each fault
tolerance scheme behaves as more memory bits and more clock cycles are employed by
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the hardware modules. This can be accomplished through a cross-comparison among the
probability of memory failures shown in Table 8.2.
The first cross-comparison evaluates the probability of memory failure of SHA-256
modules against the SHA-512 ones, as well as HMAC/SHA-256 against HMAC/SHA-512.
When employing FullTMR the probability of memory failure of modules utilizing the
SHA-512 hash function is in the average 14.2 times higher than the ones utilizing SHA-256.
In the case of HCRegs&HCMem, the increase of probability of memory failure is 10.5 times,
in the average.
The second scenario compares SHA-256 with HMAC/SHA-256, as well as SHA-512 with
HMAC/SHA-512. When using FullTMR, HMAC modules have an average probability of
memory failure 16.8 times higher than that of SHA-2 modules. By the same token, the
average probability of memory failure of HMAC utilizing HCRegs&HCMem is 15.3 times higher
than SHA-2.
Since TMR is widely used in space applications, it can be taken as a reference model
to perform a normalized analysis of the probability of memory failure. As Table 8.3
shows, the utilization of Hamming codes allowed for the memory to become more than
110 times as resistant as FullTMR. For instance, the utilization of HCRegs&HCMem to imple-
ment SHA-512 made its memory 161 times more resistant than the memory of FullTMR.
Moreover, the former fault tolerance scheme allowed for the memory of HMAC/SHA-512 to
become 171 timer more resistant than the FullTMR. Even better results are obtained with
TMRRegs&HCMem, however, such an approach leads to high utilization of implementation
area, as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.
Table 8.3: Normalized Memory Resistance Comparison
SHA- HMAC/SHA-
Scheme 256 512 256 512
(Times more resistant)
FullTMR 1 1 1 1
TMRRegs&HCMem 121 175 132 189
HCRegs&HCMem 116 161 131 171
8.2.2 Register Resistance Results
The probability of register failure is also determined by utilizing parameters listed in Ta-
bles 6.2, 7.2 and 8.1, together with Equations 8.2, 8.4 and 8.5. The probability of register
failure, in terms of ε2, for all fault tolerant schemes are shown in Table 8.4.
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Table 8.4: Probability of Register Failure
SHA- HMAC/SHA-
Scheme 256 512 256 512
(x10−3ε2)
FullTMR 4.24695 41.51328 372.82598 3267.60837
TMRRegs&HCMem 0.00008 0.00050 0.00018 0.00102
HCRegs&HCMem 0.37898 3.16266 0.81187 6.66147
The utilization of FullTMR leads to probabilities of register failure 4.24695x10−3ε2 and
41.51328x10−3ε2, respectively, for SHA-256 and SHA-512. As the register usage and
processing time increase, so does the probability of register failure. For instance, the
probabilities of register failure in HMAC/SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-512 are respectively
372.82598x10−3ε2 and 3267.60837x10−3ε2.
If TMRRegs&HCMem is utilized, the probability of register failure becomes extremely low
for both SHA-2 and HMAC/SHA-2 modules. Such a low probability of register failure
results from error detection and correction being performed in every clock cycle. However,
as discussed before, implementation area is the main drawback of this approach.
Besides benefits in implementation area and power consumption, the proposed approach
HCRegs&HCMem also provides higher register resistance. The probability of register failure of
the SHA-256 module is 0.37898x10−3ε2, whereas it is 3.16266x10−3ε2 for SHA-512. With
regard to HMAC/SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-512 modules, their respective probabilities
of register failure are 0.81187x10−3ε2 and 6.66147x10−3ε2.
Again, it is interesting to realize a cross-comparison between SHA-256 and SHA-512
modules, as well as between HMAC/SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-512. When FullTMR is
employed, the probability of register failure of modules using SHA-512 is in the average
9.3 times higher than the ones utilizing SHA-256. In turn, such a probability of register
failure is increased, in the average, 8.3 times when HCRegs&HCMem is utilized.
Surprisingly, if SHA-256 is compared with HMAC/SHA-256 an average increase of
83.3 times in the probability of register failure is observed when employing FullTMR. The
same results are obtained when comparing SHA-512 with HMAC/SHA-512. In the case
of HCRegs&HCMem, the probability of register failure is increased, in the average, only 2.1
times. This interesting result shows the robustness of the proposed fault tolerant scheme.
In other words, FullTMR faces a higher increase in the probability of failure as the register
requirements increases, whereas HCRegs&HCMem keeps such a probability of register failure
at much lower levels in the same conditions.
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A normalized register resistance comparison is listed in Table 8.5. TMRRegs&HCMem
leads to extremely high resistance against SEUs, which can achieve 3x106 in the case of
HMAC/SHA-512. This robustness comes at the price of higher requirements in implemen-
tation area.
On the other hand, HCRegs&HCMem allows for reduced implementation requirements
and increased resistance against SEUs compared to the previous approaches. For instance,
when SHA-256 and SHA-512 employs this approach their registers became 11 and 13 times
more resistant than the registers of FullTMR. Even better results are obtained as the register
requirements increase. Precisely, HCRegs&HCMem makes the registers of HMAC/SHA-256
and HMAC/SHA-512 respectively 459 and 491 times more resistant than when employing
FullTMR.
Table 8.5: Normalized Register Resistance Comparison
SHA- HMAC/SHA-
Scheme 256 512 256 512
(Times more resistant)
FullTMR 1 1 1 1
TMRRegs&HCMem 50x103 82x103 2x106 3x106
HCRegs&HCMem 11 13 459 491
It is important to mention that HCRegs&HCMem allows for a more uniform execution of
error detection and correction, causing the approach to be less dependent on the register
size and number of algorithm iterations, as shown in the previous analyses. Besides, this
approach represents a first proposal of a mechanisms for both error detection and correction
for SHA-2 and HMAC.
8.3 Summary
This chapter introduces a resistance analysis against SEUs based on the probability of
failure of memory and registers. By taking into account device properties and implementa-
tion results, it was possible to perform a quantitative analysis for each of the fault tolerant
techniques proposed in the previous chapters. For the sake of comparison, FullTMR was
taken as a reference model therefore allowing for a normalized resistance analysis to be
performed as well as for a direct comparison with the traditional scheme used in space.
The benefits of using an encoded memory is twofold. Besides utilizing less memory
bits, the memory became more resistant against SEUs. For instance, the least resistance
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using of encoded memories is due HCRegs&HCMem SHA-256, but in this case the mem-
ory is 116 times more resistant than that of FullTMR. The highest resistance is obtained
with TMRRegs&HCMem HMAC/SHA-512, whose memory is 189 times more resistant than
FullTMR.
Regarding register resistance, TMRRegs&HCMem offers the highest level of protection
against SEUs. However, the downside of this scheme is its demand in terms of imple-
mentation area, which is higher than FullTMR. On the other hand, HCRegs&HCMem offers
a high protection against SEUs, with reduced area and power requirements in comparison
with FullTMR. For example, HCRegs&HCMem allows for the register resistance of SHA-512
to be 13 times higher than the one obtained through FullTMR. The register resistance
provided by HCRegs&HCMem becomes even higher as the module complexity and number of
register increase. For instance, this scheme allows for the register of HMAC/SHA-512 to
become 491 times more resistant than FullTMR.
These results show that information redundancy not only leads to efficiency in imple-
mentation requirements, but also offers higher levels of protection to memory and registers
elements. Therefore, HCRegs&HCMem is an appropriate fault tolerant mechanism to success-
fully replace FullTMR in the implementation of SHA-2 and HMAC/SHA-2 cryptographic
primitives in FPGAs.
Next chapter provides the reader with a discussion on the fault tolerant schemes for
hardware implementation of SHA-2 and HMAC. Moreover, it includes a comprehensive
comparison in terms of implementation requirements of the proposed mechanisms with
TMR which has been traditionally used in space.
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Chapter 9
Discussions, Conclusions and Future
Work
This chapter presents discussions on the trusted platform for spacecraft recovery as well as
on the fault tolerant schemes for SHA-2 and HMAC proposed in this research. Comparisons
with related work is performed whenever possible, although not many similar work could
be found in the literature that could be directly compared to this research. Besides,
conclusions are presented which aims at answering the open questions on space security
that were posed in the introduction.
9.1 Trusted Platform
Traditional trusted platform modules [43, 20, 45, 110] have relied on a set of cryptographic
primitives that are well suited for general-purpose desktops and laptops. Even so, there
are multiple issues in the employment of such TPMs in space. First, these TPMs should be
made fault tolerant in order to cope with the harsh environment found in space. Although
TPMs can provide a wide variety of cryptographic functions, it cannot be reutilized as a
recovery platform as currently needed in space applications.
The trusted platform proposed in this research has been designed with fault tolerance
in mind, so that it can be employed in space systems. A set of fault tolerance mechanisms
have been devised, such as encoding of memory elements and data being processed within
the platform, as well as an automated secret synchronization mechanism. Furthermore,
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the proposed platform was devised to be able to recover the computational platform in
case of major failures and attacks.
Furthermore, the standard TPM has employed RSA to perform encryption and sig-
natures, as well as on SHA-1 as the cryptographic hash algorithm. It should be noticed
that the scientific community working with space security has no formal position on the
utilization of asymmetric primitives in space due to the computational requirements and
key management infrastructure demanded by asymmetric primitives. Symmetric encryp-
tion primitives, in turn, have been considered by the Consultative Committee for Space
Data Systems (CCSDS) to be adopted as a space standard [28, 29]. Besides RSA, stan-
dard TPM specification also relies on SHA-1 algorithms as cryptographic hash functions.
However, space missions usually face a long time frame from the time of their conception
to the moment they are actually deployed to operate in space. Such a time frame is usually
a couple of years and may even reach decades. Thus, the utilization of older and poten-
tially weaker cryptographic algorithms seems not to be the best choice for mission concepts
targeting years, or even decades, of operations in space. Specially if it is taken into con-
sideration the difficulty in updating a computation platform that is already deployed into
space. Therefore, whenever possible, newer and more secure algorithms should be utilized
if such a platform is intended to operate in space for long periods of time. Hence, SHA-2
algorithms are considered in this research, as well as message authentication codes based
upon HMAC/SHA-2.
In [143] a scheme is proposed to generate keys based on features and properties directly
associated with the actual spacecraft. Unfortunately this work does not provide any details
on how such an on-board key generation should be performed. Additionally, it assumes
that an attacker never has access to such pieces of information. On the contrary, if an
attacker gains information about the spacecraft subsystems and features, he/she could
break the entire system by generating identical cryptographic keys by him/herself.
The trusted recovery proposed in this research not only shows how a trusted reset
can be performed, but also how to securely recover cryptographic keys stored within the
trusted modules. Moreover, even if an attacker has direct access to the trusted modules,
it cannot perform any better than conducting an exhaustive search. However, such an
attack has been shown to be infeasible. The proposed approach achieves both security and
implementation simplicity so that it can be efficiently employed in emergency commanding
during contingency situations.
The approach utilized in the system recovery are based on the challenge-response pro-
tocol [106, 167] commonly used ground-based network settings. Moreover, this protocol
associated with the one-time secrets have similar functionality to one-time-passwords [106].
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However, differently from the challenge-response protocol proposed in [167], the protocol
utilized in this research does not rely on HMAC, but on xor functions. From another
perspective, the random number generated by the spacecraft, along with the xor func-
tion and the one-time secret sent by the control center resembles an one-time pad system.
The difference from ground-based systems is that the proposed mechanism relies on an
on-board trusted platform capable of storing one-time secrets that cannot be discovered
by unauthentic users.
The challenge-response protocol together with communications delays between the
spacecraft and the ground station are used in favor of providing higher security to the
scheme. On the one hand, a valid control center has to execute the protocol only once,
which results in relatively fast recoveries. On the other hand, a potential attacker is forced
to spend considerable amounts of time while going though the protocol every time he/she
tries to compromise the system. Is has been shown that an exhaustive search would take
8.82x1066 years to be performed against a LEO satellite, independently of the computa-
tional power of the attacker. Therefore, a high security level is achieved by the trusted
module approach.
The challenge-response protocol imposes crescent recovery delays that grow proportion-
ally to the distance between the ground station and the spacecraft. Unlike ground-based
networks, where communication can be performed very quickly, a 3-way communication
with the spacecraft orbiting Mars, for instance, would take about 39 minutes. Considering
the mission concept adopted, this delay may not be acceptable by ground controllers. It
is important to emphasize that the utilization of such a protocol is not mandatory. Thus,
mission planners and operators have the option of utilizing an one-way communication
with the spacecraft to send one-time secrets. Notice, however, that in this case an attacker
can perform an exhaustive search by sending to spacecraft one one-time secrets after the
other. The only limitation is the processing time within the trusted platform, which is
below a hundred nanoseconds. Therefore, if such one-way communication approach is to
be utilized, the size of the one-time secrets would have to be increased accordingly, so that
an exhaustive search attack is still infeasible. Consequently, more on-board storage will be
necessary to implement the secrets table.
The proposed trusted platform can be used to thwart all capabilities of an attacker as
considered in the threat model presented in Section 4.3.1. An attacker can indeed listen
to all RF signals employed in the recovery protocol, such as the random r (and r′) as
well as r ⊕ s (and r′ ⊕ n). Therefore, it is trivial for an attacker to compute s (and n).
However, any replay attack is thwarted by the one-time use of secrets, which are destroyed
by the trusted module right after their utilization. Besides, although an attacker can build
a message in a valid data format and send it to the spacecraft, he/she can perform no
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better than guess a valid one-time secret. The attacker can launch an exhaustive search
attack, but this approach has been shown to be infeasible.
If an attacker happens to gain control of the computation platform by either exploring
a security bug or breaking a cryptographic mechanism, it is still possible for operators
to regain control of the spacecraft. This is possible even when such an intruder has re-
configured the untrusted computational platform. The trusted configuration relies on a
secure bus path to check the integrity of SDRAM and the FPGA configuration, which
cannot be altered by an attacker. Besides, given a direct hardware connection with the
communication modules there is no means for an attacker to disrupt the communication
with the control center. Therefore, if any on-board component is tampered, the control
center will necessarily be informed. As a consequence, procedures can be initiated to bring
the computational platform to a safe state.
Ground-based network settings can usually rely on abundant implementation resources,
power supply, computational power, and high bandwidth. This is not the scenario en-
countered by spaceborne systems, which require very constrained implementations. For
instance, the FPGA (Altera CycloneII EP2C35F672C6 [38]) utilized to implement the
trusted modules has a total of 33,216LEs and 483,840 RAM bits. In respect to implemen-
tation area the TRM and TKM modules utilize about 5% and 7%, respectively, of the
total LEs available in this FPGA. Storage for one-time secrets of TRM and TKM have uti-
lized respectively 14% and 21% of the FPGA’s memory elements. Besides, the maximum
dynamic power consumption is less than 41mW. The relatively low power consumption is
due to simple operations involved with the recovery, which are basically memory accesses,
additions, and a few logical operations. furthermore, low bandwidth is required by the re-
covery mechanisms given that each communication with the spacecraft does not take more
than the secret size utilized, independently of a reset or key recovery being performed.
9.2 Fault Tolerant SHA-2 and HMAC
This section highlights the most important improvements brought by the proposed fault
tolerant schemes based on information redundancy. Due to the lack of similar work on
error detection and correction, the most appropriate strategy to compare the proposed
approach with is TMR.
As listed in Tables 6.1 and 7.1, the employment of Hamming codes to encode the mem-
ory allows for 60% savings in memory requirements for both SHA-256 and HMAC/SHA-256
in comparison with FullTMR. In the case of SHA-512 and HMAC/SHA-512 the savings
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reached 63%. Likewise, HCRegs&HCMem allows for the same savings (in %) in relation to
FullTMR through the utilization of encoded registers, as shown in Tables 6.2 and 7.2.
Certain trends in the implementation area of the fault tolerant modules can be observed
in Figure 9.1. As expected, FullTMR occupies about three times as much area as NoFT.
Understandably, TMRRegs&HCMem is slightly bigger than FullTMR due to the number of
voters employed. The best area efficiency is achieved with HCRegs&HCMem. This approach
utilizes in the average only 58% of the area of FullTMR.
Figure 9.1: SHA-2 and HMAC Graphical Comparison of Implementation Area
Undeniably, the fault tolerant mechanism provides the highest frequencies of operation
is FullTMR. That reflects on the throughput, which tends to be very close to the ones
obtained by NoFT, as can be observed in Figure 9.2. On the other hand, the average
throughput of HCRegs&HCMem represents a reduction of 35% when compared to FullTMR.
The HCRegs&HCMem scheme can provide an average power saving of 50% in comparison
with FullTMR, as graphically shown in Figure 9.3. These results represent a considerable
economy in the power consumption compared to the FullTMR traditionally employed in
space applications.
It is interesting to notice that, although TMRRegs&HCMem utilizes slightly more area
than FullTMR, the dynamic power consumption of the former is much lower than the
latter. In fact, the dynamic power consumption of TMRRegs&HCMem modules are similar to
the HCRegs&HCMem ones. That is explained by the fact that TMRRegs&HCMem employs LEs
exclusively to implement registers. Therefore, there is not much signal triggering caused
by the look-up tables of those LEs. As a consequence, their dynamic power consumption
end up being very low.
With regard to memory and register resistance, it can be observed that TMRRegs&HCMem
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Figure 9.2: SHA-2 and HMAC Graphical Comparison of Throughput
Figure 9.3: SHA-2 and HMAC Graphical Comparison of Dynamic Power Consumption
provides very high levels of protection against SEUs. However that comes at the cost of
utilizing more area than FullTMR. Also, the former approach provides lower throughput
than the latter one. Consequently, TMRRegs&HCMem does not result in a good trade-off in
terms of implementation parameters and resistance against SEUs.
In turn, the HCRegs&HCMem approach presents low probability of failure. Precisely,
the memory of SHA-512 and HMAC/SHA-512 using this fault tolerant scheme became
respectively 161 and 171 times more resistant than the FullTMR approach. Even higher
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resistance is obtained by the registers. Specifically, the registers of HMAC/SHA-512 em-
ploying HCRegs&HCMem became 491 times more resistant than when using FullTMR.
Another interesting aspect to be analyzed is the normalized resistance against SEUs
of each fault tolerant schemes when they are applied to different designs, and how much
more efficient they are in comparison with FullTMR. If the normalized memory resistance
of HMAC/SHA-2 is compared with the SHA-2 ones, it is possible to notice that the mem-
ory resistance of SHA-2 is higher than HMAC/SHA-2. Although both algorithms use the
same memory encoding scheme, HMAC requires much more iterations to perform its com-
putations than SHA-2. Consequently, the memory in HMAC is susceptible to SEUs for a
longer period of time therefore reducing its resistance to bit-flips. Therefore, HMAC faces
in higher probability of memory failure compared to SHA-2.
On the other hand, HMAC achieves higher normalized register resistance than SHA-2.
This comparison shows that, as the register requirements and processing time increase, the
HCRegs&HCMem scheme becomes more effective against SEUs compared to FullTMR. The
reason for such higher protection is that all registers are kept encoded all the time and
that error detection and correction is performed more often than FullTMR.
Regarding fault attacks, the proposed fault tolerant scheme may protect against some
attack models. As previously mentioned, the Hamming codes utilized in the hardware
implementation of SHA-2 and HMAC are capable of detecting and correcting single bit-
flips, and detecting two bit-flips. The following discussion considers that an attacker is
capable of performing a fault injection, which can be targeted into an individual bit or
larger portions of data. It is also assumed that such an attacker can set or reset the target
storage element. Besides, the following analysis is valid for both the trusted platform
and the fault tolerance scheme proposed in this research, given that both of them utilize
Hamming codes to protect the data being processed within the hardware module.
Memory elements are protected against single bit-flips and are assumed not to be re-
configured during the life time of the platform. As a result, if a bit happen to be tampered
by an attacker, it will remain in that state indefinitely. Therefore, an attacker is capable
of compromising the correct functioning of the memory by altering the state of a second
bit in such a way that the Hamming decoder would not be capable of correcting it. In this
case, the Hamming decoder would be capable, though, of detecting that two bit-flips have
happened. Moreover, since the considered attack model assumes that injected faults can
target multiple individual bits, an attacker can manipulate data bits and, in the sequence,
correct associated parity bits (used by the Hamming decoder to correct errors). In this
case, the maliciously encoded data would deceive the Hamming decoder, that would take
it as valid, while in fact it has been tampered by the attacker.
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Notice, however, that it has been assumed that no error detection and correction is
performed between two fault injections. Refreshing the encoded the memory, i.e. decoding
and re-encoding its data, from time to time would allow for bit-flips to be corrected.
However, it would continue to be exposed to fault injection between two refresh cycles.
Depending on the refresh rate, higher protection against fault injection can be obtained.
Although this method has not been considered in this research, it should be implemented
in two scenarios where: 1) fault injections are expected; 2) long periods of exposure to
radiation are expected.
In the case of registers, error detection and correction is performed very frequently. The
maximum period of time that the data becomes exposed to intentional or unintentional
bit-flips is during the encoded data idle period, as defined in Chapters 6 and 7. In order to
compromise the data stored in a register, an attacker would have to precisely inject faults
within a pre-determined time frame, which may last less than a few micro seconds. For
instance, the data idle period for SHA-512 is 76 clock cycles, while for HMAC/SHA-512
it reaches 171 clock cycles. If an attacker is able to inject faults in the desired positions
as well as correct the associated parity bits in such a short amount of time, he/she can
successfully mislead the Hamming decoder. On the contrary, the Hamming decoder can
correct single bit-flips and detect double bit-flips.
All in all, independently of the storage element (memory or register) the success of
attacks based on injection will depend on the time frame considered for error detection
and correction. It is important to remember that the proposed cryptographic mechanisms
are intended to operate in space, where physical access to the devices is extremely limited
(if not impossible). The main risk of suffering attacks, however, is in the pre-launch phase
while systems are still easily accessible on the ground.
9.3 Conclusions
The first problem addressed by this research is the recovery of spacecrafts from failures
and attacks. The approach utilized relies on the employment of trusted modules tailored
to space missions needs. Such a platform relies on a trusted integrity check of the compu-
tational platform as well as a direct connection with the communication modules, which
is resilient against the interference of attackers.
Trusted reset modules have been proposed to serve as a stepping stone in the recovery
of the spacecraft. Similarly, trusted key recovery modules are proposed to issue temporary
cryptographic keys so that a secured channel can be established with a control center after a
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platform recovery is performed. The trusted modules employ a scheme similar to one-time-
passwords to issue trusted resets, which is used in conjunction with a challenge-response
protocol. Exhaustive search attacks are the only known attack that can be performed
against the trusted modules. However, it has been shown that such an attack would take
up to 8.82x1066 years to be performed against a LEO satellite. Therefore, it is infeasible
for an attacker to break the system through exhaustive search. In spite of that, a trusted
reset or key recovery can be performed in less than 80ns by an authentic control center.
Additionally, the trusted modules include fault tolerance mechanisms such as encoded
memory and automated secret re-synchronization so that it can cope with radiation-
induced faults. Moreover, the simplicity of the trusted modules design favors efficient
hardware implementations. For instance, an FPGA implementation of trusted key recovery
module demands less than 2400LEs, requires less than 100KB of on-board storage, and con-
sumes less than 41mW. Besides, even though the challenge-response protocol contributes
to increased system security and decreased implementation requirements, its utilization is
not mandatory. Different missions concepts can discard the challenge-response protocol to
achieve even faster system recovery, with the drawback of utilizing larger one-time secrets
and therefore more on-board storage.
The second main problem addressed by this research is the achievement of efficient fault
tolerance for cryptographic primitives. Since the trusted modules demands integrity checks,
SHA-2 algorithms were adopted as the cryptographic hash functions. The proposed fault
tolerant scheme has been denoted as HCRegs&HCMem and employs information redundancy
to protect memory and registers. In order to evaluate how HCRegs&HCMem would behave as
the implementation requirements increases, the application of such a technique to HMAC
was also investigated. Besides, SHA-2 and HMAC algorithms can also be employed to
provide secured communications with spacecraft. Efficiency in the fault tolerance mecha-
nism is achieved by taking advantage of SHA-2 and HMAC features so that encoding and
decoding of information is minimized without compromising reliability. Furthermore, in
order to determine the resistance against SEUs achieved by each approach, an evaluation
metrics based on probability of failure was proposed so that it was possible to compare
different fault tolerant mechanisms.
Experimental results based on FPGA implementations have shown that HCRegs&HCMem
provides considerable savings in comparison with the traditional TMR. The proposed ap-
proach allowed for a reduction of up to 63% in memory and register requirements in com-
parison with TMR. Furthermore, average area savings in the order of 42% were achieved.
In the case of HMAC/SHA-512, the area savings reached 53% in comparison with TMR.
Moreover, the average power consumption could be reduced in 50%, with a maximum
saving of 53% in the case of HMAC/SHA-512. The drawback of this approach is that its
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throughput is, in the average, 39% lower than the ones provided by TMR. However, the
achieved throughput may be high enough for most space applications.
In spite of lower implementation requirements, HCRegs&HCMem also provides higher resis-
tance against SEUs than TMR. For instance, the memory of SHA-512 and HMAC/SHA-512
became respectively 161 and 171 times more resistant. By the same token, the registers of
SHA-512 is 13 times more resistance against SEUs. Even higher resistance is achieved in
HMAC/SHA-512, whose registers became 491 times more resistant than TMR. This also
shows that HCRegs&HCMem can provide higher level protection with low implementation re-
quirements as the algorithm complexity increases. Furthermore, it can successfully replace
TMR in FPGA implementations.
These results show that the utilization of information redundancy to protect registers
and memory elements can lead to efficient fault tolerant implementations of HMAC. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first proposal of fault tolerant techniques capable of
performing error detection and correction for SHA-2 and HMAC in the literature.
The provision of secure recovery mechanisms as well as efficient fault tolerant crypto-
graphic primitives can be considered as the first step towards achieving higher levels of
security in space applications. Therefore, the results of this research aims at supporting
the incorporation of on-board security mechanisms in order to meet the increasing security
requirements of modern space missions.
9.4 Future Work
Future work includes several research threads aiming at implementation-efficient and fault
tolerant security mechanisms for space applications. The first goal is to investigate the
utilization of trusted hardware modules to support on-board key derivation. Key deriva-
tion based on SHS and AES would be a first priority, given the widespread use of these
algorithms in secure communications. Besides, some platforms may already have an AES
module available, which would make it possible to reuse it for key derivation. Another
topic of research is the evaluation of the proposed fault tolerant mechanisms applied to
AES as well as to to SHA-3 as soon as the algorithm competition [136] is complete.
Due to the lack of a recommendation for key management targeting space applications,
this would be another topic of research. Therefore, it would be necessary to analyze a
key hierarchy consisting of multiple levels, where the lower level would session or traffic
keys, the next level up would be the key encryption keys (KEKs), with potential utilization
of additional levels for re-keying KEKs. Besides, this would include the definition of key
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lengths and corresponding crypto periods and scopes, i.e. keys required for authentication
and encryption of both command, tracking, telemetry as well as payload data.
Given the severe constraints in on-board computational power, limited bandwidth and
intermittent communications, public-key cryptography has not been traditionally consid-
ered to support key management in space applications. However, it would be important
to conduct a feasibility study of asymmetric primitives targeting the space segment so
that the space community can better understand what to use and what not to use for key
management in the space setting.
Another important aspect in future space missions, specially in deep space missions,
is spacecraft autonomy. This feature is also important in LEO/GEO during contingency
situations. Therefore, it would be crucial to investigate how rovers, satellites and probes
could collaborate to perform key agreement, assuming minimum or none interaction with
a control center. Secret sharing schemes [150] would be considered candidates to perform
key agreement based on virtual conferences.
Finally, yet another research topic includes the improvement of the trusted platform to
permit secure reconfiguration of algorithms and on-board secrets/keying material. Post-
launch reconfiguration not only allows for higher flexibility of the on-board key management
system. It also plays an important role in allowing for the extension of space missions
lifetimes, which has become very common in the last couple of years.
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